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Abstract
Islamist women have become increasingly visible in politics in Egypt over the last 
decade. What can explain their increased political participation? This thesis examines 
women's participation in a case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. I do so by 
the use of qualitative interviews with Islamist women in Cairo as well as an extensive 
review of previous research. In doing so, the relationship between Islamism and the 
development of women's political rights is explored. The empirical evidence is 
considered in a democratization perspective and assessed by the use of three different 
theoretical approaches to democratization. This assessment suggests that the 
integrating, bottom-up means by which the Muslim Brotherhood has contested 
political power in Egypt has been the main cause of women's increased political 
participation in the movement.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Research question: Stating the puzzle
There is an apparent paradox that embodies itself in Islamist women who participate in 
politics in Egypt. They support and represent movements which are often claimed to 
oppress women with their Islamic ideology. Even under threat of violent repression by 
the formerly authoritarian regimes, at election times they throw in their weight in 
numbers that secular parties can only dream of. And the movements, which are so 
often called a threat to women's rights, have increasingly acknowledged women as 
political actors by fielding them as candidates for national elections. Meanwhile 
decision-making remains a male prerogative within the selfsame movements that 
women represent politically. How do we understand this? What can explain women’s 
increasing political participation in Islamist movements in Egypt? That is the research 
question I aim to investigate in this thesis.
Islamist women's increased political participation is an observable pattern when 
we look at how Islamist women have increasingly been involved in election campaigns 
and political demonstrations in Egypt and other Arab countries over the last decade, 
and how some have even ran as candidates representing Islamist movements in 
elections (see Abdellatif  and Ottaway 2007). Yet Islamist women's political 
participation is a phenomenon that has largely gone overlooked. I believe this is 
because of persistent stereotypes about Muslim women in general and Islamism as a 
movement in particular. At worst, their participation has been recognized but not 
acknowledged. By this I mean that women's activism has been observed but an 
acknowledgement of their agency denied them, as their activism has been explained in 
terms of structures and the strategies of the Islamist movements or the regimes they 
oppose, which are all invariably led by men. Islamist women's political activism has 
been seen as serving an essentially male project, and therefore they have been 
considered co-opted or deceived, because of the apparent mismatch between their 
activism and what others deem to be in their best interests. There is also a tendency to 
think that structural oppression (be it political, economic, religious or cultural) limits 
2not only women's choices but also their agency. I believe that Islamist women are 
rational actors who make informed choices about how they wish to live their lives and 
participate in society, and I wish to challenge these perceptions as I examine why they 
increasingly participate in politics.
1.2 Why is this worth investigating?
This thesis is essentially about Islamism and women's rights in Egypt, a country which 
is undergoing dramatic political changes. I see Islamist women's realization of their 
right to political participation as a case within a larger debate on how democracy and 
democratic rights can or should be developed in Egypt, and what role Islamism plays 
in this. It is a timely issue to address considering the circumstances of the Arab Spring. 
As the language of democratization is dominating the political discourse in Egypt 
today, my hope is that this thesis will be conducive towards an ongoing debate about 
Islamism and the role of women in the context of democratization.
What is democratization? It can be defined as a process, a demand, a set of 
changes, an utopia, and the list goes on (Grugel 2002: 4). As I understand it in this 
paper, the people in Egypt demanded democracy with the January 25 revolution in 
2011. After the fall of Mubarak, ensuring the people's right to political participation 
and self-determination is the primary goal of the continuing popular revolution. This is 
the “freedom” of “freedom, justice and bread” which protesters started chanting for on 
January 25 2011 when the so-called revolution started. The successful overthrow of 
Mubarak sparked a process of political change that can thus be described as an attempt 
at democratization, which I define as a process of changing a political system to better 
meet the aim of democracy. What is this aim of democracy? According to Beetham, 
most people today agree that it is “popular control of public affairs based on political 
equality” (quoted in Törnquist 2004: 201). Importantly to this thesis, this means that 
there should be political equality also between the genders. 
While women had been on the front lines of the January 25 revolution in Egypt, 
their presence was not guaranteed in political decision-making afterward, where old 
and new actors are still competing for power. The parliamentary elections held at the 
3turn of the year in 2011/2012 resulted in an exceptionally low number of women being 
elected into parliament. Although the elections were largely deemed free and fair, 
obviously the women of Egypt do not yet have the possibility or capacity to be 
represented through this important democratic institution on the same basis as men. It 
may feel problematic to single out women's rights as an area of focus in a process of 
political transformation where the rights of the whole population are at stake. Indeed, 
women in Egypt have been told explicitly to put the fate of their nation first and voice 
their gender-specific concerns later. As one male informant phrased it to me during my 
fieldwork in Cairo, what is the point of being empowered if the military is still running 
the country? However, the same informant had the insight to see what many others are 
missing; that this argument goes both ways. How can we fight authoritarian rule, 
whether civilian or military, without also promoting the political rights of all citizens 
based on the principle of equality?
I have chosen to focus on the Islamist women for two reasons; the first is the 
dominant position the Islamists enjoy in Egyptian politics after the 2011 uprising, and 
the second is the particularly contentious relationship Islamists are claimed to have 
with women's rights. In a way this makes Islamist women's political participation the 
“least likely case” of women's rights promoters in the sense that if Islamists are able to 
promote women's political participation, other groups should be able to do the same.
Free and fair elections that result in an almost all-male parliament is a warning 
sign of insubstantial democratization because women are not represented. It may well 
be expected and understandable due to the particular historical, cultural and social 
context; all the same, it is a warning that needs to be taken seriously if one indeed aims 
at achieving true democracy. Women's rights is an issue over which the West and the 
East often lock horns and get stuck in debates over means – usually prescribed by the 
West as universally valid and rejected by the East as conflicting with local traditions 
and culture. While we may disagree on the means by which this aim should be 
achieved – and the West in particular could well assume a less normative stance on 
these means – we should be able to assess them fairly by examining how they 
contribute towards the aim of democracy.
By looking at Islamist women's political participation in this paper I also 
4investigate means towards fulfilling women's right to political participation, which is 
crucial to ensure the political equality which democracy should be based on. My 
approach is not to compare how Islamist movements may promote women's political 
participation compared to an ideal of “how it should be done”, but rather measuring to 
which degree the means they apply promote the aim of democracy; popular control of 
public affairs based on political equality – also between the genders. To focus on the 
promotion of this right is different from simply assessing whether women's rights in 
Egypt are fulfilled. This is less interesting as the democratization process is in such 
early stages. It is more interesting to examine whether these measures actually bring us 
closer to a democracy based on political equality between the genders in Egypt.
1.3 Promoting women's rights?
The phenomenon of Islamist women's growing political activism in Egypt raises new 
debates within Islamist movements and can potentially have a strong influence on how 
women's rights are understood and promoted in the Muslim world. It is a phenomenon 
which has not received due recognition, also because it contradicts the Western (and 
indeed secular Arab) idea of who the true supporters of women's rights are.
Women have long been important in Islamist organizations because they 
provide a huge resource for mobilization purposes. Organizations such as Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt put a lot of effort 
into building large and strong organizations that have a very wide outreach potential in 
the population, including a network of charitable organizations providing services such 
as education, health care as well as financial support to those in need. Their female 
members have been crucial contributors to these projects. Understanding this helps us 
understand how women have become important contributors in the political sphere as 
well. These Islamist organizations have oriented themselves towards participation in 
political elections where women as well as men are allowed to vote. Winning the 
women's votes requires women's activism, and some organizations have even gone as 
far as running female candidates to win support from this half of the population. This 
sheds light on how women's political activism is now translating into a greater internal 
pressure to include women in decision-making within the Islamist movements. As 
5women become aware of and receive recognition for their own importance in these 
organizations, they have increasingly demanded a larger role and representation at 
higher levels of the organizations (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007). In addition, there is 
the external (and indeed international) pressure to include women as part of the 
Islamist movements having to prove their commitment to democracy and political 
freedoms for everyone.
At the same time, Islamist movements continue to reject what they call 
“Western” gender equality and maintain that while men and women are equal citizens, 
the two sexes are complimentary. Thus they are given roles accordingly, in society as 
well as in politics. Often this means that women’s roles and responsibilities as mothers 
and caretakers are stressed. While Islamist movements in Egypt have demonstrated 
great flexibility and will to adopt “modernizing” or “Western” ideas such as 
democracy and liberal economics, some still claim that gender seems to remain the 
impossible compromise. By those who see Islamism as a threat to women's progress in 
the Muslim world, “women's engagement in Islamic movements is perceived as the 
product of non-liberal religious practices and beliefs and therefore further contributes 
to the detriment of women in the Islamic world” (Hafez 2011: 58). At the same time, 
looking at Egypt the Islamist movements appear to be the most successful in 
mobilizing women. It seems a paradox that women could be drawn in great numbers to 
a movement which contributes to their detriment, as it is claimed. This thesis examines 
how this phenomenon could best be explained, while also engaging women's own 
voices and considering their capacity to influence and reshape their roles in Egypt and 
in Islamism. Islamist women are not only targets or billboards of Islamist ideologies, 
but through their activism they also reconstitute them. The results may include new 
roles for women that draw on modern and secular ideas as well as tradition and 
religion.
Women's political activism in Islamist movements has received rather shallow 
attention; usually a study of Islamist mobilization will include a paragraph about 
women's activism contributing to vote mobilization and the Islamist organizations' 
networks of social services. As part of understanding how Islamist organizations 
mobilize, recognizing and studying Islamist women's activism is important. But there 
6is another reason to study women's activism in Islamist movements, which Omayma 
Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway have pointed out in their preliminary study of women 
in Islamist movements, and that is the importance of Islamist women's activism for the 
realization of women's rights (2007: 3):
 «If it spawns a full-fledged Islamist movement for women's rights – and 
there are indicators that it may – such a movement has the potential for 
reaching a large number of women. Secular women's nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) led by educated women have only limited outreach 
outside the urban upper class they come from. Islamist movements, in 
contrast, have proven themselves adept at building a broad following across 
social classes. If women activists become more influential, Islamist 
movements could become important instruments – possibly the most 
important instruments – for promoting the rights of Arab women» (Ibid).
Indeed this vision remains far from manifest and can be thwarted by a number of 
factors yet. However, it highlights the potential that Islamist women's activism and 
political participation has for promoting the rights of women in Egypt and other 
Muslim-majority countries. This potential should be explored considering the current 
transformations which are ongoing in Egypt after the January 25 revolution of 2011.
72 The Dependent Variable
In this chapter I will attempt to define the dependent variable of this analysis. My 
research question, “What can explain women’s increasing political participation in 
Islamist movements in Egypt?” logically produces the dependent variable of “Islamist 
women's political participation”. First I will define what I mean by “political 
participation”, and look critically at how participation should be understood in a 
gendered perspective. Then I will decide on a definition of “Islamist” and “Islamism”. 
Finally I will discuss how I will use my definition of the dependent variable in my 
analysis.
2.1 Participation and representation
Participation and representation in democratic systems are two concepts that need to 
be defined in order to investigate Islamist women's increased political participation. I 
will first decide on a definition of political participation that I can use to measure the 
participation of Islamist women against. Then I will discuss the relationship between 
participation and representation, and present some arguments as to why women's 
participation and representation are important issues to investigate.
In a democracy, every adult individual has the right to political participation. In 
this paper, I will use the following definition of the right to political participation 
presented by Neera Chandhoke: “the right to participate in institutions that make 
public decisions or in deliberations on and around these decisions" (2009: 27-28). 
Chandhoke argues that every individual’s equal right to political participation is an 
embodiment of what gives democracy its intrinsic value, namely the presumption that 
“human beings possess equal moral status in a given polity” (Ibid). The most obvious, 
but not the only manifestation of this equal moral status and right to political 
participation is the principle of universal franchise, the universal right to vote for all 
adult citizens.
The right of political participation is a root right in a democracy, argues Chandhoke, 
because it “paves the way for the struggle for and the grant of other rights” in four 
8ways:
- by validating the equal moral status of each person;
- by contributing to the making of informed public opinion and thus to the constitution 
of democratically aware citizens;
- by serving to limit the power of the state and to hold it accountable;
- by empowering citizens to demand that the state realise their right to social and 
economic goods (Chandhoke 2009: 28).
However, Chandhoke continues, in modern democratic states it is not possible to have 
a direct political relationship between the citizen and the state only. Our societies are 
too large and complex for direct democracy and citizens’ lives are full of other 
demands which restrict their political involvement. The demands and interests raised 
in a modern democratic state are also too varied and conflicting for direct democracy 
to be practical. Instead there needs to be an intermediating agent who can process 
these demands and interests and re-represent them in a manner and a forum where 
public policy can be decided. Chandhoke also argues that modern legislation and 
administration is by nature so specialized and inscrutable that ordinary citizens cannot 
participate in lawmaking (Ibid.). It follows from this that for people’s right to political 
participation to be realized one must include a third agent in the political relationship 
between citizen and state, namely the representative.
2.2 Participation in a democratization perspective
Why do I bother to study the development of women's political rights specifically in a 
democratization process, in other words democratization in a gendered perspective? 
Am I as a Western feminist acting more keen on the women of Arab societies than the 
Arabs themselves are (an accusation towards Western feminists in general which one 
of my female informants proposed to me during my fieldwork in Cairo)? Or is it 
because we share some fundamental concerns about the state of political participation 
in large parts of the world, not exclusive to the Arab region at all, but critically visible 
in the Arab states nonetheless?
9In essence, substantial democratization requires that gender inequalities are 
addressed. "Empowering women" or, more specifically, fulfilling women's political 
rights is not about women as a group asking for gender-defined rights, but a gender-
defined group demanding the realization of equal rights. That the achievement of these 
rights requires special attention is a consequence of the complex political, 
socioeconomic and cultural obstacles that women are especially, but not exclusively 
oppressed by. It is not due to any specificity in the nature of the rights they aspire to 
achieve; those are exactly the same as the aspirations of men. Learning from the Arab 
Spring, we may ask ourselves; Which group other than the Arab women could not 
achieve their political rights under authoritarian leaders? The Arab men. Thus, in light 
of the Arab spring, we may argue that political rights must be claimed by all, for all, in 
order for substantial democratic rights to be achieved.
We need a perspective on developing political participation that differentiates 
between the aims, means and benefits of realizing this right. Today most scholars and 
advocates of democracy agree with Valentine M. Moghadam, self-declared feminist 
and leading social scientist on the Middle East, that women's political rights need to be 
realized because “a polity is not fully democratic when there is not adequate 
representation of women” (Moghadam 2010: 280). Achieving a fully democratic 
polity, in other words realizing the aim of democracy, is the aim of realizing women 
and men's political rights. However, far from every promoter of women's political 
rights limits herself to such a simple statement.
Lines of argumentation regarding women's rights differ according to which 
perspective is employed on gender and on democracy. Thus our argumentation, which 
states our motivations for promoting women's political rights, matters - especially to 
those who are the center of our attention. Conservative feminists use argumentation 
based on the different experiences of life that women and men have, promoting 
political equality by emphasizing gender differences. Social movements often stress 
the difference in women's interests from men's, but not inherent gender differences. 
Political theorist Ann Phillips, for example, argues that women must be represented by 
women because women have different interests, experiences, values and expertise than 
men do, mainly because of their different social positions (Phillips 1995). Neo-liberals 
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focus on the output of political equality, arguing that society cannot afford to ignore 
the resources of half their populations. To simply assert the democratic need for 
women's political participation can be described as a liberal line of argumentation, 
concerned primarily with the realization of the right itself, not the means or benefits of 
exercising it.
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, developed in 1995 and 
adopted by the UN in 1996, called on the international community to empower women 
and realize their human rights. This important document states the following on 
women in power and decision-making:
“Achieving the goal of equal participation of women and men in decision-
making will provide a balance that more accurately reflects the composition 
of society and is needed in order to strengthen democracy and promote its 
proper functioning. Equality in political decision-making performs a 
leverage function without which it is highly unlikely that a real integration 
of the equality dimension in government policy-making is feasible. In this 
respect, women’s equal participation in political life plays a pivotal role in 
the general process of the advancement of women. Women’s equal 
participation in decision-making is not only a demand for simple justice or 
democracy but can also be seen as a necessary condition for women’s 
interests to be taken into account. Without the active participation of 
women and the incorporation of women’s perspective at all levels of 
decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be 
achieved” (UN 1995: 79).
As exemplified by this declaration, women’s political participation has become a 
policy goal not just for the sake of gender equality in itself. Women have a right to 
political participation, but importantly, it is also recognized that their participation is of 
great value and benefits society in several domains. Equal or increased participation by 
women in decision-making and policy shaping is considered to have democratic, 
developmental and even peace-building benefits for society at large. The issue of 
realizing women’s right to political participation thus draws its importance from both 
11
their equal moral status, which is a fundamental principle of democracy, and from the 
impact on society it is expected to bring.
Should we fall for the temptation of promoting women's political participation 
for the sake of economic rewards, peace-building benefits and other trending lines of 
argumentation? These are windfall fruits to be recognized and celebrated, indeed, but 
they must not be allowed to overshadow our primary aim of building democracies 
founded on political equality between all citizens, women and men. We should 
recognize that this focus on the fruits of democratic principles, rather than the moral 
value of the principles themselves, are symptomatic of an attitude to democratization 
which is highly problematic, with its focus on and contentment with (quick) results 
rather than fundamentally rooted changes.
2.3 Participation in a gender perspective
Heba Raouf Ezzat, lecturer of political theory at Cairo University and the American 
University in Cairo, argues that the dominant conceptions of political participation 
which form the basis for indicators on women's political empowerment must be 
revisited (Ezzat 2007: 184). By doing so she challenges what she considers to be the 
dominant modernist paradigm on the social and the political (Ibid). This paradigm, in 
Ezzat's understanding, produces narrow and simplistic answers to why women are not 
politically active and how they can be activated.
“If democracy is the end goal and women's liberation from injustice and 
discrimination is the means, then women's “empowerment” should start by 
developing a notion of power and politics that befits women in its logic and 
its structure (...)” (Ezzat 2007: 184-185)
 She proposes that a new definition of political participation should be developed to
“bridge the conceptual gap between the public and the private, and engage 
in re-defining the “Political” in terms of power relations rather than power 
structures, understanding that the engagement of citizens and the 
management of power relations on a day-to-day basis (are) mainly located 
outside official political bodies and structures especially when political 
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participation is obstructed by despotism” (Ezzat 2007: 187).
Historically, women have been excluded from arenas of decision making across 
cultures and societies, in domains such as government, political parties, civil 
society, the judiciary, media, academia and others. This does not mean that they 
have not made important contributions in society, and even in the political 
domain – usually the last bastion for women to conquer – women have 
contributed extensively in “extra-parliamentary politics” (Moghadam 2010: 280). 
It is important, especially in early stages of a democratization process, to also 
understand how women participate in politics outside of the formal institutions, 
for example as grass root supporters and vote mobilizers. Through these 
activities, women increase their knowledge of politics and develop both skills 
and credibility as political actors. This can be one step towards developing pro-
democratic rights for women in a democratization process that extends beyond 
creating the right formal institutions. But as we can derive from Chandhoke's 
definition of political participation and its challenges in modern societies, where 
citizens cannot deal directly with the state, participation without representation is 
not enough to realize women's political rights.
2.4 Descriptive vs. substantial representation
Without female representation, as I have noted, women’s right to political participation 
is not realized. But when women are elected as representatives, do they automatically 
represent women's interests and values?
Hanna Pitkin, in her 1967 study The Concept of Representation, distinguishes 
between representation as “standing for” another and representation as “acting for” 
another. Being represented by someone alike you, such as women being represented by 
women, is a type of descriptive representation where the representative is “standing 
for” women. Quotas that designate a number of seats for women assure this kind of 
representation. Symbolic representation, as is exercised by kings and queens, is also a 
kind of descriptive representation. But the fact that the representatives are women does 
not guarantee that they are “acting for” women by representing their interests and 
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ideas, what Pitkin calls substantive representation (1967). This type of representation 
depends less on who the representatives are, but more on what they do. You don't even 
have to be a woman to represent women's interests, at least in theory. In practice, 
however, the two kinds of representation are connected. It has been found that a 
certain percentage of the political representatives need to be women before the elected 
bodies make decisions based on women's interests and ideas. This suggests that 
women need to be descriptively represented in order to be substantially represented.
In this thesis, I am interested in how women in Egypt may be both descriptively 
and substantially represented, and how these two concepts relate to each other. 
Through my fieldwork I have tried to get an impression of Islamist women's 
experiences and perspectives on this.
2.5 What is Islamism?
As I have singled out “Islamist women” in my research question, this begs a definition 
of what I mean by “Islamist” and its mother term, “Islamism”. Islamism is a 
movement which is called by many names, each with an array of definitions. Here I 
will present three terms used to describe this movement; Islamism, political Islam and 
Islamic activism, and how they relate to each other. While the three terms are quite 
similar as they are defined below, there are some key distinctions that I will elaborate 
on. In the end I will present the definition of “Islamism” and “Islamist” I have chosen 
to use for this thesis.
Definitions of Islamism range from the narrow, political definition to wider 
definitions that encompass other modes of action than the political. An example of the 
first kind is Olivier Roy’s definition, which states simply that Islamism is “the 
contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology” (Roy 1994: 
ix). The focus of the Islamic movement is understood to be the building of an Islamic 
state, and this understanding of Islamism is synonymous with the term political Islam. 
"Islamic" is to Roy not to be confused with "Muslim"; while the term "Muslim" simply 
refers to something or someone associated with the religion Islam, the term "Islamic" 
refers to ideas, actions or agents of Islamism (Ibid). The strength of Roy's definition is 
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that it defines the movement by to its ideology and not by its choice of methods. This 
allows us to compare Islamism to other kinds of religious fundamentalism and, as Jeff 
Haynes discusses in the following quote, include in the movement different followers 
of this ideology who adopt a range of means:
”A defining character of religious fundamentalism is that it is always 
socially but not necessarily politically conservative. Thus some Islamic 
fundamentalist (Islamist) groups seek to overthrow the existing socio-
economic and political order by various means, including violence or 
terrorism, incremental reform of existing political regimes, or winning 
elections through the mobilization of a political party” (Haynes 2008: 135-
136).
However, understanding Islamism as a strictly political project can make it hard to 
understand the movement under the authoritarian political conditions that the Islamists 
have been dealing with in the Middle East and North Africa region. Sometimes self-
declared Islamic fundamentalists do not pursue their goals by political means, either 
because they don't want to or because they are not able to, such as Salafi1 Muslims 
who have long refused to engage in “un-Islamic” politics.
In The Spectrum of Islamist Movements (2007) edited by Diaa Rashwan, three 
analysts at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Egypt attempt to 
redefine what is meant by “Islamist movements”. In their definition they too focus on 
the intellectual underpinnings of the movements themselves, specifically their belief 
that their enterprise is related to Islam (which is a  wider definition of their belief than 
Roy's); “By Islamist movements, we mean those groups that take some aspect of Islam 
or its interpretation as the frame of reference for their existence or objectives” 
(Rashwan 2007: 15). They argue that it is the influence of their intellectual foundation, 
extending to all aspects of Islamist movements including their names, symbols, 
organizational structures, strategies and operational tactics, which distinguishes them 
from other social and political movements (Ibid: 15-16). They stress that the various 
Islamist groups and movements should also be differentiated according to their 
1 Muslim fundamentalists who seek to recreate the age of the first Muslims, the salaf.
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intellectual foundation, rather than their social origins, political ideas or operational 
tactics (Ibid).
Similarly, social movement-based definitions of Islamism are intentionally 
made very general to embrace also reformist Islamic movements and Islamic 
movements that focus on missionary or social work, perhaps because the current 
political climate does not allow for political participation. In this understanding of 
Islamism the aim and means of the movement are not limited to the political project of 
building an Islamic state, as exemplified by Janine Clark's definition:
“An “Islamist” is a Muslim who attempts to re-Islamize society by 
encouraging individuals to practice Islam in daily life and bridge the gap 
between religious discourse and practical realities. In other words, he or she 
is a Muslim who seeks to actively extend and apply Islam beyond what is 
commonly regarded as the private realm to affect the public realm. In doing 
so, Islamism promotes the idea that Islam is a complete system or body of 
values, beliefs, and practices encompassing all spheres of life” (Clark 2004: 
168).
Another social movement scholar, Asef Bayat, prefers to speak of Islamism as one 
kind of Islamic activism, which he defines as “extra-ordinary religious activism”. By 
extra-ordinary he means that the Islamic activists are seeking to preach and not only 
practice Islam. This definition is extremely wide and includes activism by any means, 
even the type that does not aim at changing the society but rather at individual change. 
He distinguishes one type of Islamic activism as Islamism: “It may be involved 
explicitly in politics, which I would call 'Islamism', or restricted to 'apolitical' but 
active piety, as exemplified in trends and movements which centre on individual self-
enhancement and identity” (Bayat 2005: 894).
In this thesis I will use the term Islamism understood through Bayat's definition 
as a movement which seeks to preach Islam through extra-ordinary religious activism 
and which is explicitly involved in politics, and belonging to the greater family of 
Islamic activism. I prefer this definition to Roy's because it does not restrict the 
movement's ideological understanding of Islam to a political one. Also, because 
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political activism is not the only way to practice what Bayat calls Islamic activism, this 
allows us to more easily include in our understanding of Islamism the Islamic groups 
which go from being apolitical to political, such as Salafi groups in Egypt who only 
recently accepted participation in democracy as a mode of action. 
2.6 Summary
In summary, Islamist women's political participation is in this thesis defined as:
a) participating in institutions that make public decisions or in deliberations on and 
around these decisions, by
b) women identifying with a movement which seeks to preach Islam through extra-
ordinary religious activism and which is explicitly involved in politics.
It is also understood that an important element of political participation is 
representation, which can be either descriptive, symbolic or substantial.
For this thesis, I will use point b of this definition to select candidates for 
interviewing, as I will elaborate on in the following chapter, and discuss with them 
which factors may explain their participation as defined by point a.
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3 Research Design
As stated, the research question for this analysis is “What can explain women’s 
increasing political participation in Islamist movements in Egypt?” In chapter 1 I have 
discussed briefly the puzzle that inspired this research question, and on which grounds 
I consider it to be an important issue worthy of investigation. In chapter 2 I have 
defined the various components of the puzzling phenomenon or “dependent variable” 
that this research question seeks to explain the increase of, namely Islamist women's 
political participation. A clearly defined research question and dependent variable lets 
us decide on which research design and methods to employ in order to answer this 
question, and what kinds of data this research needs to be based on. Here I wish to 
elaborate on how this research question will be answered, in other words the research 
design of this thesis.
3.1 A case study approach
Obviously, my research question aims at a causal explanation which is concerned with 
the “how” and “why” of Islamist women's political participation in Egypt. To produce 
causal inferences about a complex social phenomenon, “thick” or qualitative data is 
needed. A case study is a common research design to produce qualitative data and 
causal inferences with. Case studies are intensive studies of a single case conducted to 
shed light on a larger number of cases of similar nature, a population of cases. 
However, it is implicit in this definition of a case study that the single case is not 
perfectly similar to the other cases; in other words the case is not perfectly 
representative of the population (Gerring 2009: 20). Therefore, the selection of a case 
or cases to study matters to which inferences one can make about the research 
question. In the following section, I will explain the case selection for this thesis.
3.2 Case selection
I will not be able to research the full specter of women's political participation in 
Islamist movements in Egypt. In this study I therefore seek to try a number of 
arguments and explanatory factors in the best possible case, but which case should that 
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be? I have selected the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most organized Islamist 
movement in Egypt, as a suitable case to study women's political participation. They 
have for decades been a strong organization, indeed influential across the Muslim 
world, and they are one of the most dominant political force in post-revolution Egypt. 
In the following I will elaborate on the reasons for this choice.
First of all, the Brotherhood is the best case to study if we wish to know how 
the influence of Islamism will affect women's political participation in Egypt because 
they are the most influential actor in this matter. This is due to their size, history and 
position as the largest party in the Egyptian government. In the post-revolution 
elections for the People's Assembly in 2011/2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's political 
party, the Freedom and Justice Party, won 43% of the seats (Carnegie Endowment, A 
nd). As this thesis is being written they are competing for the presidency, with their 
official candidate Mohammed Morsi being one of the front-runners of the elections. To 
understand how women can participate in politics and decision-making as members of 
one of the strongest political groups in Egypt today is important to exploring how 
Egypt's women may find their place in politics.
Secondly, I have chosen to study the Brotherhood because their long history of 
activism and political participation in Egypt allows us to trace changes in Islamist 
women's participation over time. The Brotherhood has had a women's section almost 
since its creation and it has been training and fielding female candidates for elections 
since 2000. They have been the most successful in having female candidates elected 
after the revolution, as four of the nine women who were elected to the People's 
Assembly in the 2011/2012 elections represent the Freedom and Justice Party 
(Carnegie Endowment, A nd). Thus a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood provides 
the most observable evidence of Islamist women's participation and allows for a longer 
perspective than simply changes after the 2011 revolution. Comparatively, the Salafi 
movements in Egypt have only organized politically since the revolution, and as such 
there is less evidence to study their women's political participation, although it would 
make for an interesting study in the future.
Thirdly, I have chosen the Brotherhood as the best possible case because their 
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strong and widespread organization produces some of the most potent participation in 
the country. If individuals are to have political influence, it helps to be affiliated with 
such a powerful organization. It is interesting to see whether women are able to tap 
into the capital of the Brotherhood in their political activism, as it has potential to 
produce some of the most powerful female representatives in politics.
And finally, a case study of the Brotherhood makes a good contribution to the 
literature on Islamism and women's political participation. Egypt's Muslim 
Brotherhood is probably one of the most-studied Islamic movements, but Islamist 
women's participation remains under-explored. This study can thus draw on much 
previous scholarship and suggest improvements to our accumulative knowledge about 
the movement and Islamist women's activism.
I will note that while the Muslim Brotherhood is the best possible choice for a 
case study of women's political participation in Islamist movements in Egypt, any 
conclusions based on this case study cannot be generalized across the variety of 
Islamist movements in Egypt. We can expect few similarities between the Muslim 
Brotherhood's ideology on women's participation and that of the Egyptian Salafis, for 
example. These more conservative Islamists may potentially be a strong obstacle to 
women's rights even within an Islamic framework, as they form a viable competition 
for the Islamic vote in Egypt.
3.3 Cases in the case?
Ideally there should be a “case in the case”, a specific event to look into where women 
have been active politically, and which I could try to explain. However, the number of 
politically active women is still low and women's push for participation in decision-
making within the Brotherhood is still relatively fragmented. The revolution of 2011 
was a special case where women participated much more openly in politics and in 
larger numbers than had been seen before, but this participation was not sustained at 
the same level and in the same shape after the revolution. Women's participation in the 
revolution was more of an exceptional case, which does not make for a good case to 
base our understanding of Islamist women's participation on. That is not to say that the 
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revolution was not immensely important for the political participation of all Egyptians, 
and that it may not have had a special effect on the participation of Islamist women. I 
still feel that it is necessary to have a wider perspective; looking at women's 
participation over a longer time span which includes the situation both before, during 
and after the revolution, and looking at various forms their participation may take 
which you could not observe in one single event. I am interested in looking at 
processes of participation and discussing why women join or leave the Muslim 
Brotherhood and their experiences of activism and political participation over time. I 
think a wider perspective will give a better understanding of the strategies and rational 
reasonings behind women's participation than exceptional or fragmented cases in the 
case could provide.
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4 Theory
In this thesis, I am attempting to explain the rise of Islamist women's political 
participation in Egypt. As I have stated in the introduction, I see this exercise both as 
an examination of alternative ways to promote women's rights as well as a contribution 
to the debate on the relationship between Islamism and democratization in the MENA 
region. In this debate, women's rights play a crucial dual role. Firstly, I see women's 
political rights as a marker of democratization, a strong indicator of whether the 
political process is contributing towards a system of governance based on political 
equality. Secondly, women's rights is a high-priority policy interest for the political 
actors of the region including the Islamist groups, the secular regimes, secular parties 
and organizations on the national level, as well as foreign nations and international 
bodies which try to influence the development of political and social affairs. It may 
seem a long leap, but I would like to propose that democratization theories are 
appropriate tools to explain the increase of Islamist women’s political participation. 
I prefer this theoretical perspective mainly because I am attempting to explain 
an increase in how Islamist women exercise a fundamental democratic right. Part of 
this exercise is to examine whether and how Islamism and Islamist movements 
promote women’s political participation, and democratization theories seek to explain 
precisely what it is that produces such democratic rights. Because the movement the 
women belong to has a contested political ambition which may or may not contribute 
to the aim of democracy, it is helpful to use theories which may explain the role and 
democratic nature of actors in a democratization process.
Such a complex social phenomenon as Islamist women's political participation 
in Egypt is a challenge to explain because of the multitude of relevant factors, even as 
my focus on a single case allows an in-depth study of these. How should the empirical 
evidence be interpreted? In the lack of theoretical consensus on democratization, I 
wish to draw on three different perspectives on democratization in my analysis. My 
purpose is to compare their explanatory powers and see which perspective better 
explains the empirical evidence in the case studied here. I do not aim to settle any 
theoretical debate, but primarily discuss which theoretical perspective better explains 
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different developments and relationships in the data as well as what is left 
unexplained, in order to achieve objectivity in my interpretation of the evidence. I 
follow a framework for assessing democratization which allows me to choose which 
actors, institutions and processes to evaluate independently of the respective 
theoretical perspectives. In this chapter, let me present the theories I draw on for my 
analysis, and the framework that structures the analysis in which they will be 
compared.
4.1 The democratization debate
The literature on democratization theory has a dual focus; mainly it tries to explain the 
causation of democratization (what makes countries democratize), and increasingly it 
is also paying attention to the consolidation of democracy (what makes emerging 
democracies survive and gain substance). Different perspectives on democratization 
have evolved from different definitions of democracy as well as differences in 
emphasis on explanatory factors. Here, three theoretical perspectives which represent 
three different approaches to democracy are presented; the conservative approach 
represented by Mansfield and Snyder's sequencing theory (2002, 2005 and 2007), the 
liberal democracy approach represented by transition theory, and the substantial 
democracy approach represented by Carothers' gradualism theory (2002, 2007a, 
2007b). My presentation of these approaches to democratization is especially informed 
by two debates published in Journal of Democracy, in 2002 and 2007, which included 
criticisms and defenses of the “transition paradigm” and the sequencing theory 
respectively, and of gradualism as an alternative to these two approaches.
4.1.1 Sequencing theory
The conservative approach to democracy is primarily concerned with its ability to 
produce stable and peaceful political societies that are mutually compatible with a 
liberal economic system. In its definition of democracy it is influenced by the 
experiences of Western democracy, setting out standards for democracy which are 
procedural rather than normative (such as the holding of free and fair elections and the 
alternation of power).
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Different “waves” of democratization have produced different theoretical 
explanations of what makes countries become democratic, and more recently, what 
made some of them survive the transition phase to become consolidated democracies 
as well as what caused some to revert to authoritarianism. One early and long-lived 
explanation is found in modernization theory. This theoretical perspective grew out of 
the experiences of the first wave of democratization taking place in the Western world, 
in which democratization was closely linked to the expansion of capitalism. 
Modernization theory looks to underlying transformations in society and the economy 
to explain why countries embark on a process of democratization. This focus turned 
into the idea that certain structures such as a critical level of economic development 
are preconditions without which democratization will not take place or be successful. 
The basic idea of modernization theory was that if a country introduced the right 
(capitalist) economic structures and developed economically, democratization would 
follow and produce stable, democratic political societies - regardless of the historic or 
cultural specifics of the societies in question.
In his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel P. Huntington 
criticized the modernization theory's emphasis on economic structures as prerequisites 
for democratization. Huntington warned that states should also establish a certain 
“politics of order” before democracy is introduced (1968). Processes of modernization 
such as urbanization, social mobilization and economic growth are not necessarily 
conducive to stability, argues Huntington, but can in actuality be a cause for instability 
as expectations rise and new groups are rapidly mobilized into politics (Ibid). Political 
institutions must be developed to handle the stress of these processes because to 
Huntington order, regardless of which political system it is produced by, is an 
important aim in itself in developing societies (Ibid).
Building on the Huntingtonian idea that political order is an important aim in 
developing societies, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder have suggested that 
democratization should take place in a certain sequence. In various articles and the 
2005 book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War they have 
contested the popular idea in international relations that democracies are inherently 
peaceful. They argue that states which are going through the transition to democracy 
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are actually more likely to fight wars than both consolidated democracies and 
authoritarian states are.
«We find that the heightened danger of war grows primarily out of the 
transition from an autocratic regime to one that is partly democratic. The 
specter of war during this phase of democratization looms especially large 
when governmental institutions, including those regulating political 
participation, are especially weak. Under these conditions, elites commonly 
employ nationalist rhetoric to mobilize mass support but then become 
drawn into the belligerent foreign policies unleashed by this process. We 
find, in contrast, that transitions that quickly culminate in a fully coherent 
democracy are much less perilous» (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 298).
In short, Mansfield and Snyder fear that greater political freedoms can easily be 
abused if proper institutions such as political parties and the rule of law are not 
established first, echoing Huntington’s call for a “politics of order”. They contend 
“that it is dangerous to push states to democratize before the necessary preconditions 
are in place and that prudent democracy-promotion efforts should pay special attention 
to fostering those preconditions”, warning against what they call out-of-sequence 
democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 5).
This line of argumentation has been employed to excuse the continued 
authoritarian rule in many states of the Middle East and North Africa which are 
deemed “not ready for democracy”, including Egypt. In an opinion piece for The New 
York Times, Thomas L. Friedman recently lamented that the post-revolution transitions 
in the Arab states are difficult because they had “squandered their dictatorship 
moments”, instead of building democratic preconditions top-down through 
authoritarianism like the East Asian dictatorships of South Korea and Taiwan had 
(Friedman May 5 2012). Mixed with a post-September 11 fear of Islamic terror and a 
perception of Islamism that lacks nuance, this perspective on democratization has had 
a strong influence on Western policies regarding democracy promotion in the Muslim 
and Arab world. The following is an example of how one influential American think 
tank has evaluated the progress and prospects for democratization in the Muslim world 
in a manner which echoes this thinking:
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In a 2002 article in Journal of Democracy, Freedom House president Adrian 
Karatnycky discusses what he terms the “democracy gap” between Muslim-majority 
countries (and especially the Arab states) and the rest of the world. Based on Freedom 
House's 2001 “Freedom in the World” survey of political rights and civil liberties 
worldwide, he first remarks that there are no free or democratic countries in the Arab 
world and few among Muslim-majority states (23% of which have democratically 
elected governments, according to the survey) (Karatnycky 2002: 102-103). Later, he 
attempts to explain this “weakness of democracy and freedom in large parts of the 
Muslim world” by factors such as lack of development, “the cultural burden imposed 
by an interpretation of Islam that relegates women to second-class status”, a 
“longstanding Islamic tradition” of merging the religious and the political, the rentier 
effect, and the historic legacies of either rigid, unequal monarchies or statist 
autocracies derived from totalitarian models (Ibid: 105-106).
Karatnycky pays considerable attention to Islamism in his article. He describes 
the experiences of Muslim states with Islamist groups in two ways; pointing out where 
repressive regimes have “successfully suppressed Islamist political movements” and 
states where “the Islamist threat has proved real” (Ibid: 104, 106). Reading between 
the lines, such descriptions suggest that an authoritarian oppression of the political 
opposition2 are preferred over a political opening which may be exploited by the 
Islamists, as Algeria experienced (Ibid). Finally, Karatnycky contends that there is still 
reasonable hope connected to the “project of promoting the expansion of democracy in 
the face of the terrorist and Islamist threat”, but that it is inappropriate to see 
democratic elections as the answer to the problems of these “struggling societies” 
(Ibid: 111). Thus, the means by which he proposes that democracy should be promoted 
is a list devoid of political openings. Instead he suggests increasing access to 
information on democracy, supporting liberal economic reforms, and expanded 
commitment to civil society as “mechanisms by which reliable allies of the democratic 
world and committed opponents of terrorism and ideological extremism are 
empowered” (Ibid: 112).
2  Karatnycky himself notes that in countries like Egypt, democrats suffer from this repression as much as the 
Islamist.
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4.1.2 Transition or Agency theory
The third wave of democratization broke with the assumptions that certain structural 
preconditions were needed in order for democratization to take place. How should we 
understand the democratization in countries in Eastern Europe or sub-Saharan Africa 
that experienced democratization without a developed liberal economy or a 
strengthened middle class? Scholars of democratization responded to this challenge by 
shifting focus from structures to agency and looking to the role played by elites in 
negotiating transitions from autocracy to democracy. This “agency approach” to 
democratization, which gave importance to the role of conscious, committed actors 
and emphasized the political over the socioeconomic, also highlighted the room for 
external influence. Democratization, thus understood, could be fostered in the form of 
international support for reform-minded political elites willing to build the 
institutional preconditions for democracy. The underlying assumption is that if a 
minimum of liberal institutions are crafted, actors will adjust their behavior to these 
institutions and democracy will follow. The democratization process or “transition” to 
democracy was considered to consist of several stages; first a period of democratic 
opening, then a break-through, and finally consolidation of democracy.
This approach to democratization builds on a liberal definition of democracy 
that is quite minimalist. If democracy is understood to be a set of liberal democratic 
institutions such as free and fair elections and the rule of law, then it becomes possible 
to build democracy “from above” through elite negotiations. Coupled with a belief that 
actors adapt their behavior to these institutions, it becomes possible to see the 
construction of such institutions as the beginning of a transition which will grow 
stronger by the commitment of pro-democracy actors, among which civil society plays 
an important role. The third wave of democratization brought great optimism that 
democracy could be introduced in very different contexts; liberal democracy, with its 
formal and minimalist model of democracy, seemed to demand fewer preconditions 
than modernization theory had presumed. Critics argue that this led to formal 
democratic institutions being introduced without much regard for context and existing 
power relations. In the 1990s the world actually experienced a democratic rollback as 
the number of democracies not only stopped growing, but receded, with some 
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“democratizing” countries taking an authoritarian turn again. Many counties also 
seemed to be “lost in transition” as they had adopted some democratic institutions and 
reforms, but retained entrenched illiberal features. In response, the liberal 
democratization theory struggled to explain what could consolidate liberal democracy.
The liberal democratization approach emphasizes institutional design, support 
for civil society and economic reform and development as important means to reach 
the aim of democracy. As previously mentioned, political elites such as party officials 
and prominent politicians, bureaucrats and public office-holders are seen as key 
agents. This focus on elites puts off the inclusion of the masses into political decision-
making, the same way that the focus on supporting and developing civil society draws 
focus and efforts away from developing political society. The liberal democratization 
approach also encouraged “depoliticized” democratization by for example producing a 
technocratic government and giving greater roles to market actors and civil society 
through privatization. At the same time, it struggles to ensure real equality before the 
law, produce social equality, or combat corruption, all of which disempowers citizens 
and especially the poor. Meanwhile transitionists such as Kenneth Wollack with a 
minimalist approach to democracy define issues such as encouraging the political 
participation of women, youth and minorities as “next-generation” issues which are 
“necessary to reduce apathy and disaffection among voters” (Wollack 2002: 21). In 
other words, it is not a prioritized means of democratization.
This approach to democratization has been criticized heavily by Thomas 
Carothers on a number of what he calls key assumptions of a “transition paradigm”3 
(Carothers 2002: 6). These assumptions of the theory are, according to Carothers: 
1) If a country is moving away from authoritarianism, it is necessarily moving 
towards democracy.
2) Democratization tends to happen in consecutive stages of a democratic opening, 
followed by a breakthrough and then a consolidation of democracy. 
3) Elections are especially important to produce democracy. 
4) The importance of structural preconditions is underestimated or ignored; it is 
3  The article in which Carothers presented this critique sparked a debate in which several scholars contested  
his interpretations of the theory; see Journal of Democracy vol. 13 no. 1, January 2002.
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presumed that democratization may happen anywhere at any time. Emphasis is 
placed on agency rather than structure, according to the belief that democracy 
may be produced by elite negotiations. 
5) It is assumed that state-building is not an issue to be dealt with in the process of 
constructing a democracy; a functioning state is taken for granted. (2002: 6-8)
These assumptions are false and create a misguided approach to democratization, 
according to Carothers. His alternative approach is introduced next.
4.1.3 Gradualism theory.
This theory is fronted especially by Thomas Carothers, who has been a vocal critic of 
both sequencing theory and the “transition paradigm”. It is based on an idea of 
democracy that emphasizes its participatory aspect and principle of equal political 
participation, and as such promotes democratization processes that include the larger 
masses to the largest possible degree. 
Carothers looks to encouraging cases of successful democratization such as 
Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan and notes that their political evolutions were defined 
by an extremely gradual, incremental process of liberalization pushed forward by an 
organized political opposition across successive elections, and not by the reforms of 
soft-liners in the regimes (2007b). While Carothers recognizes that there are 
preconditions for democratization that, if in place, increase the chances of successful 
and peaceful democratization, he does not accept the argument that in the lack of 
these, authoritarian rule is the best and safest approach to political development. In 
countries like Egypt, he argues, authoritarianism is not the way to establish rule of law 
but indeed the main obstacle to this democratic institution (Carothers 2007a: 17). 
Mubarak and his government maintained the emergency law through all his decades as 
president, thus limiting the basic rights of citizens and preserving “wide discretional 
legal authority” for himself, and in the lack of genuine democratization he was 
unchallenged in doing so (Ibid). Indeed, Carothers sees an inherent conflict between 
authoritarianism and genuine rule of law, which ought to limit the power of the 
sovereign and thus threatens authoritarian rule (Ibid: 16). Democratic reforms 
introduced by authoritarian rules will by necessity be shaped by the regime's 
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reluctance to have its own powers substantially challenged or limited, argues 
Carothers. 
Carothers also puts little hope in the democratizing effect of institutions such as 
popular elections, as he regards these to be easily manipulated or undercut if a strong 
commitment to democracy is not already in place. Similarly, he does not believe 
democratization can be created by elites alone, through negotiations or otherwise. 
Instead Carothers proposes that for it to be possible to develop truly democratic 
institutions, the process of developing them must also be democratic and political, as it 
was in Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan where power over decision-making was 
contested by democratic means. He argues that in dominant-power systems, what 
really promotes democracy is to develop alternative centers of power (Carothers 2002: 
19).  Especially, political parties should be developed in order to “improve the variety 
and quality of the main political actors” and to “bridge the gulf between the citizenry 
and the formal political system” (Ibid). In addition, Carothers argues that any over-
concentration of economic power should be reduced, and clear lines drawn between 
the ruling party and the state (Ibid).
John Harriss has studied patterns of citizen problem solving in urban cities of 
Mexico, Brazil and India, which are all developing democracies. He found that while 
the poor are more politically active than the wealthy people (at least in India's global 
cities), they are not much involved in associations (2006). Therefore the “old politics” 
of political participation through parties is still important to the poor, despite the bad 
reputation political parties and mass movements have amassed globally as being 
corrupted and unable to solve many social problems. The “new politics” of civil 
society, which is often fronted as the better alternative to dirty party politics, is more 
focused on problem-solving than on exercising democratic practices and usually 
exclude the poor as active agents, addressing them as users and receivers of programs 
and services. Old and new politics also differ in their tactics. Harriss found that in 
India, the movements that mobilize masses of poor people focus on staging protests 
and getting political representation as means of achieving their goals, while the more 
elitist organizations of civil society engage in partnerships with the government 
(2006).
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Even if developing political society is essential to the gradual democratization 
approach, the importance of civil society is still recognized and especially in the early 
stages. Marcus Mietzner argues that it is mostly because of the pushback from the civil 
sector that Indonesia has not been part of the democratic recession which has been a 
trend of the last decade, but merely suffered democratic stagnation as conservative 
elites have attempted to reverse democratic reforms to recapture old privileges (2012: 
211). He warns against redirecting democratization assistance from civil society to the 
government apparatus too early in the transition to democracy, lest the aid should 
strengthen anti-reformist elites still dominating the government apparatus. If so, the 
state could get stuck in “incomplete” transition without the continued push to 
democratize from civil society, as Mietzner finds has been a risk factor in Indonesia's 
recent developments (Mietzner 2012: 224). Especially in young post-authoritarian 
nations, such re-channeling of aid may make government more effective but can halter 
the consolidation of democracy and instead create a strong state in “continued 
democratic stagnation”, argues Mietzner (Ibid).
4.2 Assessment framework
As I aim to compare how well these perspectives explain my puzzle, what aspects of 
that puzzle shall I focus on and discuss whether and how the perspectives can make 
sense of?  The criteria by which I choose these should not stem from one of the 
theoretical perspectives, which would make for a biased, circular analysis. Rather I 
would like to study factors they all agree are important, regardless of which 
perspective you employ. Furthermore, the framework for this analysis should allow for 
an analysis that is, as far as possible, contextually sensitive and not based on a “blue 
print” idea of democracy taken from formalized Western democracies. 
In his forthcoming book Assessing Democratisation, Törnquist argues that this 
is possible by identifying the essence of democracy, which we will understand as the 
aim of a democratization process, and analyze how the actors, institutions and 
dynamics of the democratisation process contribute towards this aim. As previously 
discussed, I am using Beetham's definition of the essence of democracy, which is 
“popular control of public affairs based on political equality” (quoted in Törnquist 
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2004: 201). Törnquist (forthcoming) further argues that an assessment of 
democratisation should be based on a substantive rather than a procedural definition of 
democracy. An assessment of the substance of democracy, according to Törnquist, 
must go beyond assessing institutions to also consider whether the rules and 
regulations of a democracy cover all vital aspects; whether they are not just formalities 
but actually work; whether democratically made decisions are in fact implemented; 
and whether “the content of the decisions do not undermine but foster the aim of 
democracy” (Ibid: 16). To assess democratisation in this way, Törnquist argues that 
four dimensions must be included in an analysis; 1) the institutions that are supposed 
to promote democracy, 2) the major actors' adherence to these rules and regulations, 3) 
the same actors' political capacity to use and promote the institutions of democracy, 
and 4) how the critical factors combine and change in the process of democratisation 
(Ibid: 80).
4.2.1 Intrinsic democratic institutions
What are the institutions needed to promote Islamist women's political participation? It 
is not my intention in this thesis to assess the democratization process in Egypt in 
general, so this framework may be slimmed down and adjusted to the topic of interest 
here. First, Islamist women's political participation, or any women's political 
participation in Egypt, is clearly a phenomenon which needs to be assessed especially 
against the aim of “political equality” which is part of our essential definition of 
democracy. Therefore, in this analysis I will limit the institutions to those needed to 
make this principle real and the actors to those important to this issue, and ask 
questions of these that seem relevant to answering my research question.
Which intrinsic institutions of democracy are most important for Islamist 
women to participate in politics in Egypt, and are they in place? Also, are these rules 
and regulations formal or informal? Are they substantial or just formalities? Törnquist 
has developed a list of 13 “clusters” of rules and regulations (presented below) deemed 
intrinsic institutional means of democacy, which he has selected based on the criteria 
that “the institutions are both logically necessary to foster the aim and principles of 
democracy and have been proven empirically to be crucial in processes of 
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democratisation”(Törnquist (forthcoming): 54). The clusters are meant to be universal, 
but should be detailed in each context. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, I 
have selected to focus on the following (in bold) which I expect to be logically 
necessary to foster Islamist women's political participation in Egypt:
“The intrinsic institutional means of democracy
 Equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well defined public affairs
 Rule of law and governance in line with International law and UN-conventions
 Equal justice
 Full universal human rights
 Democratic political representation through parties and elections
 Legal rights based citizen participation
 Institutionalised channels for interest- and issue based representation
 Local democracy made real in combination with relevant influence on other levels
 Democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private forces)
 Transparent, impartial and accountable governance
 Government’s independence and capacity to take decisions and implement them
 Freedom of and equal access to public discourse, culture and academia within the
framework of human rights
 Citizens’ democratic self-organising”
(Törnquist (forthcoming): 57)
The complete list will naturally be conducive towards political equality in various 
ways, but I can only include the most important institutions for my topic here. My 
selection is based on previous research and logical inference, but as part of my 
analysis I will also compare my selection of vital institutions to the ones emphasized 
by my informants in Egypt.
Let me elaborate on why I have chosen to focus on these five clusters and what 
they include. As I have clarified in the second chapter of this thesis, I am interested in 
explaining variation in how women exercise their right to political participation, which 
I have identified as a root right in a democracy. Democratic rules and regulations as 
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the ones listed above are based on this right, but they also influence to which degree it 
has substance. While the right to participate in politics empowers citizens to demand 
other democratic rights, the fulfillment of other rights equally empowers citizens to 
realize their political rights in a cyclic relationship. However there are some functions 
of a democracy, such as citizens holding government accountable and checking the 
powers of the state, which first require substantial political rights to be at least partially 
fulfilled, and which are less interesting in this analysis as explanations of why Islamist 
women participate in politics. Therefore I am leaving out for example the clusters 
regarding good governance, dissolution of democracy, and government capacity. On 
the other hand, there are some prerequisite elements of democracy which are taken for 
granted and not discussed in this assessment, such as the constitution of demos and 
public affairs. My review of relevant literature does not suggest that these are 
contested issues in relation to Islamist women's political participation. I will not 
include especially the law-related clusters because of time and space constraints, but 
comment on legal issues where they relate to the selected clusters. That leaves me with 
these five clusters of democratic means, which I deem especially relevant for the 
following reasons:
“Full universal human rights” include both political, civil, social and economic 
rights. That political and civil rights are intrinsic democratic means is conventionally 
accepted, but the inclusion of social and economic rights may be more controversial. 
Törnquist argues that these must be added because “it cannot be taken for granted that 
all are citizens, that men and women are equal and that even all of those who are 
citizens can survive and have the chance to function as politically equal human 
beings” (Törnquist (forthcoming): 55). Women are indeed socially and economically 
disadvantaged in Egypt in ways that undermine their political equality, thus an 
assessment of broad-specter human rights is an essential part in an assessment of 
women's political participation. The word “full” here emphasizes that political equality 
is bred not simply by equal rights but by equal chances to exercise them. To this end, it 
is especially important that basic needs are covered and that people have the social 
capacity to engage in politics, including the necessary knowledge about their rights 
and the democratic system.
34
The importance of “democratic political representation through parties and 
elections” in this study has been emphasized previously in the definition of the 
dependent variable. Here, I will add that to ensure that political representation through 
parties and elections contributes towards the aim of democracy, principles such as 
transparency, responsiveness and authorization from a democratic mandate are 
important (Törnquist (forthcoming): 55)
“Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based participation” is 
interesting more for the lack of such channels in Egypt and the consequent limited 
opportunities for women's political participation. Törnquist writes:
“The ninth cluster of rules and regulation relate to the social democratic 
oriented tradition of providing democratic channels for interest- and issue 
based representation in local and central government and implementation of 
government decisions. These arrangements are thus in addition to the 
system of individual citizens’ legally guaranteed participatory rights and 
may be seen as supplementary parts of the political system.”
It may be interesting to contextualize this form of participation in the Egyptian setting 
and examine whether there may exist alternative channels for women's interests and 
issues, or how the lack of these plays out in relation to traditional participation.
“Democratic control of instruments of coercion”, or lack of such, is of almost 
self-evident importance to achieving democracy in a repressive regime such as Egypt 
under Mubarak and in a revolutionary process. It is also a cluster of rules and 
regulations which is especially important for women's political participation in Egypt 
as security threats impact the participation of women and men differently in a 
patriarchal society.
Finally, “citizens' democratic self-organising” is both a human right and an 
important building block of democracy, so that rules and regulations guaranteeing this 
principle have special importance in a democratization process. When it comes to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an organization which has been outlawed in Egypt for half a 
decade, it is obvious that this principle is important to their members. Moreover, it is 
especially important to female members of the Brotherhood who are missing out on 
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the important democratic training that such organizations provide, as they are blocked 
from leadership positions under the explanation that illegal activism is too dangerous 
for women.
4.2.2 Actors, capacity and strategies
Next, the framework suggests that an assessment should identify important actors and 
consider how they relate to the institutions, as well as how these actors in turn are 
shaped by them. Who are the most important actors regarding Islamist women's 
political participation? Törnquist argues that our identification of important actors, in 
order to be as objective as possible, should not be informed by a single theory's 
emphasis on a certain type of actors, such as the middle classes or moderate elites 
(Törnquist (forthcoming): 62). “On the contrary, we need to compare and discuss all 
the vital actors, and their relations to the institutions, which are considered in 
competing explanatory frameworks for the study of democratisation” (Ibid).
In the three perspectives on democratization I am using to explain Islamist 
women's increased political participation, different actors are emphasized and their 
relationship to institutions are explained with different and competing arguments. 
Sequencing theory emphasizes the state as the constructor of democratic institutions 
and sees Islamist opposition groups as potential threats to these. It does not expect 
miracles in terms of undemocratic actors adapting their behavior to democratic 
institutions; rather it is fearful that actors with self-serving strategies may abuse weak 
institutions if there is no “politics of order”. Liberal democratization theory 
emphasizes the role of moderate elites and regime soft-liners in introducing liberal 
democratic institutions through negotiated reforms, especially those serving the 
development of a capitalism-friendly environment, and often with international 
support. Actors are expected to adapt their behavior to these institutions. Gradualism 
theory is more skeptical about the democratizing influence of introducing the “right” 
institutions from above. It emphasizes the need to include the masses in the 
democratizing process and warns against authoritarian-led construction of democratic 
institutions, which is seen as institutionalizing democratic deficits.
According to Törnquist' review of the general literature on democracy, relevant 
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actors to include in an assessment could be the following:
“(...) actors related to the business sector, the middle- and working classes, 
the primary sectors (including big and small farmers and fishermen) as well 
as social categories like politicians and political executives, bureaucrats and 
military, journalists, intellectuals and students and religious and ethnic 
leaders in addition to social movements, civil society organisations, and a 
general categorisation to consider gender division” (Törnquist 
(fortcoming): 62).
To find explanatory factors for this thesis, I have already made a review of previous 
research on Islamic activism and women's political rights in Egypt, in Chapter 3. This 
literature includes actors such as the authoritarian state (previously under president 
Mubarak, now under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), the Islamist 
opposition (the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, most notably the Salafi 
groups), religious leaders (both loyal to the state and independent), female intellectuals 
(some representing Islamic feminism, others secular feminism), women's NGOs (both 
secular and Islamic NGOs, which form no coherent women's movement), the UN (and 
related bodies) and recently the popular masses which claimed a role for themselves in 
the revolution (especially the youth as a highly active and previously underrepresented 
group, but also women, workers and others).
This list may be narrowed down further to focus on the most important actors. 
To explain Islamist women's political participation under Mubarak's authoritarian rule, 
obviously the regime is the most influential actor – but, as it was overthrown, the 
revolution proved the political capacity of other actors which must be included in an 
assessment of more recent events. The loosely defined “revolutionary youth groups” 
which led the demonstrations that toppled Mubarak were indeed important for this 
critical chain of events, but seem to have lost much of their political influence since. 
The revolution was a critical turning point for universal political participation in 
Egypt, but in the longer perspective of this study, the revolutionary youth groups 
themselves have ephemeral relevance. External forces such as the UN have had little 
direct influence, especially in the revolution and the following transition process, and 
will be left out of the analysis except where other actors relate to them. However I will 
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include women's rights organizations, because their influence or lack of such is 
important to understanding why women choose to participate in politics in the Islamist 
movement. 
The Egyptian military, in the shape of the currently ruling Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF) has appeared as a powerful political force in the post-
revolution transition period. As they lay much of the premises for the democratization 
process (Brown 2012), they are necessary to include. The Muslim Brotherhood is a 
given actor in this case study that focuses on its women, but as previous research on 
Islamist organizations have shown, such an organization should not simply be taken as 
one actor. Instead one should pay attention to internal variations between the 
leadership, possible reformists, the youth section and the women's section etcetera, as 
these may often have conflicting views and opinions, and sometimes even different 
strategies. I will return to this in the analysis. Other Islamist groups will not receive 
special attention in this study as the Brotherhood is the best case of women’s 
participation. 
After identifying the vital actors, the framework proposes some questions to ask 
about how they relate to the institutions of our interest. To assess whether the actors 
accept that democracy is “the only game in town” one can ask whether they produce, 
consume or destroy (avoid or abuse) the institutions of democracy (Törnquist 
(forthcoming): 62). In this study, focus will primarily be on how the identified actors 
relate to the six clusters of rules and regulations previously selected. Probably, some 
relations between actors and institutions will call for closer attention. What are the 
politics and policies of the actors regarding institutions that are especially important or 
problematic? Also, how have the institutions affected the behavior of the actors? 
Törnquist proposes that “one may identify specific institutional arrangements that have 
been crafted to alter actors’ behavior, and then use them as a point of departure for 
finding out whether and how the projected positive effects have materialized” (Ibid: 
63).
Next, it is necessary to look at the political capacity of the actors included 
because “power matters for what actors can do and how institutions are shaped and 
perform” (Törnquist (forthcoming): 67). Political capacity has implications for the 
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dynamics of democratization which we will turn to later, and a certain level of political 
capacity must be in place to enable people to act as citizens and promote as well as use 
the democratic institutions (Ibid). After reviewing broad-scope analyzes of 
democratization, Törnquist has narrowed down the variables used to explain political 
capacity to five main arguments (Ibid). Here I will briefly present the five arguments, 
which could also be called categories of capacities, and the questions outlined in the 
framework that may be asked of vital actors regarding these capacities:
1) Political inclusion/exclusion. Democratization presupposes that “people shall not 
be excluded from politics and the vital parts of society that effect politics” (Törnquist 
(forthcoming): 67). What capacity do the actors have to be included and to fight 
exclusion? Are the vital actors present or excluded in the political terrain, and how? 
Are some actors or groups marginalized?
2) Authority and legitimacy. To have political power, actors must be able to 
transform various forms of capital (for example social capital, economic power, 
knowledge or intellectual influence, religious authority, military power, or “people 
power” of demonstrations etc.)  into authority and legitimacy. Which types of capital 
do the actors draw their power from? How do the actors transform, or fail to transform 
this capital into authority (what Bourdieu calls symbolic capital) and legitimacy, and 
ultimately political power (Ibid: 68)?
3) Politicization and agenda-setting. Democratization requires that citizens have 
some capacity to set the political agenda by turning their non-private concerns into 
public political matters (Ibid: 69). What matters do the actors deem to be public 
matters ? To what extent and how have they been able to put them on the political 
agenda?
4) Mobilization and organization. To gain political capacity, actors must be able to 
mobilize and organize support (incorporated by way of elite populism and clientelism, 
or integrated by way of organizing from below) for their demands and policies (Ibid: 
70). Which of these mobilization strategies do the actors employ to gain support?
5) Participation and representation. Democratization also requires that existing 
means of participation and representation can be used, reformed or developed in order 
to influence governance institutions, especially as these are often underdeveloped in 
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democratizing societies (Ibid: 70). Where do the major actors who dominate or foster 
change turn with their matters of concern, and how (Ibid: 74)? What about ordinary 
people?
In my case study I will focus mainly on the actors’ capacity in terms of political 
inclusion/exclusion, transformation of capital into authority or legitimacy, and 
mobilization and organization capacities. Previous studies have shown that women are 
not able to set the political agenda until they reach a critical mass of representation 
which Egypt is far from achieving, therefore this would be less relevant to study at an 
early stage of the democratization process. The question of where actors and citizens 
could or should turn with matters of concern is a matter of much confusion at this 
stage in the post-revolution transition process, therefore this kind of capacity would 
also best be addressed at a later stage.
Finally, the framework calls for increased attention to the dynamics of 
democratization. As the framework is built to assess the substance and not only the 
formalities of democracy, a critical aspect is to capture how the critical factors of 
democratization interact and change. How do the strategies and government policies of 
the vital actors affect critical aspects of democratization, and vice versa (Ibid: 86)? To 
narrow this part of the analysis down, I will focus on the most relevant problems of 
democratization identified earlier in the analysis, and especially deficits related to 
popular democratic representation, as political participation and representation (by 
extension) is the phenomenon in question in this thesis.
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5 Research Methods
To compare the explanatory power my three theoretical perspectives hold over my 
puzzle, I need observations to explain, in other words data material to analyze. How 
can I collect and analyze data to find answers to my puzzle, and which kinds of 
inferences can I make? Studies of Islamic activism are growing in number, but little 
attention is dedicated to women's roles as activists and especially in politics, and few 
empirical studies have been conducted on this. Because I wish to have more empirical 
data about my puzzle, I have chosen to conduct a field study in Cairo and use 
qualitative interviewing to produce the kind of “thick” data that can produce some of 
the inferences I want, as described below. Then I will rely on this thick data and 
extensive use of secondary literature as evidence about Islamist women's political 
participation which I can analyze.
The secondary literature readily available to me consists of a small number of 
papers or studies focusing especially on Islamism and women's activism, a larger 
number of books and studies focusing on Islamic movements, the relationship between 
Islam and democracy or between Islam and women's rights, and no quantitative studies 
or available data sets with information on Islamist women's participation that I have 
been able to find. In chapter 6 I have included the most relevant studies for this thesis 
in my review of previous research, and suggested how it may inform the analysis. In 
the following I will describe how the empirical material has been collected and discuss 
how it can be used to make inferences.
5.1 Qualitative interviewing and use of secondary sources
Interviewing is especially relevant when little empirical material exists, as is the case 
regarding women's political participation in the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore I have 
conducted a field study in Cairo during the month of February 2012, where I met and 
interviewed 15 informants, of which 10 were women associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This interview material is the basis of the “thick description” of Islamist 
women's experiences with and opinions about political participation and related issues 
which I present in chapter 7, contextualized in a more general presentation of the 
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Brotherhood's history, relationship to the state and changes in women's roles. In 
chapter 7 I also elaborate on which questions I asked in the interviews. I conducted 
semi-structured interviews, allowing the informants time to elaborate on their answers 
and me the chance to ask follow-up questions or rephrase answers to double-check my 
interpretations.
The interview material lets me explore why Islamist women participate in 
politics and other kinds of activism, from their own perspective. This presentation lays 
the foundations for my understanding of the puzzle which I seek to explain by my 
analysis in chapter 8. For this explanation I including more data about context, 
structural factors and other actors than the Brotherhood, and compare the explanatory 
power of the three theoretical approaches to democratization presented in chapter 4. 
Because qualitative interviews cannot produce all the data I need for this analysis, I 
will draw extensively on information from secondary sources. I have also used 
secondary literature to find arguments or factors which I can look for support for in my 
interviews and analysis, and I will look for support in the literature for my own 
inferences based on the interview material as part of the analysis. Preferably, I would 
have included some statistical data in the analysis pertaining to the percentage of 
women members in the Muslim Brotherhood and in the movement's political 
activities, but this information is not available due to the movement's history as an 
outlawed organization.
To explain women's increasing political participation in Islamist movements in 
Egypt it is clearly necessary to look qualitatively at the complex relationship between 
individual factors such as the mobilizing mechanisms of the Islamist movement as 
well as cultural, economic, social and political structures that have produced and 
shaped Islamist women's participation. Qualitative methods allow us to trace processes 
between X and Y and explain the mechanisms that produce an observed outcome 
rather than just measure their correlations statistically. The kind of inferences that 
these research methods allow for are fitting for my research question. Based on my 
interview material I may be able to say something about the experiences of my 
interviewees concerning their association with the organization which can produce 
hypothetical explanations to the research question. I can trace processes of how my 
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informants have come to join, leave or advance within the movement. From their 
ideas, opinions and reasoning, I might better understand which ideas and kinds of 
argumentation motivate them and others like them to political activism. By 
considering which factors the interviewees themselves give importance to, which are 
downplayed and which perhaps might be omitted, I can suggest which explanations of 
women's increased political participation seem more credible. And through a 
contextualized assessment of how the Muslim Brotherhood interacts with other major 
actors, influences democratic institutions and is shaped by them in turn, in my analysis 
I may suggest why its women are increasingly more involved in politics and whether 
this contributes to democratization and the promotion of women's political rights.
5.2 Data collection
Here I will describe briefly how the interview material was collected during my 
fieldwork in Cairo in February 2012, starting with my sampling procedure.
Because the Muslim Brotherhood lacks a membership register or a similar pool 
to draw or select my informants from, I used the snowballing method to reach the 
informants I wanted to interview for this thesis. I was primarily interested in 
interviewing women associated with the Muslim Brotherhood who had experience 
from political activities, which could be anything from participating in demonstrations 
or student politics to running for elections. I started out by interviewing young female 
activists who were or had recently been members of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom I 
found through newspaper articles, social media and connections in Cairo. I met and 
interviewed five of these young women, who were in their late teens or in their 
twenties. Through these informants, e-mail contact with the Brotherhood organization 
and other connections in Cairo I was also able to reach two women in their thirties 
who were co-founders of and committee members in the the Freedom and Justice 
Party, one older woman who had been active in the Brotherhood for more than a 
generation, and one female member of parliament representing the Freedom and 
Justice Party. Altogether I interviewed ten women, three of whom were youths who 
had left the Brotherhood after the revolution.
43
I also interviewed four men associated with the Brotherhood. One of them was 
a young previous member who had left the movement since the revolution, two were 
youths who were still active members and supporters of the Brotherhood, and one was 
a middle-generation member with leadership responsibility. All these men worked or 
had worked with the Ikwanweb.com website which is the Muslim Brotherhood's 
official English website, and as such were experienced with representing the 
Brotherhood. In addition I interviewed a scholar at the American University in Cairo 
who teaches gender and social activism, who has studied women's organizations in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and who has a critical perspective on the Islamist 
movements. These last five interviews were conducted to increase my own knowledge 
about the topic of the thesis and not to produce data about women's political 
participation.
The snowballing method I used for sampling did not provide me with the 
broadest specter possible of experiences and opinions on women's political 
participation in the Muslim Brotherhood. Every time I asked informants to help me 
contact other members that they knew, it is expectable that this introduced some 
selection bias because the new informant was likely to hold similar opinions to the 
informant that led me to her. Some informants were also selected by the Brotherhood 
organization to avail themselves for interviewing at my request, and it is likely that 
they were selected because they are considered to be good representatives to a Western 
audience, which may also introduce some bias in the available observations of 
experiences and opinions. Also, my sample has an age imbalance with more youth 
being represented than married or older women. I suspect that because of these biases, 
my informants may be more liberal in sum than the average Brotherhood member. 
However, some bias is unavoidable with this sampling method. There is also 
considerable variation in the experiences and opinions presented to me by these 
informants, including opinions that may be categorized as conservative, and the 
material is by no means invalid because of some selection bias.
The best way to amend for selection bias when random sampling is impractical 
(because the universe is unknown, or because the sample size is too small, both of 
which reasons are present here) is to select strategically. In my sampling I sought to 
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select so that I had some variety across age and experience among my informants, 
which I achieved. Underway in the interviewing process I also realized that it would 
strengthen the sample to include former members who had left due to disagreement 
with the movement, because it would provide more variety in the observations 
available to me, and therefore the three former members I have mentioned were 
included.
All of the interviews were conducted in Cairo, sometimes in the home of the 
interviewee but most often in a public place such as a cafe. Many of the interviews 
were conducted with the help of an Arabic-English interpreter, while some were 
conducted in English. I did not make sound recordings of the interviews, as it was 
impractical in the settings where most of the interviews were conducted, but took 
detailed notes on a laptop while interviewing. I attempted to write down the 
informant's answers word-by-word and in as much detail as possible, but naturally I 
can not guarantee that every word of my interview notes are correct without sound 
recordings. I will make little use of direct quotations and be careful to not put special 
emphasis on word choice in analyzing my interview notes, since these may be 
distorted both by interpretation or the informant speaking in a language that is foreign 
to her, and by my simultaneous interviewing and taking notes. Instead I will look for 
and analyze the ideas and abstract concept represented by the answers I have recorded.
To analyze these interview notes, I borrow the process of coding as a tool for 
data analysis from grounded theory, although I don't follow the grounded theory 
approach to data collection and analysis whole-scale. My analysis is indeed more 
informed by theory and less iterative than the grounded theory ideal. The very limited 
time I had to conduct interviews for my data collection did not allow me to 
simultaneously analyze this data. Instead I have attempted to use coding as a tool to 
organize and analyze the information gathered in my interview notes after the 
interviewing process was over. The coding and analysis of my interview material will 
be further discussed as the findings from this material is presented in chapter 7.
45
5.3 Internal and external validity
In qualitative interviewing, people's experiences and attitudes are explored in debt, 
which allows us to conclude more confidently about the meaning behind the data we 
produce. This means that in this study I can be quite confident about the internal 
validity of the inferences I make based on my interview material. When I am asking 
my interviewees about their experiences with political participation as women, or their 
opinions on women's participation, this produces a “thick”, in-depth description of the 
topics discussed. Interviewees can elaborate on the issues of special concern to them, 
and I can use interview techniques such as rephrasing information given by the 
interviewees to double-check whether my interpretations are correct.
A large part of my analysis will also be based on secondary sources, which I 
combine in a qualitative in-depth study of one single case. This lets me contextualize 
the various factors I include into explanations and consider how the factors influence 
each other and relate, which enhances the internal validity of my study and reduces the 
uncertainty of my causal inferences.
External validity is not the strength of qualitative research and generalization 
across cases is not the primary aim of this study; I am more interested in developing a 
deep, contextualized understanding of the case I consider to be the best possible to 
base an explanation for my research question on. Hopefully, this case study will 
contribute some increased knowledge about the factors which might explain Islamist 
women's political participation and how they interact.
5.4 Reliability
While I have stated that the strength of this study will be its internal rather than 
external validity, one other important aspect will determine whether the result will be a 
useful contribution to the scholarly literature. That is the issue of reliability, which can 
very simply be defined as the replicability of my study. It is an important principle of 
accumulative science that for a study to be reliable, it should be possible to conduct the 
same study twice with the same results. While this is rarely done, the principle is 
important because it demands a high degree of transparency when it comes to 
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methodological choices and a commitment to sharing the data material on which the 
analysis is conducted. In comparative politics this is especially important because 
scholars are often limited to studying one or a few cases at a time, but their inferences 
can be compared to those of other scholars who have conducted similar studies if these 
principles have been observed. I have aimed to follow the ideals of comparative 
politics so that the findings in this thesis may be comparable. In short, this means that I 
have attempted to be explicit about the logic of my research design and the basis of the 
findings in my study. 
However there is an obvious limitation to reliability when a study is based on 
qualitative interviews which naturally cannot be replicated with the same results. I can 
make the notes from my interviews available for others to analyze, but if someone 
wished to replicate the interviews themselves they would be hard pressed to even 
reach the same people I have interviewed, and the conversations would naturally run 
differently the second time around even if the same questions were asked. The best I 
can do is to share with the reader all relevant information about how the data material 
has been collected as well as what the interviewees have been asked and said, before I 
present my analysis, so that it is possible to follow, challenge or replicate the process 
of data collection and analysis. Therefore, I have shared detailed information about 
how the interview material has been collected in this chapter.
47
6 Previous Research
What does previous research have to tell us about the phenomenon I here aim to study, 
Islamist women's political participation? In this chapter I present the most relevant 
explanations provided by previous research, as well as some points of dispute that may 
be examined further. Later, I will draw on these elements in my analysis.
6.1 What promotes women's rights in Egypt?
This question is subject for great dispute in the literature. Broadly speaking, three 
strategies for promoting women's rights in Egypt are recognized; secular feminism, 
Islamic feminism, and conventional Islamic activism. The first strategy is followed by 
an array of organizations and individual activists, but does not amount to a popular 
movement for lack of unification and grass root support. The second strategy is more 
of a theoretical exercise which mostly female scholars of Islam engage in. Only the 
third is a social movement, which unites various organizations and actors in a sense of 
common purpose. Here I will elaborate briefly on the distinctions between the three, 
before each is presented with some questions regarding its potential for empowering 
women.
The gender agenda of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood is challenged 
not only by Western feminists but also by secular feminists of the Muslim world. 
These dismiss the particularism of Islamic feminism and argue that women’s human 
rights should not be derived from religion, but rather from a set of rights that are 
universal and apply to Muslim and non-Muslim women all over the world. Barlow and 
Akbarzadeh remind us that Islamic and secular Muslim feminism have been 
competing movements over the last four decades, noting that “Muslim feminism is not 
necessarily bound by Islam, or by what Islamists proclaim to be Islam,” (2006: 1482). 
The main divide between the two strategies, in other words, is over whether women's 
rights can be based on and advanced by a particular religion, or whether they must be 
based on universal human rights. But even on the pro-Islamic side, there is at least one 
other dividing factor. What is it that separates the Islamic feminists from the 
“conventional” Islamic activists? Amina Wadud, an Islamic feminist herself, provides 
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a description of what she believes Islamic feminism can do for women:
“By going back to primary sources and interpreting them afresh, women 
scholars are endavoring to remove the fetters imposed by centuries of 
patriarchal interpretation and practice. By questioning underlying 
presumptions and conclusions they are creating a space in which to think 
about gender. Drawing upon enduring principles of human rights, enshrined 
in the text, they extract meanings that can interact with the changing moral 
and intellectual circumstances of the reader” (Wadud 2006: 204).
This feminist challenge towards patriarchy by re-interpretation of Islamic principles is 
not so popular with the Islamists. Although Islamic feminists do it to varying degrees 
and effects – and some even reject the “Islamic feminist” title altogether – this gender-
sensitive re-interpretation remains mostly the domain of scholars, while the Islamist 
movements interpret the Islamic principles more in conformity with the cultural 
context in which they are embedded. However this divide is not categorical but rather 
more of a sliding scale, and some liberal Islamists may well be inclined to accept re-
interpretation of Islamic principles in gender issues.
6.1.1 Secular feminism in Egypt
Iranian scholar and feminist Valentine M. Moghadam describes how the context in 
which women try to defend their rights in Egypt, as in other Middle Eastern and 
Muslim countries, is marked by a perceived struggle (if not conflict) between the 
Muslim world and the West. Especially so, argues Moghadam, in countries where 
Islamist movements are strong (2003: 185). This means that when women are 
defending their rights, they are "frequently accused of being Westernized" and 
"importing a foreign ideology", as Moghadam notes (Ibid). Thus, she sees secular 
feminism as a tough strategy to pursue in the promotion of women's rights in Egypt, 
while strategies of Islamic feminism or conventional Islamic activism are more easily 
accepted by the society (Ibid).
Is this strategy indeed too hard to follow? Egyptian researcher Aliaa Dawoud 
has looked at three well-known secular women's rights organizations in Egypt and the 
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discourse they use to promote women's rights concerning two important legal revisions 
concerning women's rights in Egypt in recent years. These are the issues of women's 
right to transfer their nationality to their children and husband (nationality law) and 
women's right to unilateral divorce (khula law). She argues that “Egyptian feminists 
have abandoned women's rights discourse because it either gets them nowhere or 
backfires. They have replaced it with de-gendered and paternalistic discourses” 
(Dawoud 2011). 
The organizations Dawoud studies are quite different in their aim and make-up. 
Therefore, one could expect that their discourse and favored arguments for promoting 
women's rights would wary, however Dawoud argues that they all display the same 
discursive pattern (Ibid). The first organization, the Association for the Development 
and Enhancement of Women (ADEW), primarily aims to empower women who are 
heads of their households, but does not focus on political empowerment especially. 
The second, the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR), is an independent 
NGO that aims to realize all of Egyptian women's rights based on the Egyptian 
constitution and international conventions about women, and specifically focus on 
empowering  women politically and legally.
Finally, Dawoud also looks at the National Council for Women (NCW) which 
was a government organization established by Presidential decree in 2000, in response 
to the UN Beijing Platform for Action (Dawoud 2011). Highly unpopular after the 
revolution for its close links to Mubarak, it closed down in 2011 after a fire in the 
headquarters. This organization distinguished itself from the other two by being 
closely linked to the presidency and consisting mainly of members from the former 
regime or the previously ruling National Democratic Party. The NCW had a mandate 
to suggest as well as comment on, follow up and evaluate government policies and law 
proposals pertaining to women's issues (Ibid). 
While the political nature of the organizations were different, Dawoud found 
the same pattern of discourse change away from women's rights. She warns that 
although these discourses have produced some gains (in terms of legal reforms) “they 
are largely short-term and/or incomplete ones. More importantly, in the long-run, they 
will actually make it more difficult for Egyptian women to obtain their rights” (Ibid). 
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If these secular organizations have abandoned the discourse of women's rights, is that a 
sign that the secular strategy of empowering women based on universal rights is 
weakened relative to other strategies?
6.1.2 Islamic Feminism
Omaima Abou-Bakr is a scholar of English and comparative literature in Egypt, and a 
proponent of Islamic feminism. While Islamic feminism is a label which is often 
rejected by Islamic women because they do not view themselves as “feminists”, a 
word evoking ideas of Western-style gender ideas, she embraces it. Abou-Bakr 
provides an example of someone who advocates for a reinterpretation of the Quranic 
text and prophetic tradition in order to establish women’s rights within an Islamic 
framework. She argues that women have a right in Islam to raise their concerns, as 
validated by two episodes described in the prophetic tradition where God himself has 
responded to concerns and questions raised by women (Hatem 2006). “If God himself 
and the Prophet (pbuh) gave ear to Muslim women’s queries, then why should not any 
particular Muslim community if the need arises at another point of our history?”, 
Abou-Bakr asks rhetorically (quoted in Hatem 2006: 33). 
What she seeks to prove is that questioning gender issues is not a Western idea 
but one that existed and was accepted even in the early years of Islam, the time period 
which Islamists strive to replicate the ideals of in today’s society. Abou-Bakr indeed 
represents a moderate interpretation of Islam, but her way of developing her ideology 
is the same as that of the Muslim Brotherhood's; reinterpretation of Islamic principles 
according to the context of the current society. Although her interpretations of Islam do 
not have the same following as the Brotherhood's, they expand the Islamic debate and 
may contribute to an increased room for reinterpretation and variations in 
interpretation within larger Islamic movements. Have the women who have become 
more politically active in the Brotherhood engaged in or been empowered by such 
reinterpretations?
Another well-known if controversial Islamic feminist, scholar Amina Wadud, 
claims that women's political participation and representation are among the issues that 
need to be revisited today (Kamrava 2006: 201). In Wadud's opinion, the 
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conceptualizations of gender and gender relations found in the Quran are liberating for 
both men and women, when contextualized and understood properly (Ibid). Wadud 
argues that the male scholars and thinkers of Islam who later laid the foundations of 
the religion, without the benefit of having known the Prophet directly or experienced 
Revelation first-hand, “moved away from the Qur'an's ethical codes for female 
autonomy to advocate instead women's subservience, silence, and seclusion” (Wadud 
2006: 203). To her, this is something women can and need to challenge today by 
reinterpreting the correct meaning of Islam. Is this what the women of the Muslim 
Brotherhood have done? Islamic feminists are controversial among Islamists because 
they try, as exemplified by Wadud, to separate patriarchal fundamentalism from the 
ideals they believe are truly Islamic, thus reaching interpretations that appear quite 
radical to the conservative Islamist movements and their patriarchal, traditional 
societies. Is it possible that the women of the Muslim Brotherhood have advanced into 
politics without challenging this patriarchy?
6.1.3 Conventional Islamic activism
If secular feminism is under pressure and Islamic feminism is too radical to engage the 
people, what may be a viable alternative to empowering women in Egypt and the Arab 
world? Can Islamic activism empower women? 
Valentine Moghadam asks of women who join what she calls fundamentalist 
Islamic movements whether they are patriarchal women or Islamic feminist (2003: 
185). She is suspicious that this strategy of promoting women's rights entails 
“internalizing the notion that Islam or the community is in danger”, which results in 
“an ordering of priorities established by the male leadership and an indefinite 
postponement of issues of equality and empowerment" (Ibid). Her description of this 
strategy to promoting women's rights is a good example of the qualms many have 
about believing that women are actually committed to this strategy, rather than lured 
in:
"This strategy avoids challenging identity and frees women from the fear of 
betrayal; moreover, fundamentalist groups have both the will and the funds 
to offer their members various gratifications and advantages, such as grants 
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to study, free medical care, and loans without interest. Women followers 
also benefit from social and parental recognition and the ability to choose a 
husband within the group instead of going through an arranged marriage. In 
this context, hijab makes possible women's entry into and activity within 
the public spaces dominated by men" (Moghadam 2003: 185).
Is this view of the conventional Islamic strategy justified by what we can observe of 
women's empowerment in Islamic movements? While the literature is aflood with 
legal and theological discussions of the gender roles in Islamism, assessing the 
empowering capacity of the Islamist movements is difficult because of the lack of 
literature that have an empirical focus on how Islamist movements develop and 
practice their gender ideologies. Important exceptions of relevance to the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood include Omayma Abdel-Latif's article «In the Shadow of the 
Brothers: The Women of the Muslim Brotherhood» (2008) and «Women in Islamist 
Movements: Towards an Islamist Model of Women's Activism» (2007) co-authored 
with Marina Ottaway. 
Comparatively to Moghadam, Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway (2007) 
believe in an emerging women's agenda within the Islamist movement which has 
potential for empowerment, as female members are raising a debate about women's 
roles, rights and issues of particular interest to them. Essentially their concerns are 
similar to those of women elsewhere across history and different societies, but their 
answers are different, as they are re-framing women's rights in the Islamic frame of 
restoring the original, ideal Islam and deriving their answers from the Islamic tradition 
(Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007: 6). Such an Islamic paradigm for women's issues has 
great potential, but is far from a coherent, viable reality, as Abdellatif and Ottaway 
point out. Indeed, the existing discourse is full of disagreements and self-
contradictions. If a paradigm will manifest itself in the future, it is highly unclear what 
it will look like, except that it will be different from Western feminism. Islamist 
women view Western feminism as «a movement to free women from all social 
constraints and obligations to family and community, leading to excessive 
individualism and even licentiousness» (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007: 7). 
53
Many Islamist women recognize that women's roles in their societies do not 
correspond to the rights and opportunities that they envision for women. Naturally 
they do not hold Islam responsible for this; instead they argue that if women are 
oppressed, this goes against the true ideals of Islam and is caused by human factors 
such as politically oppressive settings, conservative traditions, lack of education and 
enlightenment. Men's interpretations of Islam have not been immune to these factors; 
therefore they can explain less empowering interpretations of Islam as corrupted by 
pre-Islamic influences, cultural conservatism etcetera. Abdellatif and Ottaway find that 
women in Islamist movements are not very critical of their own organizations (2007: 
10). They found that women of the Muslim Brotherhood firstly blame political 
oppression for their inferior positions relative to men, while Hisbollah women blame 
social and cultural norms (Ibid). There does exist an internal pressure to better 
represent women in these movements, but Abdellatif and Ottaway find that very few 
women are willing to put themselves in opposition to their movements on account of 
this issue. To their understanding, the female Islamists feel that their movements have 
enabled their empowerment more than they have restricted it:
«It is clear from these interviews that women are pushing for change within 
the Islamist movements. However, it is also clear that they feel the 
movements, probably more inadvertently than by design, have offered a 
space where they have started organizing, analyzing and challenging the 
social norms and cultural values that undermine their position, and, more 
tentatively, demanding changes within the movements themselves» 
(Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007: 11).
Is this the case in the Muslim Brotherhood, that women have inadvertently had 
their roles developed into political participation? If these are the processes that 
have promoted women into politics, what does it mean for the Brotherhood's 
commitment to women's political rights?
6.1.4 A failed elite project?
Hania Sholkamy, in an article discussing feminist empowerment programs in the Arab 
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world, argues that feminism in this region has been unsuccessful and elite biased in 
promoting women's rights (2010). “Women’s rights advocates may have educated the 
revolutionaries and the rulers. But they have not by themselves been able to affect 
history or the polity. The quantum leaps in realizing rights were initiated by social and 
national movements”, she claims (Ibid: 257). Her verdict of the Arab women’s rights 
movement is that while Egypt and other Arab countries have seen feminist 
movements, feminism has a very limited audience, few results to show for itself and a 
troublesome, popularly perceived connection to the West (Ibid: 256). In Sholkamy's 
perspective women are empowered by engaging in larger projects and practices that 
have real potential to transform society, rather than by being the receivers of gender-
targeted development initiatives (Ibid). This is a perspective it is easy to agree with, 
and it adds weight to the idea that Islamism, as a movement with great capacity to 
transform society, also can improve women's rights in a bottom-up way by engaging 
them in this project. But does this not depend on what kind of a society the Islamists 
aim at? Can their aims and ideals be simultaneously promoted with women's 
democratic rights?
Empowerment by feminist movements has not only been an activity of the elite, 
but has mostly benefited the elite, according to Sholkamy's broad-brush verdict. She 
argues that development initiatives have failed Arab women because they have not 
been able to alter the patriarchal contexts in which their lives and choices are 
embedded (Ibid). This failure has highly differentiated impacts on women of the lower 
and higher socio-economic classes. While middle-class women may be able to benefit 
from policies based on assumptions about family solidarity and patriarchal obligations, 
it leaves few options for women whose families cannot guarantee them opportunities 
for work, education and access to assets (Ibid: 256). With unemployment on the rise, 
social security systems compromised by economic reforms and increased demand, and 
increased informalization of markets, many poor Arab women (and men) are left with 
little income, family support and security (Ibid). In other words, what may be 
empowering to a few is not necessarily empowering to the masses.
Indeed, the Islamist movements are not about to challenge the patriarchy 
wholesale, the way Islamic feminists may be doing in a scholarly fashion. However, 
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the Islamist movements have shown a strong commitment to realizing social justice, as 
proven by their extensive charity work and community programs. As Sholkamy points 
out, realizing women's rights is also about improving the conditions in which they are 
able to exercise them. As such, the Islamic strategy may empower and inspire more 
women than a failed elite project of feminism.
6.2 Why do women engage in Islamic activism?
To examine women's participation in the Islamist movement, it is first useful to look at 
some of the existing literature that explains the rise of Islamism in the Muslim world 
and pick up some arguments from the theories applied. Why do people join this 
movement in the first place? What made Islamism appeal as an ideology and what 
helped Islamist movements to gain a growing following in the Muslim world? 
6.2.1 Understanding the rise of Islamism
Here I will present some traditional explanations to the rise of Islamism, before I point 
out some weaknesses with these explanations. Islamism is widely understood as a 
reaction against the social, political and economic expansion of the West into the 
Muslim world, especially motivated by the failure of modernization projects in the 
Muslim world as prescribed by the West. Two types of grievance-based models of 
explanation dominate the literature; cultural identity models, and political economy 
models. They are not mutually exclusive in their explanations, but emphasize different 
structural strains. I will describe their main arguments briefly, beginning with the 
cultural identity model of explanation.
At the heels of decolonization in the mid-20th century, many leaders in Muslim 
countries adopted the Western project of modernization with liberalization of the 
economy, downgrading of local traditions and customs, and importation of Western 
technology and culture. However, they largely failed to deliver on their promises of 
progress and prosperity for the masses. Proponents of cultural identity models of 
explanation stress that the Western cultural domination of the Muslim world alienated 
the Muslim masses and led to a collective protest, the rise of Islamism, in which they 
sought to reclaim their Islamic heritage as a source of identity and value to build 
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society on. Nazih Ayubi is one scholar who argues, along these lines, that the rise of 
Islamism can be understood as a reaction towards alienation and a quest for 
authenticity (Høigilt og Selvik 2008: 10). This cultural identity model of explanation 
suggests that Islamism today is driven by a desire for identity and morality; as a 
positive reorientation towards the local culture and religion, which had long been 
considered an obstacle to be overcome in the modernization process, and as a counter-
balance to rapid social change, which many perceived as a threat to moral order (Utvik 
2011: 28).
Political economy models, on the other hand, explain the rise of Islamism as a 
reaction to political mismanagement, widespread corruption, lack of economic growth, 
social inequality and lack of political rights affecting the wast majority of people in the 
Middle East and North Africa region. In short, people's worldly grievances are the base 
units for this model of explanation. Arguably, women as a group suffer from such 
socioeconomic factors at least as much as men, and are often disproportionally 
affected by them.
Saad Eddin Ibrahim exemplifies this model of explanation by arguing that since 
independence, Egypt has unsuccessfully "experimented" with several secular 
alternative solution to these pressing socioeconomic issues. First a liberal experiment 
from 1922 to 1952, then a national-socialist experiment from 1952 to 1970, and since a 
quasi-autocratic experiment starting in 1970 and continuing under Mubarak (Ibrahim 
2002: 27). In general, Ibrahim argues that the Muslim world has responded to Western 
domination through emulating the West (liberalism), attempting to reconcile Western 
civilization with Muslim heritage (nationalism), or by rejection of the West altogether - 
that would be, through Islamism (Ibid: 66). Since the secular alternatives have failed, 
the "Islamic solution" - although untried except in Iran after the revolution, at the time 
when Ibrahim was writing - has an increasing appeal as a response to people's 
socioeconomic grievances, according to this model. Ibrahim thus understand the 
resurgence of Islamism in the 1980s as a third wave of "politicized Islam as an idiom 
for expressing profound worldly grievances" (Ibid: 76). Political models of 
explanation also often stress that the lack of credible opposition groups in 
undemocratic political systems leaves a political vacuum that the Islamists have been 
57
able to exploit.
Are women participating in Islamist movements as a way of alleviating their 
socioeconomic grievances, as this model suggests? If so, what about the 
overwhelmingly middle-class demography of the Islamist movements? The rise of 
Islamism cannot be understood simply as a product of structural strains that paved the 
ground for a new, untried ideology. To understand the rise of Islamism as a popular 
movement we should be able to say something about how the structural or contextual 
factors that facilitated this rise were made use of by those who believed that «Islam is 
the solution». These two models of explanations include many grievances which 
undoubtedly have motivated Islamic activism in the MENA region, but they still do 
not suffice to explain why or how this movement has mobilized. The two models are 
too focused on either ideological or structural dimensions, and therefore they miss the 
strategic or mobilizing dimension of Islamism as a social movement. This is made 
apparent in a striking paradox which these models do not explain, namely that 
Islamism is at the same time a reaction to and a product of modernization. Islamist 
movements have been formed by the growing middle classes, and took long to develop 
a membership base among the poor, whose grievances are more dire. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, although popular today with the poorer and rural parts of the 
population, was started by and is still led by the educated, urban middle class. They 
found their strength in public universities and professional syndicates. Moreover, their 
mobilization comes in the face of the serious risks associated with political opposition 
in autocracies, especially in times of violent confrontation with the state.
The grievance-based models do not sufficiently explain why Islamism attracted 
its followers in the face of such risks. The structural strains emphasized in explaining 
the rise of Islamism such as the failure of secular modernization, Western cultural 
imperialism, or lack of formal political access – or, increasingly, a combination of 
these strains, are very real. However, these explanations rest on a logic which has been 
heavily criticized. Structural strains exists in all societies and do not necessarily 
produce movements; especially not in poor countries with limited resources and 
restricted political freedoms. In fact, contentious social movements are much more 
prevalent in resourceful, democratic Western societies. “While grievances are 
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ubiquitous, movements are not”, notes Quintan Wiktorowicz, who has studied Islamist 
movements from a social movement perspective (2004: 10). Conventionally, social 
scientists have not addressed this flaw in the underlying logic of their models, but 
rather combined the different structural strains into more complex models of 
explanations. “The massive accumulation of different social problems makes 
mobilization seem virtually inevitable,” Wiktorowicz admits, but it does not explain 
why, for example, groups choose different intra-movement tactics within the same 
political context, or why Islamism was chosen over another ism, or how movements 
mobilize under repressive conditions (2004: 9). Therefore these grievance-based 
explanations, while undoubtedly part of the answer, are insufficient causal 
explanations of Islamic activism.
6.2.2 Women's Islamic activism
Why, then, do women or others join Islamist movements? And more specifically, why 
did women's Islamic activism in the political field rise over the recent years? In my 
literature review I have found three pieces to the puzzle that focus on and explain 
women's activism from a rational actor perspective, which I present here.
Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway (2008) present the most ready-made 
explanations to the puzzle, as they have studied the same phenomenon but on a 
regional scale. They argue that Islamist women have become more active and 
empowered because of three factors: 1) Islamist movements needed women for wider 
outreach, 2) educated women members of Islamist movements have become more 
aware of their own importance, 3) Islamist movements provided a safe space from 
which to press for women's rights without being dismissed as Western stooges (2007: 
5). Indeed, Islamist movements have made efforts to make the most of women's 
activism, including «strengthening the organizational structures of women's branches 
as well as engaging women in crucial political tasks such as election campaigning and 
voting on election day» (Ibid). 
In the eyes of Abdellatif and Ottaway, women's empowerment in Islamist 
movements was an unexpected outcome of their activism, a pattern which resembles 
that of Western social movements. «Like women in political movements elsewhere in 
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the world, they soon started asking whether activism only meant helping with the 
implementation of policies decided by male leaders or whether women had a right to 
be involved in making decisions» (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007: 6). However, 
Abdellatif and Ottaway acknowledge that this has not immediately translated into 
women being represented in decision-making bodies in these movement; indeed the 
rate of change remains slow. Ironically, nominating women as candidates in elections 
for local or national government has been a less controversial move than changing 
internal structures to include women in decision-making within the movements. While 
the issue is being raised, the leadership in the Islamist movements don't necessarily see 
a need to challenge social and cultural norms to include women in decision-making 
(Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007: 6). Are the explanations suggested by Abdellatif and 
Ottaway reliable? The two other contributions in the literature presented below shed 
some more light on their explanatory power
Journalists and political commentators often refer to women's role in 
recruitment and grass root mobilization as one reason why Islamist movements are so 
numerous and popular. How exactly do women carry out this role, and is this the only 
function of their grass root activism? With a social movement theory approach, Janine 
A. Clark looks at how Islamist women in Yemen build and adapt social networks 
(2004). She finds that Islamists, including women doing Islamic activism, are not only 
recruiting those who for structural reasons are predisposed to Islamism; more 
importantly they are creating these predispositions (Ibid). 
An Islamist, as I have defined the term in chapter 2, is someone who seeks, 
through extra-ordinary religious activism, to apply Islamic values, beliefs, and 
practices in all areas of life, based on the idea that Islam is an all-encompassing “way 
of life” to be applied both in the private realm and the public realm. An important 
concept related to this idea and mission is the the act of da'wa, which roughly 
translates as “inviting” someone to Islam, but takes many shapes in practice. This 
concept intimately connects activism with the religious conviction that Islamists share. 
Da'wa activities, in contrast to Christian missionary work, are usually directed at other 
Muslims rather than unbelievers, with the aim of increasing their knowledge about 
Islam and encouraging them to be more pious in all aspects of their lives. Clark 
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explains that da'wa can be practiced in different ways, for example by hosting a Quran 
study circle, joining a political party or doing charity work (2004: 168). She notes that 
“for Islamist women in Yemen, therefore, there exists a seamless web between 
religion, politics, charity, and all forms of activism. (...) The act of da'wa itself 
promotes an environment in which Islam and Muslims can flourish.” (Clark 2004: 
168-169).
Clark goes on to detail the usefulness of a specific form of da'wa, namely study 
circles for studying the Quran and Islam, to Islamist social movement organizations 
and their members, specifically in reaching women and recruiting under unfavorable 
political circumstances. Both Clark and Wickham find that Islamist networks build 
upon existing social relations, making them easy to access (especially for women, 
whose options for public participation are more limited) or expand in a nonthreatening 
manner, and at the same time offer great personal rewards to the women who 
participate in them, which gives them their appeal and contributes to their success 
(Clark 2004, Wickham 2004). These study circles are especially important, argues 
Clark, because they provide a socially legitimate reason for women to go out of their 
homes and participate in the public sphere (2004: 179). Through these circles, women 
may in turn be introduced to or recruited into other forms of activism, or they may 
simply be socialized into an expanded network of shared meaning which lays the 
foundations for social change.
It is widely recognized in social movement theory that social networks foster 
mobilization for social movement organizations, but Clark argues that the kind of 
networking that Islamist women in Yemen carry out also furthers the Islamist cause in 
other ways than through recruitment and institution-building (Ibid: 165). She finds that 
the social movement organizations have a strong impact on the social networks, which 
they actively target and utilize to “access larger numbers of women with different 
degrees of commitment, including those women normally found outside of the 
counterculture or mobilization potential” (Ibid: 180). The role of social networks thus 
also helps us understand how middle-class women can be mobilized, for example, as 
unexplained by the structural strain models of explanation. Indeed, effective da'wa can 
influence the political environment in which the Islamist parties vie for power but are 
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often excluded from formal politics, as Clark explains:
“As da'wa activities reconfigure social networks, Islamist women are 
creating and reinforcing a worldview that ultimately envisions dramatic 
social change. The potential for grassroot social change is all the more 
powerful given that many of the women targeted by SMO members may 
participate in SMO activities without consciously acknowledging that they 
are, in essence, working on behalf of a political party or ideology by 
supporting its interests. As the Islamist “invention of tradition” slowly takes 
root through social networks, political parties, regardless of ideological 
persuasion, will have to take note of the groundswell of support for an 
Islamist-inspired, conservative social and political agenda” (Ibid: 180).
This contribution to the literature helps us understand how Islamist women, who most 
often exercise da'wa in the shape of charity work or religious activism rather than 
political activism, also have contributed to the political project of the Islamist 
movement by these activities. If the women themselves make this connection, it may 
lend support to Abdellatif and Ottaway's argument that Islamist women's political 
empowerment is a result of their activism in other fields. This is a notion to follow in 
the closer examination of my puzzle.
While Clarke examines how women's Islamic activism create the preconditions 
for recruitment and the spread of Islamism, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham looks at how 
the preconditioned are drawn into the movement. In a contribution to Quintan 
Wiktorowicz's 2004 compilation of social movement perspectives on Islamic activism, 
she tries to explain how Islamism could attract so many university-educated young 
supporters in Egypt (Wickham 2004). Based on fieldwork in lower-middle-class 
neighborhoods in Cairo, she concludes that the youth engage in Islamic activism both 
because of incentives and because of ideas. Rational actor models of mobilization 
theories explain mobilization by incentives, or the various social, psychological, and 
emotional benefits of participation, but Wickham finds that these incentives can only 
explain participation in low-risk activism. To engage youth in high-risk activism such 
as political participation, Wickham finds that the Islamists successfully frame this kind 
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of activism as a moral obligation. This framing is successful not because of some 
intrinsic appeal of Islamism, argues Wickham, but because the message fits with the 
life experiences and beliefs of the youths who are the target of mobilization, because 
the Islamists and their modes of transmitting their message are credible and effective, 
and because the framing of activism as a religious obligation is reinforced through 
what Wickham calls “intensive, small-group solidarity at the grassroots level” (Ibid: 
232). Wickham includes both men and women in her study, and we can assume that 
the same factors apply to both genders.
Wickham, like Clark, highlights the “critical importance of the Islamist da'wa, 
or project of ideological outreach, in generating motives for the higher-risk forms of 
Islamic activism associated with the movement's bid for political power” (Wickham 
2004: 247). She also argues that the Islamists in general have been most successful on 
the plane of ideas, unable to actually alter the political landscape but still able to 
“provide Egyptians with a radically different vantage point from which to view the 
political system and their role within it” (Ibid: 245). Wickham compares this to Vaclav 
Havel's notion that “ruling elites [implicate] citizens in their own domination by 
sapping them of the capacity to challenge dominant beliefs and norms” (Ibid: 246). 
Only through a change of consciousness, citizens can liberate themselves from 
oppression (Ibid). Is Islamist women's increased political representation a product of a 
similar change of consciousness regarding women's role? If so, what has brought about 
this change? These are also questions that deserve attention as the puzzle is 
investigated.
6.3 Summary
A review of critical literature on women's rights and empowerment in Egypt and the 
Arab world suggests that the project of promoting women's rights is in something of a 
crisis. The secular strategy has not lived up to the expectations and its own followers 
are abandoning the discourse of universal rights. Islamic feminism remains an 
academic strategy removed from women's realities. The Islamist gender agenda is 
viewed with suspicion, but some contend that by engaging in Islamic activism, women 
have gained capacity to claim their rights. Is it indeed a credible strategy by which 
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women's rights can be realized?
While the rise of Islamism was first explained by models emphasizing the 
structural strain Muslim individuals were put under and which they sought to alleviate, 
Islamism is increasingly understood from a rational actor-perspective. Studies 
employing this perspective suggest that Islamist movements recruit members both by 
incentives and by the power of ideas. Moreover, these studies have shown us how 
women's activism contributes to “Islamizing” society in a way that makes this 
recruitment easier and changes the political context. These studies lend support to the 
idea that through activism aimed at spreading Islam and creating a just Islamic society, 
women's roles in Islamic movements and the Arab world have grown beyond what the 
movements initially envisioned. Thus, women's Islamic activism seems potent to both 
empower women and change their roles within both their societies and their 
movements. These ideas will be explored further in the close examination of women in 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the following chapter.
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7 The Main Case: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
In this chapter I will first give an introduction to the Muslim Brotherhood, the case I 
have chosen to study, in which I sketch out two factors of its organization and history 
which are of special importance to understanding how women come to participate in 
politics through this movement. One is the contentious relationship between the 
movement and the Egyptian state, which has had a special impact on women’s 
activism. The other is the role of women in the movement and its ideology, which have 
gone through considerable changes. 
Then, for the remainder of the chapter I will present my qualitative data about 
women's participation in the Brotherhood collected during my fieldwork in Cairo. By 
presenting the findings from my interview material I aim to give a “thick” description 
of the women's attitudes and experiences regarding political participation. This in-
depth examination of the puzzle serves up some suggestions for explanations about 
Islamist women's increasing political participation. I will draw on these for my 
analysis in the next chapter.
7.1 The Brotherhood and the state
The Muslim Brotherhood was established in Egypt in 1928 by the charismatic Hasan 
al-Banna (1906-1949), in the city of Ismailiyya. Today, the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood is a sociopolitical movement based on an Islamist platform which favors 
peaceful means in the struggle for political power (Rashwan 2007: 10). Because of its 
renunciation of violence and because of its rather moderate interpretations of 
Islamism, it is largely counted among the moderate Islamist movements. It is also the 
oldest and most influential of all the Islamist movements in the region, as today there 
are offshoots or likeminded groups existing in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and other countries. 
Ideologically, the Brotherhood was based on a revivalist, fundamentalist 
understanding of Islam which borrowed from 19th century thinkers such as Jamal al-
Din Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. These thinkers recognized that the Muslim world 
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had been overtaken and overrun by the West, and sought to find a solution in Islam. 
Their answer was to reform Islam in order to make it compatible with science and 
rationality, so that the Muslim world could develop and progress like the West had. 
From the beginning, the Brotherhood focused on strengthening the individual 
Muslim's faith and give guidance for how Islam should be practiced correctly on an 
individual level. This idea of reforming the individual as the way of changing society 
remains a central element of the Brotherhood's ideology to this day (Utvik 2011: 93).
It is estimated that by 1948, the Brotherhood had amassed 500 000 members 
divided into 2000 branches (Utvik 2011: 95). In each branch members were organized 
in “families” (usra in Egyptian Arabic), the lowest units of organization, which 
received their instructions from the higher links (Ibid). After the second world war, the 
Brotherhood had become more directly involved in politics, seeking to build a society 
based on Islam. They also engaged in social work, creating an alternative welfare 
system consisting of schools, hospitals and health clinics which picked up where the 
state failed to deliver. The Brotherhood which al-Banna built was a hierarchic structure 
with four ranks of membership (from helper to fighter), a leading council of elders 
with 12 members and a larger council of 150 advisers. This organizational structure 
remains to this day. Al-Banna himself, while he was alive, served as the undisputed 
center of authority with his charisma.
In the early 1940s the Brotherhood was involved in guerrilla attacks on the 
British forces in Egypt and also in political murders, and in 1948 a member of this 
groups assassinated prime minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi. Al-Banna denied any 
responsibility for his assassination, but the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed. In 
1949 al-Banna himself was assassinated by a police agent. Despite these blows, the 
Brotherhood remained intact and was able to participate in the 1952 revolution in 
Egypt, where the Brotherhood supported the Free Officers Corps which performed a 
military coup on July 23 1952. For their close association and political agreement with 
the Free Officers, the Brotherhood was spared when the officers banned all political 
parties in 1953. However the relationship turned into a power struggle and the 
Brotherhood turned against what they saw as an increasingly authoritarian regime led 
by Nasser. In 1954, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate 
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Nasser and the regime cracked down brutally on the Brotherhood. Six of its most 
prominent leaders were executed, thousands arrested, many fled into exile, its 
headquarters were burned and the organization was outlawed, effectively crushing 
their ability to operate actively well into the 1970s, when Nasser was followed by 
Anwar al-Sadat.
After the death of al-Banna, the writer and prominent Muslim Brother Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-66) inspired an ideological radicalization of the Islamist movement in 
Egypt which worsened the Brotherhood's confrontation with the state. According to 
Qutb one could declare as infidels those who through their actions betrayed that they 
did not adhere to the correct faith, particularly rulers of Muslim majority states, which 
justified the use of violence against them. Qutb was executed in 1966 for his activism 
and flammable radicalism, accused with attempting to overthrow the regime. His 
ideology inspired the formation of radical and violent Islamist groups in the 1970s 
which engaged in violent jihad against the state in Egypt and performed terrorist 
attacks in Egypt until the 1990s. The Brotherhood leaders did not accept and agree 
with Qutb's radical ideas, particularly disagreeing with the idea of declaring a 
“misbehaving” Muslim an infidel. They upheld that only God could judge what was in 
a person's heart and that He would administer punishment or heavenly rewards on the 
day of judgment. When the Brotherhood reemerged in the 1970s, this view formed an 
important ideological contribution to their reformist policy.
Besides banning opposition groups such as the Brotherhood, Nasser laid the 
sites these groups had used to reach out to the masses under state control, such as 
universities, schools, media and mosques (Wickham 2002: 21-23). But how did Nasser 
control the targets of mobilization against opposition groups? Wickham looks at why 
the educated youth, which had been the main targets of Islamist mobilization in the 
early years of the Brotherhood's history, not only were deterred from participating in 
activism under Nasser but indeed supported the Nasser regime in large numbers. She 
argues that Nasser succeeded in this by granting the educated middle-class and lower-
middle-class youth a material and symbolic stake in his state project, singling them out 
for extra entitlements and extra indoctrination because they were seen as strategically 
important to manage for the stability of the regime (Ibid: 23).
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However, Nasser depended on a “social contract” with his people – providing 
economic and social benefits in return for political support, such as expanded access to 
free education, employment in the state sector and subsidies for food, energy, health 
and housing. These benefits were, as Wickham stresses, not distributed equally, but 
rather aimed at these important targets of mobilization that the Islamists had 
previously recruited from. Precisely these educated middle-class and lower-middle-
class youths would again support the Islamist resurgence as economic re-
entrenchment, military defeat in the war with Israel and political crisis in Egypt wore 
away at Nasser's ability to co-opt them, starting at the end of the 1960s. Social 
activism grew again in Egypt beginning with the defeat by Israel in 1967, which 
sparked protest demonstrations started by industrial workers and soon joined by the 
students and university graduates. Students took to the streets to “hold the regime 
responsible for failing to deliver on its revolutionary promises” (Wickham 2002: 31). 
The military defeat against Israel unleashed a list of grievances which were now raised 
by precisely the students which Nasser had cultivated politically and given 
opportunities to organize in the universities, no longer loyal when the regime could not 
perform (Ibid). Important ideological reformists came into the Brotherhood from the 
student movement in the 70s, including figures such as  Abdel-Monem Abul-Fotouh.
Unable to sustain the social contract based on expensive social and economic 
benefits, Nasser's regime in the mid-1970s attempted to instead buy its legitimacy with 
increased political and economic liberalization, offering its citizens increased but 
limited rights to participation. However, this only increased the divide between regime 
and people. At first it was the leftists that attracted the youths that Nasser could no 
longer control, as they did in many other countries at the time, because they were 
ideologically similar to the regime and thus better able to use the opportunity 
structures that emerged after the 1967 war (Wickham 2002: 34). However these 
educated youths started to orient themselves towards Islamism already in the mid-
1970s, and especially in the 1980s and early 1990s the reformist Islamists became the 
leading oppositional force in Egypt.
Following the sudden death of Nasser, Anwar Sadat became the new president 
of Egypt. From 1971 Sadat increased the freedoms of the political opposition. While 
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the Brotherhood officially remained illegal, he also released many members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from prison, thus indirectly helping to bring the Brotherhood 
back as a vital opposition movement. This was a strategic move by Sadat in an attempt 
to weaken the socialist opposition. During the 1970s, as the Brotherhood regained its 
strength it focused its policy on pragmatic issues and renounced the use of violence, 
thus seeking to minimize its confrontation with the regime. The Brotherhood increased 
its presence especially in student unions at universities and in professional syndicates, 
and in 1979 members of the Brotherhood again participated in parliamentary elections. 
However Sadat's opening up of the political system was only partial. Opposition 
parties were still not allowed, and Wickham argues that this political reform 
paradoxically undermined the legitimacy of Egypt's formal political institutions and 
elites (2002: 64). Meanwhile, the Islamists had the advantage of being able to mobilize 
their supporters at the periphery through the religious institutions, primarily the 
mosques, outside the sphere of party politics. From this position, the Islamists were 
able to reach out to the alienated and disillusioned urban, educated youths through the 
1980s and 1990s.
Since 1979, the Brotherhood has contested representation in parliament by 
running their candidates as independents or allying with oppositional parties (Carnegie 
Endowment C nd). Hosni Mubarak, who became president when Sadat was 
assassinated in 1981, tolerated this, but the organization remained officially outlawed. 
In 1995, the Brotherhood declared its acceptance of multiparty politics in a statement 
which marked a major departure from the teachings of Hasan al-Banna  (Norton 2005: 
140). While al-Banna was against what he considered to be a divisive political system, 
the 1995 leadership “embraced parties as instruments of shura (consultation)”, an 
Islamic principle of leadership, “while reiterating that power may not be taken by the 
sword”, thus reinforcing their commitment to peaceful means of advancing their 
agenda (Ibid). The Brotherhood sought to signal its willingness to abide by democratic 
rules, and in the mid-1990s made many efforts to find entrée into the political system 
while the Mubarak regime moved to tighten its control of it (Ibid). The Mubark regime 
made no response to the statement (Ibid). In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood 
accomplished an unprecedented feat and won 20% of the seats in parliament in a 
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reasonably free political climate where the opposition was allowed to campaign. 
However, the regime came down on the organization after this victory and from 2006 
on, hundreds of members were arrested, senior leaders taken to military courts (as 
Mubarak never lifted the emergency law since Sadat was murdered) and their finances 
attacked (Carnegie Endowment C nd). In the next parliamentary elections in 2010, 
Mubarak's National Democratic Party won 95% of the votes and used considerable 
repressive means against Brotherhood members who participated in the elections 
(Ibid). The Brotherhood as well as other opposition groups vocally accused the regime 
of voter fraud and rigging, which increased the popular resentment against the regime.
The January 25 revolution in 2011 was initiated by secular groups, most notably 
the 6th of April Youth Movement and using the “We Are All Khaled Saeed” Facebook 
page to mobilize support. Although many of its younger members participated in the 
demonstrations from the first day, the Muslim Brotherhood did not officially support 
the revolution until Friday January 28, the day it gained its critical momentum. Since 
this day, the Brotherhood has been one of the strongest groups on the side of the 
revolution, often engaging in dialogues with the military council which has ruled 
Egypt since Mubarak was forced to step down on February 11 2011, and contesting its 
power. The Brotherhood formed its first political party, The Freedom and Justice Party 
(Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala) in April 2011. Its vice-president, Rafiq Habib, is a Coptic 
Christian. The Freedom and Justice Party won 45,2% of the seats in the People's 
Assembly in the Egyptian parliament (lower house)(Carnegie Endowment, A nd), and 
58,3% in the Shura council (upper house)(Carnegie Endowment, B nd), which gives it 
the largest number of seats among all parties in both houses.
In its political program for the 2011 elections, The Freedom and Justice Party 
envisions a state which is a “national constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based 
on Sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of reference” (Freedom and Justice Party 2011: 10). 
An excerpt from this program illustrates the seemingly contradicting, yet fundamental 
ideas this vision seeks to merge and which inspires doubts about how this vision of 
democracy would work out in practice. Within the first two paragraphs concerning the 
structure of this state, the platform first notes that Sharia “regulates various aspects of 
life for Muslims and their non-Muslim partners in the homeland” either directly or 
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through general principles, but that non-Muslims  “have the right to refer to their own 
rules and laws in the fields of family and religious affairs” (Ibid: 10-11). Then it lays 
out the following as the first principle of the state: “The State is based on the principle 
of citizenship, where all citizens enjoy equal rights and duties guaranteed by law in 
accordance with the principles of equality and equal opportunities without 
discrimination because of religion or race” (Ibid: 11).
7.2 The Brotherhood and the women
In the early years of the Brotherhood and while Egyptian feminists began to demand 
emancipation, Hasan al-Banna set up the Brotherhood's first women's division in 1932. 
It was called The Muslim Sisters Group (ferqat al-akhawaat al-muslimaat), and its 
members were mainly the daughters, wives, and other relatives of the Brothers (Abdel-
Latif 2008: 2). An internal statute released in April 1932 defined the aims of the 
Muslim Sisters group as upholding the Islamic ethos and spreading virtue through 
lectures and women-only gatherings (Ibid: 3). It also defined the hierarchy of the 
women’s organization, which was not to have its own head but be under the authority 
of the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide (Ibid). Today the Sisters' division remains 
separated from the Brothers' activities and affairs, as it has been from the beginning. 
Women are subjected to a leadership they cannot choose or participate in, as they are 
excluded from the two decision-making bodies of the Brotherhood, the Shura Council 
(the legislative body) and the Guidance Bureau (the executive body) and not allowed 
to vote in elections for these bodies.
As recruitment of women proved difficult, al-Banna approached the well-
known Islamic activist Zainab al-Ghazali, who had established her own Islamic 
women's organization. He proposed a merger of the two organizations, but al-Ghazali 
refused, preferring to retain the autonomy of her work and organization. However she 
came to alliance herself with al-Banna and the Brotherhood later and was instrumental 
to its revival in the 60s. The Muslim Sisters division was revived by internal efforts 
instead in 1943, at the initiative of 120 young women who attended al-Banna's 
sermons (Abdel-Latif 2008: 3). Omayma Abdel-Latif notes on the history of women's 
activism in the Brotherhood that although women's efforts were crucial to the 
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movement's survival in times of confrontation with the state during the 1950s and 60s, 
the women's division also suffered in these periods of confrontation and was not 
prioritized in times of restructuring during the rule of Sadat (Ibid: 7). Therefore, 
women's efforts to help the movement survive did not translate into added influence 
within the Brotherhood (Ibid). Abdel-Latif claims that while the Brother's section was 
rebuilt under Sadat, the roles and rights of women in the Brotherhood were barely 
even debated, noting that “apart from the release of a few documents during these long 
and lean years, which contained only thin and repetitive sections on the movement’s 
vision of women’s roles in politics, there was hardly any debate at the time about the 
roles and rights of women” (Ibid: 8).
Not until the 2000s did women's role as political actors in the movement 
become visible (Abdel-Latif 2008: 8). 2000 saw the nomination of the Muslim 
Brotherhood's first female candidate for elections, Johan al-Halafawi. The 
Brotherhood has continued to fielded female candidates in all parliamentary and 
municipal elections in Egypt in all elections during the last decade. Because the 
Brotherhood was not allowed to form a political party under Mubarak's regime, this 
means that the women ran for elections as independent candidates with the expressed 
support of the Brotherhood. This situation changed after the 2011 revolution which 
toppled President Mubarak on February 11 2011, collapsed the ruling National 
Democratic Party and eventually allowed oppositional groups to legally establish 
political parties in April the same year. The Muslim Brotherhood promptly established 
their political front, the Freedom and Justice Party. During the 2000s, female Islamists 
have also actively engaged in demonstrations and "street politics" despite the high 
risks involved, defying the argument that the Sisters should be spared the dangers of 
political activities. This became especially true during the 2011 revolution and ongoing 
protests. 
Islamist women candidates for elections in 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2010 have 
reported being threatened and harassed by the state apparatus. While women were 
considered a “red line” which the state security could not cross in their confrontation 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime sometimes sidestepped this by arresting their 
husbands instead. Women activists have also been detained or arrested for participating 
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in student politics and campaigning for Muslim Brotherhood candidates. In a way, the 
use of such tactics against the "Sisters" can be read as a confirmation that their 
activities are, in fact, seen as potent. Islamist women's political participation and 
activism is indeed taken seriously by the regime when it decides to use such force to 
repress it. Ironically, women's participation may invite such political oppression not 
because the ideas they promote are so radical, but because their very participation 
enhances the political credibility of the movement they belong to.
Women within the movement, especially from the younger generation, have 
begun to ask for integration and equal rights within the movement itself in response to 
this increase in women's political participation. Women's rights to political 
participation both as voters and nominees have been stated repeatedly in Brotherhood 
party platforms and documents on the role of women. The first such statement came in 
1994 and discussed the various rights of women within Islam including their political 
rights. It stated that women had the right to participate in elections as voters and 
candidates, but that women could not hold the post of al-Imaama al-kubra (equivalent 
to the caliphate), which is an argument against women's right to be head of state 
(Abdel-Latif 2008: 8). The document also stressed the need to educate women on their 
political rights and encourage them to run in elections (Ibid). These views were 
repeated in a document called “The Muslim Brotherhood Initiative for Political 
Reform in Egypt” which was issued in 2004 (Ibid). The Brotherhood's electoral 
platform of 2005 and party platform of 2007 also emphasized women's right to vote 
and candidate themselves in elections, but balanced with their differentiated social 
roles (Ibid: 8-9). The political platform of the Freedom and Justice Party released in 
2011 declares that its representatives are dedicated to “guarantee non-discrimination 
among citizens in rights and duties on the basis of religion, sex or colour” and also to 
“ensure women's access to all their rights, consistent with the values of Islamic law, 
maintaining the balance between their duties and rights” (Freedom and Justice Party 
2011).
These documents reveal some contradictions and an element of traditionalist 
sentiment concerning women's status and roles inside the Brotherhood. This has also 
been visible in a continuing debate on whether a woman can run for president, which 
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the Muslim Brotherhood still officially opposes, and the lack of female members at the 
top level of the organization. Critics are asking if the nomination of a few women for 
national and local elections is simply a PR-move by the Brotherhood. Why are women 
allowed to run as candidates for the Brotherhood in external elections, but not 
participate in the movement's internal elections? Women seem to have a greater role in 
the newly-established Freedom and Justice Party, where there are allegedly 1000 
women among the 7000 co-founders. However, the authority of the party is 
questionable in its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood; important decisions 
regarding the politics of the party, selection of candidates etc. seem to be made in the 
decision-making bodies of the Brotherhood rather than in the party itself.
7.3 Findings from the field study
As described in chapter 5 I have conducted a field study in Cairo in order to explore 
my puzzle in detail. Here I wish to present the findings from my interviews with 10 
women who are or were associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. What does the 
interview material consist of? What have I talked with my informants about? In my 
interviews I have generally started off by explaining the purpose of my field work, 
then asking about my informants' personal experiences with activism in the 
Brotherhood and the roles they have filled, as well as their perspective on why women 
from the Muslim Brotherhood have become more active participants in politics. Then I 
have continued to ask follow-up questions either based on what the informant has told 
me or from a prepared set of questions. 
If the informants did not bring up the revolution in their answers, I have asked 
them about changes in women's participation after the revolution. I have also asked 
about their general ideas and perspectives on women, gender equality and political 
participation. For example, I have asked if they believe that gender equality is an 
Islamic idea, which always prompted elaborate answers. I have also asked their 
opinions on specific controversial topics regarding women's political participation in 
Egypt, such as what they thought of the abolished gender quota in parliament or how 
they feel about a woman running for president. Much of the interviews have also 
focused on discussing women's roles and rights inside the Brotherhood, which in 
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general have produced the most diverse answers.
To analyze my interview material I have adopted some tools from Strauss and 
Corbin's approach to grounded theory (1998). Their approach is one that begins with 
the researcher identifying an area of interest, followed by focused gathering of data 
around this area and leading up to the development of concepts, hypotheses and 
theory. In this thesis I do not aim to develop theory, but I have used grounded theory 
analysis to break down my interview material into the concepts that the are embodied 
in the data in the initial coding. As these concepts are re-arranged into central 
categories or themes in the material, I can compare my observations across informants 
and suggest some causal links between important concepts. I have looked at how the 
larger categories of concepts relate to each other to form explanations about the 
phenomena described in the material. Categories link to each other as conditions, 
actions/interactions or consequences and these links explain the what, why, where, and 
how of a phenomenon (Ibid: 135). I have tried to identify how Islamist women 
themselves understand the actors, structures and processes that enable or limit their 
political participation, and their interrelationship. 
For this presentation I have only made use of the material from interviews with 
the 10 informants who were women associated with the Brotherhood. The perspectives 
of the men I interviewed were informative for the data collection process and have 
familiarized me with a greater plurality of voices in the Brotherhood, thus influencing 
my approach to this thesis and my interpretation of data. However, in this part of the 
thesis I primarily want to explore women's political participation from their own 
perspective. Below I present the main findings from this interview material organized 
according to the most central categories of concepts I have identified in the material; 
recruitment, women's activism, political repression, and ideology and gender roles. 
Concepts, which are my abstractions of the answers, are written in italic, and phrases 
used by the informants in the interviews are sometimes given in quotation marks to 
illustrate the concepts.
7.3.1 Recruitment
All the informants discussed to some degree how and why she joined the Brotherhood. 
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Thus recruitment is an obvious category of concepts in the interview material. 
Examining this material, why and how did each women join or let herself be recruited? 
Which concepts relate to their recruitment and how?
Informant A claims she sought an organization to join on her own initiative. In 
her case seeking activism opportunity can be described as a strategic action leading to 
recruitment into the Brotherhood, motivated by her desire to help which enabled her to 
be recruited. She was attracted to the Brotherhood for its religious nature, thus 
religious identification was also an incentive for activism (as Wickham calls it) or a 
motivational condition (as Strauss and Corbin refers to such subconcepts leading to 
action) for recruitment. But before she made her final decision, she also had an 
introduction to MB activities, and made her final decision based on her connection 
with members. This process of recruitment is stereotypical of most movements or 
organizations, also secular ones.
Informant B started to orient herself towards the Brotherhood after her father, a 
leader in the Brotherhood, was detained and sentenced to prison by military court in 
the 1995 regime crack-down on Islamist movements in Egypt. Through her father she 
had a family connection to the Brotherhood, but the trigger event that primed her for 
self-recruitment was experiencing repression. She describes how she sought answers 
about why her father had been arrested and started reading about the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
It is noteworthy that this informant had experienced first-hand the risks 
associated with this activism when she decided to join. As Wickham's study discussed 
in the literature review has pointed out, incentives are not strong enough to recruit 
members into dangerous forms of activism. In these cases, the success of the 
recruitment relies on whether the recruited accepts and identifies with the frame of 
ideas that the movement justifies its activism by. In the interview, informant B actually 
continued to elaborate on what she calls the basic idea of the Brotherhood and what 
most convinced her as she was reading about it. She emphasized three things; that the 
Brotherhood sought to “implement the right Islam", that they could do so in a way that 
was sensitive to the context of the country yet universally valid (even respecting 
minorities like other religions), and that they understood Islam in a moderate way (vs. 
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extremist). This informant then became engage in political activism in student union 
elections and in demonstrations, exactly the type of activism which puts her at risk.
Informant C, now a grandmother, joined the Muslim Brotherhood after first 
attending lessons on Islam at the mosque and reading about Hasan al-Banna. She had 
social ties to the Brotherhood because the father of her friend was a member. After 
joining she married a Brotherhood member, and she has raised her children "in the way 
of Muslim Brother thinking". The time when she became active in the Muslim Sisters 
was a time of repression against Islamism in Egypt, after the murder of Sadat. So she 
became active under and despite dangerous conditions, and she speaks about 
experiencing harassment because of her activism in the university.
Informant D (daughter of informant C) was born into the movement as both 
her parents were members. However she claims that it was her personal choice to join 
actively and that she compared the Brotherhood to other movements before she made 
her decision. Since college she has had an active role. She, as well as her mother, is 
focused on the religious aim and religious activism as the basis of Brotherhood 
activity. They are both engaged in religious activism, teaching others about Islam and 
how they can live their lives in accordance with the right interpretation of the religion.
Informant E was also born into the movement. She tells that her parents, both 
members, raised her among the zaharat (an Arabic word meaning flowers, used to 
describe young girls receiving Islamic education in the Brotherhood movement). As a 
youth she left briefly when she did not identify with the religious syllabus. When she 
started joining the weekly meetings (usra) this was a positive experience that re-
inforced her committment and gave her incentive to engage in religious activism aimed 
at spreading the faith (da'wa). She then started to educate herself on the Brotherhood 
by reading about Hasan al Banna, and in 2005 when she was 16 she participated in 
political activism for the elections. Thus positive identification with the religious 
nature of the group, positive experiences from religious activism and inspiration from 
the ideology of the Brotherhood led her to political paticipation.
Informant F explains simply that although her whole family were part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, born into the movement, she considers herself a member since 
she joined actively as a teenager in university. She became familiar with the 
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Brotherhood through her family, a condition priming her for recruitment, but claims 
that it was her activism in the group that convinced her of its "idea". In other words, 
her activism in university was the activity that produced her commitment to the 
organization and led her to identify with its ideas.
Informant G was also brought up within the Muslim Brotherhood as both her 
parents were members, and in her own words she and her siblings "were Muslim 
Brothers since we were children". She started participating in political activism when 
she was in the secondary school, helping with election campaigning. Later, when she 
entered university, she started doing student activism because "students in the 
university are some of the important people in the Muslim Brotherhood". It seems that 
her commitment was given by her being born into the movement and that her activism 
was motivated by how she perceived the needs of the movement, where they needed 
her help.
Informant H is a rare case of self-recruitment because no one in her family 
were members of the Brotherhood when she decided to join based on her personal 
choice. After she became a member she found her future husband in the movement, 
and says that today she encourages him to "do his part in the party and the movement", 
because the party "needs qualifications". She explains "that's the role of the wife, how 
to encourage her husband to do his best." As many informants have described, family 
dynamics reinforce commitment to the movement, but this is an atypical pattern where 
the woman is the one who set these dynamics into motion. 
Comparatively, Informant I was born into the movement and explains her 
membership simply by telling that her father was a very active member of the 
Brotherhood who “raised his children in his steps”.
Informant J explains that she joined the movement at school as a youth over 
30 years ago. She emphasizes two things that mobilized her to be an active member; 
encouragement from her husband, whom she met in the movement, and the guidance 
of the Brotherhood's "First Lady" Zeinab al-Ghazali. Again, encouraging family 
dynamics is important to re-inforcing commitment to activism in the Brotherhood. In 
addition, this informant has benefited from the mentoring and encouragement of the 
most prominent female leader figure in the Islamist movement. "My relationship with 
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haga4 Zeinab encouraged me to work harder and work more specifically with the 
Muslim Brotherhood for 30 years", she explains.
Summarizing the relationships between the key concepts of the category: 
Many of the women were born into families where one or both of the parents were 
members of the Brotherhood, but few of them see a direct causal relationship between 
their upbringing and their activism. Instead, all but one of the informants speak about 
choosing to join the Brotherhood in some way. There is however a variety in the 
pattern of conditions, incentives and ideas that influenced them to make this choice. 
Many of the women explain that, quite naturally, religious identification with the 
movement's message was an incentive that made them interested to join. Experiences 
of activism are important in reinforcing women's commitment to the movement and 
leading them into more public roles. Family dynamics between husband and wife who 
both belong to the movement is emphasized as a positive contributor to women's 
activism. And it seems that experiencing repression conditions women for political 
activism, which may at the surface seem surprising, as these women have experienced 
the dangers of political activism.
7.3.2 Women's Activism
Much of the interviews centered around how women participate in activism in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, both politically and otherwise, and which factors either facilitate 
this activism or limit it. In relation to this, informants also discussed women's 
representation in representative politics and in internal decision-making within the 
Brotherhood.
Informant A discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood functions as a learning 
ground, giving members the skills they need to carry out activism aimed at meeting 
needs in the comunity of either a social or political nature. This activism is structured 
both by an organizational hierarchy and gender segregation, but as a young woman 
the informant still feels able to take initiative for activities. She also feels that the 
organization's resources and support is available to her. She believes that women's 
4 “Haga” is a honorable title (in colloquial Egyptian Arabic) used for Muslim women who have performed the 
Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca which is one of the five pillars in Islam.
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political activism is limited by their family obligations, but that women should 
participate equally as men, also taking leadership positions in the Muslim Brotherhood 
but in a separate women's structure.
Informant B has personal experience with political activism on behalf of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in demonstrations and in student politics. Here she was assigned 
roles in demonstrations, campaign etcetera according to her skills as a journalist, not 
restricted by her gender. In this activities she faced the threat of regime repression, 
which did not deter her, but after the revolution she left the Brotherhood because of 
disagreements over strategy and internal representation between the youth and the 
leadership. The informant was disappointed that youth requests about supporting the 
continued street protests after the revolution were dismissed by the leadership and not 
met with dialogue. Requests to represent women in the Guidance Bureau were also not 
internalized by the leadership, which added to the informant's doubts about the 
organization. However, she believes that for internal change to take place in the 
Brotherhood, the external circumstances must first become more stable. The informant 
differentiates between women as representatives internally and externally, arguing that 
female leaders in the Brotherhood would represent women's issues while female 
politicians would represent the communities they were elected from. She believes 
women's political representation should be promoted because women have gender-
special insight into family matters which make them important decision-makers. She 
notes that the revolution has broken barriers and changed ideas about women's 
political participation, as they gained respect for their efforts to claim people's rights.
Informant C explains why participation in politics is important by recounting 
Hasan al-Banna gradual approach to Islamic reform of society. This approach starts 
with the individual reforming himself to be a better Muslim, then his family, his 
society through social activism, and finally the state. Until Islamism reaches the state 
level, she argues, it is not completed.
Informant D believes that women's participation has changed after the 
revolution, saying that "now we are participating in everything". She is proud that the 
Freedom and Justice party got more female representatives elected to the People's 
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Assembly than any other party. However, she considers that the repressive conditions 
before the revolution have a lasting, restricting effect on women's representation in 
that the Sisters today lack experience to participate publicly. In time she believes this 
condition will change and women's participation will increase. However, she does not 
see a need for women to take new leadership positions within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, claiming that they have “too much work already”.
Informant E has participated in election campaigning on behalf of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other kinds of Islamic activism before the revolution, but after the 
revolution she left the movement. She claims that she was “shocked” by the 
Brotherhood's hesitance to support the revolution and consequent choice of strategy as 
it kept out of many confrontations with the regime and the military council which the 
youth engaged in. She is adamant that women's role in society is equally important to 
men's or more, because women connect the private and the public sphere. If women 
were decision-makers, politics would therefore be “closer to society” she claims. She 
observes that women today do not have substantial representation in politics or in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and that this needs to change.
Informant F explains that while women participate in all kinds of activism, 
they operate separately from the men in activities aimed specifically at women, 
especially proselytizing or inviting other women to Islam. She believes that the 
Muslim Brotherhood's practice of consulting women instead of including them directly 
in decision-making at the leadership level is sufficient. She believes women will have 
problems taking positions in the two decision-making councils of the Brotherhood 
because women lack experience, and because of social norms about women's roles. 
She notes that it is also hard for women to be elected to parliament, but believes this 
will change as women prove themselves based on their connection to community. This 
will give women more legitimacy than female representatives under Mubarak who 
were elected by clientelism. She also rejects empowerment by quota as introduced by 
Mubarak.
Informant G claims that women's roles in the Brotherhood are to be “soldiers, 
not leaders”, carrying out the tasks assigned to them. She is questioning the continued 
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lack of women in the leadership of the Brotherhood after the revolution, but at the 
same time believes there is a “big respect” for women in the movement. She describes 
a patronizing of women which denies them their full agency. With other youths she has 
called for a reformation of the organization to make use of women's abilities. In 
disappointment that this did not happen after the revolution, she left the Brotherhood 
and joined Al-Tayyar al-Masry, a new youth party. She believes women's 
empowerment is best achieved through gender equal competition, not by quotas, which 
she feels diminishes women.
Informant H feels that Islamist women were excluded from participation in 
politics by the former regimes in order to maintain an image of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as extremist and dangerous. In her experience, however, women were 
encouraged by the Brotherhood to take part in political activism such as 
demonstrations against the Mubarak regime and “make their voices heard”. She says 
that the Brotherhood's idea about serving the people was an inspiration to not give up 
their attempts at political representation even when the regime rigged elections against 
them. Women are able to represent the whole community in politics because she is 
connected through the society by her family roles, she argues, and women in the 
Brotherhood have proved themselves through charity projects etcetera at the grass root 
level, which gives them legitimacy among voters. She contends that women's political 
activism is not new, but more visible after the revolution. As a committee member in 
the Freedom and Justice Party, the informant feels encouraged to be active and 
represent the Brotherhood, and has been selected to be the movement's sole 
representative in meetings abroad.
Informant I vehemently rejects that women can be empowered by an 
instrument such as Mubarak's quota. “Empowerment from law is artificial, it must 
come from within”, she claims, and women can prove themselves when the public 
field is open to them. She argues that society will not be convinced by a law, therefore 
women must go out and prove themselves by activism. According to her, it was 
because women in the Brotherhood proved themselves by contributing to election 
victories that the leadership came to support their representation in politics.  She 
describes how women have a special capacity to mobilize political support at the grass 
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root level by talking to people and connecting to their community. She is also a 
member of the Freedom and Justice party and feels that the party today is trying to 
push women forward, as proven by its four female representatives in the People's 
Assembly.
Informant J is one of these four representatives, and she describes the election 
campaign as a rich experience. Because her campaign had conferences for both 
women and men separately, she had to work “twice the work of men”. However 
winning the women's support was important to her because, as she explains, women 
support you with their whole families, while men go alone to vote. She says that when 
the party recognized the support it got from female voters, it decided to focus more of 
its work on women and develop the women's work in the movement.
Summarizing the relationships between the key concepts of the category:
Many of the women see their activism as motivated by the needs in society. They also 
contend that there is a need for women's contributions in political decision-making, 
where they would serve to connect politics with the community level. All of the 
women I asked were negative to a political quota as a means of empowering women. 
There seems to be a general consensus that women must claim a role and prove 
themselves in society and politics, but considerable debate regarding how women's 
roles should be claimed and changed within the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
7.3.3 Changes in political repression
The revolution was an event, a collective action, which altered the security situation in 
Egypt for citizens in general and the Islamists in particular. It especially altered the 
conditions for women's political activism, and many of my informants emphasized the 
change in security as the main factor which changed women's political participation. 
Exemplary of this, informant A contends that before the revolution, a woman 
taking a leadership position in the Muslim Brotherhood would provoke the regime to 
repressive reactions such as threats and harassment. This action was not allowed 
because of the reaction it would provoke. There is an enhancing condition to this 
excluding relationship of actions that is also recounted by many of the informants, 
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namely that the Brotherhood sought to protect the women especially due to cultural 
gender norms. Regime threats, imprisonment and violence towards male members was 
suffered for the sake of the cause, but women were "a red line", as many of the 
informants put it. The result is male dominance in leadership positions, or as Informant 
A puts it, that "99% of the important roles belonged to men". The security issue 
redirected women's activism into other fields than decision-making and politics. 
Informant A believes that the number of women in leadership roles in the Brotherhood 
will now increase gradually. She mentions that the Brotherhood had four women 
elected to parliament as a positive sign. However, she differentiates between external 
representation (in politics) and internal representation (in the Brotherhood), and notes 
that "there is [still] only one woman in the organization among the leaders, in the 
national office".
Informant B largely echoed these descriptions of how lack of security limited 
women's roles and involvement. She says that the change of conditions brought on by 
the revolution had led women to raise the issue of women's representation within the 
Guidance Bureau, to which the morshid (leader) had replied that he had no problem 
with Sister representatives (within the organization). However, a year later no change 
has taken place. Through her student activism, the informant experienced how the 
Muslim Brotherhood members who ran for student union elections "mostly got 
arrested". She recounts how one of her female friends was threatened by state security 
officers, who held a gun to her head when she was observing the counting of votes, 
and how the state security officers rigged the student union elections. She also 
describes how activists outside were threatened by thugs. Strikingly, the dis-incentives 
to participate in these kinds of elections are rather strong. It is dangerous for the 
candidates, who face the risk of imprisonment, and it is likely to fail as a political 
project, at least if the end goal is to gain political power in the student union, because 
the elections will be rigged against them. These are tough conditions for political 
participation, which the informant nevertheless engaged in, along with others.
Informant C recounts how she became active in the Sisters' division of the 
Brotherhood during a time of political repression just after the death of Sadat, under 
dangerous conditions, and how they were harassed in the university where she was 
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active, suffering regime repression. Informant D describes the security situation 
before the revolution as an open conflict with the regime, saying that "before, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was an enemy to the government". She echoes previous 
informants in that she sees this condition as the reason why before the revolution, "the 
Sisters used to do everything but they weren't leaders or held activities on their own, 
so they wouldn't be attacked".
Informant E, in comparison, is disappointed with what she considers to be a 
lack of reform in the Brotherhood's attitudes to women. To her, the attitudes of the 
leadership have lost legitimacy in the absence of regime repression since the 
revolution. In this new context, she has got a new perspective on their attitudes, which 
is that their ideas are "stale and can't be changed". She compares the leaders' attitudes 
to the youth, whom she considers to have good ideas about how to develop women's 
roles inside the Brotherhood and make them active. Because the Brotherhood did not 
accept these ideas, she left it in favor of a newly formed youth party, Al Tayyar al 
Masry.
Informant F also experienced the former regime's political repression 
personally. While she was politically active in the student union at her university, she 
was harassed by the regime because of her membership in the Brotherhood. She tells 
that she was harassed and searched every time she came to enter campus, and 
sometimes denied access. The regime also threatened her father to stop his daughter's 
activities in the Brotherhood. However, this did not stop her from being active. She 
echoes that women were not allowed to participate in politics before the revolution for 
"security reasons", with a few exceptions. The informant points out that the 
Brotherhood did however run female candidates in the 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections. 
Also, she tells that women were doing grass root political activism, holding 
conferences, workshops and outreach activities to raise awareness about politics in the 
community even before the revolution, but now they can do it more openly and in 
larger scale. She too sees a big change after the revolution in the conditions for 
political participation, and not only for women: "(after the revolution) all of us can 
participate politically, every Egyptian citizen can say his opinion now". The informant 
sees the high number of women who participated in the last parliamentary elections as 
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a sign that women are using this opportunity, and the victory of independent 
candidates as a sign that women's participation is politically potent.
 Informant G also talks about how the youth raised the issue of women in 
leadership positions after the revolution, when they found that the justification of these 
roles being unsafe for women was no longer valid. Thus the revolution was the action 
or event that changed the conditions for thinking about women's role. She also talks 
about the lingering effects of a repressive, unsafe environment on the thinking of the 
organizations. "The leaders are too old, they have the old mind, they can't read our 
reality of our lives now. They can't believe that it's okay, it's secure", she says.
Informant H talks about how the regime through political repression excluded 
the Brotherhood from communicating through media and threatened men with 
imprisonment for their activism in the 2010 elections, and how this indirectly gave 
more importance to women's activism. Because of these difficult conditions, the 
Brotherhood made a decision to "prepare women to be a symbol and be among people 
everywhere", give women political training and let them talk to people directly at the 
grass root level. Informant H emphasizes the non-violent forms of repression that the 
former regime used against the Brotherhood, also when they tried to represent women, 
notably rigging elections. She feels that the regime rigged elections against Islamist 
women because "they tried to send a message to the West that Islamists are against 
women in politics, and if they let women succeed that image would disappear".
Informant I describes the previous political conditions under Mubarak as 
repressive for everyone, and the Brotherhood especially: "We didn't feel that we own 
Egypt. We were underground, we didn't feel like we could do things equally". 
Informant J contends that while women were not participating politically in large 
numbers before the revolution, they had a large role to play in the organization off the 
political radar. "Our role was bigger than that of the men before the revolution, 
because of the violence that was directed at the men and women of the Muslim 
Brotherhood before the revolution".
 Informant J recounts how she participated in political training with other 
women in the Brotherhood since 2000, the first year the Brotherhood fielded a woman 
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candidate for parliamentary elections. The informant believes that in 2005 one woman 
from the Brotherhood won a seat but was cheated of her victory by rigged elections. 
This repeated itself in 2010, when the Brotherhood made a strong showing of 
representing women. "In 2010 we saw the result of all the political work. There were 
13 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the (women's) quota in 2010. And also (this 
election was) faulted by the regime, they didn't win. And two of us lost their husbands 
in detention because of that", she says. Informant J was one of these two who had her 
husband detained in 2010 because of her political participation, some of her assets 
seized by the regime and her son's career threatened. "When he asked them why they 
are doing this, they answered him, We detained your father and we are going to tear up 
your project so next time when your mother takes a decision to enter elections again, 
you will be stopping her". In 2011 she won a seat in the People's Assembly.
Summarizing the relationships between the key concepts of the category:
Many of the informants have been personally exposed to the political repression which 
Mubarak's regime used against the Islamists, both through rigged elections and attacks 
against political candidates or activists. This threat restricted the roles women were 
encouraged or allowed to take before the revolution; however many of the women did 
participate in high-risk political activism despite this insecurity. While women were 
officially not participating in politics, they also constituted a “secret force”. They 
could keep the movement operating when the men were in prison or mobilize support 
on the ground when men risked detention, because they were flying below the political 
radar. But although the regime observed the cultural gender norms to some degree and 
treated female activists different from men, they did resort to repressive means against 
women when their activism was politically potent. The women emphasize the past 
regime's power abuse as the obstacle to women's political participation and democratic 
rights being respected. The duality of this struggle between the Brotherhood and the 
regime became the dominant narrative which justified women's roles. Now that the 
security threat is gone, women have begun to raise the issue for reconsideration and 
demand greater representation.
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7.3.4 Ideology and gender roles
My informants find guidance and inspiration for gender roles and equality in the 
values of Islam, which they believe should be the guiding principles in all areas of life. 
However, they interpret this ideology differently.
Informant A suggests that gender equality can be found by the act of 
reinterpretation of Islam which reveals the real Islamic meaning of gender equality. To 
her, this produces gender equality in political participation but also complimentary 
gender roles. She uses biological differences as a reason to claim that a man, for 
example, would make a better president than an equally qualified woman. However, 
she maintains that she believes a woman could be “a leader like a president”.
Informant B sees the women who participated in elections from the Freedom 
and Justice Party as proof that gender equality is part of Brotherhood ideology. She 
also emphasizes that the revolution changed a lot of ideas about women's political 
participation.
Informant C contends that Islam is the way of life, and a guide to everything. 
She believes these principles should be implemented through an Islamic state and that 
it is therefore necessary for Islamists to contest political power so the people can 
choose Islamism. She has a religious degree and uses many examples from Quran and 
sunna to show that Islam has a legacy of empowering women, giving women the right 
to raise women's issues, educate themselves and participate alongside men even in 
wars. She claims that women have equal rights but complimentary roles which have 
equal value. Women have gender-specific duties to her family, which is valued as a 
seed for society. In this interpretation, gender equal rights means that women should 
have the right to perform her gender-specific duties in balance with her participation 
in society.
Informant D agrees with this perspective on rights and roles. She also 
describes the ideological goal of the Muslim Brotherhood as spreading the correct 
interpretation of Islam in Egypt. She sees political activism as a necessary action or 
means by which this goal can be achieved, and by this interpretation finds justification 
in her ideology for political participation. She believes a good Muslim should see that 
there is a need in society for women's activism and encourage his wife to activism, and 
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she believes women in the Muslim Brotherhood are more active than other women 
because many of the members share this attitude.
Informant E believes that the gender ideas in the Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology is distorted by conforming to cultural values of the society. She believes that 
even women believe in distorted gender roles, which is why few of them claim 
leadership roles. She claims that Islam gave women more rights than the Muslim 
Brotherhood does. She discusses various interpretations of Islam regarding women's 
right to be president, and gives her support to the interpretation that allows women to 
lead a civil state.
Informant F also states her commitment to Islam as a way of life guiding all 
her actions and relationships. She believes that Islam gives men and women different 
roles, but argues that the Muslim Brotherhood's interpretation is more empowering for 
women than other Islamic groups. The informant believes this interpretation seeks to 
restore women's role in the community as it was in the time of the Prophet, when 
women had a role in all aspects of life.
Informant G argues that the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood do not 
genuinely mean it when they claim that the genders are equal and complimentary, 
because they put more faith in men's capabilities. She, however, believes that women 
are men are equal in rights and duties and compliment each other in their abilities. 
One of the duties she ascribes to both genders is the duty to make society better. She 
argues that women must claim their right to fulfill this duty, in other words to 
participate in society in order to make it better. Thus she too finds support in her 
interpretation of Islam for claiming participation in the public sphere.
Informant H echoes this, as she describes how she feels that her ideology 
empowers her and gives her greater influence in her society and community because it 
pushes her to work faithfully. She feels that a moderate interpretation of Islam 
encourages women's activism and frames active participation as a religious duty.
Informant I also believes that when Islam came it gave women more 
progressive roles in the society. She argues that the needs, roles and responsibilities of 
the genders are different and that complete gender equality is not required in Islam. 
She claims that the most important value in Islam is justice, not equality.
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Informant J also contends that women and men are equal in Islam, as “women 
are the sisters of men”. She echoes the perspective that Islam as a way of life which, as 
people  aspire  to  be  as  equal  as  possible  to  the  example  of  the  Prophet  and  his 
companions,  inspires activism.  According to this informant, woman are as important 
as men in Islam and should be equal to them in the community, but the Arab tradition 
give women lesser roles than Islam does.
Summarizing the relationships between the key concepts of the category:
Given the diversity of opinions regarding women's roles in the Brotherhood today, the 
women have  surprisingly  similar  ideas  about  gender  roles  and  gender  equality  in 
Islam.  They  contend  that  women  and  men  have  equal  rights,  but  different  or 
complimentary  roles.  Some  emphasize  biological  differences  and  women's  family 
obligations more than others. They all agree that the rights and roles of women in 
Islam are empowering, but a few feel that the Muslim Brotherhood's interpretations of 
these are not equally empowering because they conform to a conservative society.
7.3.5 Summarizing the findings
Now that I have discussed how the various concepts in the material relate to major 
categories debated in the interviews, it is time to see how these categories relate to 
each other.
The women I interviewed contend that a repressive regime willing to resort to 
violence and illegal action has been the main constraint on women's political 
participation. This excluding relationship is enhanced by the Brotherhood's policy that 
women should be protected, which the women have nevertheless experienced as 
legitimate. However, it appears that women's roles in the new, more secure 
environment after the revolution are subject to debate and reconsideration as there is 
much variety in opinions regarding this. 
Surprisingly, political repression and security threats have not kept women from 
joining the Brotherhood (although it has kept them from advancing to leadership 
positions) nor even from engaging in high-risk political activities. On the contrary, the 
material gives many examples of how women have joined under conditions of 
repression or harassment, engaged in political activities despite being aware of the 
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high risks and even personally exposed to harassment and repression. 
The women are surprisingly similar in their interpretation of gender roles and 
rights in Islam and maintain that they empower women. From the perspective of these 
women, it is insecurity and not the ideology of the Brotherhood that has limited their 
participation in the past. To the contrary, this ideology and experiences of women's 
activism in the Brotherhood seem the primary factors which have motivated their 
entrance into politics, even in the face of political oppression from the former regime. 
Notably, the young women I interviewed who had left the Brotherhood had done so 
over disagreements over strategy and lack of reform, not ideological disputes.
In short, the women I have interviewed understand the increase of women's 
political participation within the Muslim Brotherhood as a natural expansion of their 
roles as activists. Their sense of religious duty and identity is a strong motivational 
force for my informants to go out of the home and try to change their society for the 
better. They see politics as a means to achieve this goal, thus they find support for 
political activism in their interpretation of the “real Islam”. In addition, they emphasize 
that the revolution has facilitated women's political participation by removing the 
repressive former regime and the security threat previously connected to political 
participation.
91
8 Analysis
Why do Islamist women increasingly participate in politics in Egypt? In chapter 4 I 
have identified the main institutions and actor to gather observations about in order to 
explain this puzzle. Here I will discuss them according to the framework of assessing 
democratization as presented in chapter 4, and informed by extensive use of secondary 
sources as well as the findings from the qualitative interviews presented in chapter 7. 
Then, I will compare which of the three theoretical perspectives on democratization 
presented in chapter 4 best explain this puzzle, and what may be left unexplained.
8.1 First dimension: Strength of democratic institutions
As detailed in my earlier discussion on the theoretical framework for my assessment, I 
have identified five “clusters” of democratic rules and regulations that are especially 
important to realizing women's right to political participation in Egypt. Here I will 
briefly discuss the existence, substance and spread of these institutions in Egypt, as 
they relate to Islamist women's political participation.
8.1.1 Full universal human rights to ensure that all can “function as 
politically equal human beings.”
According to the UN convention on human rights, a person should not be 
discriminated against on the basis of her sex. The Egyptian constitution guarantees all 
citizens equal rights, but the Egyptian legislative framework still institutionalizes 
considerable inequalities between women and men, especially under personal status 
law (also known as family law)5. Three general observations can be made in this 
regard. 
Firstly, the consequences of a discriminatory family law extend well beyond the 
family. Egypt's gendered personal status laws (regulating marriage, divorce, child 
custody, nationality etc.) discriminate between women and men as well as between 
Muslims and Egyptians of other faiths (SIGI 2011). The Muslim family law 
5 Other unequal laws include gendered inheritance laws, restrictions on women's freedom of movement, and 
laws prohibiting women from taking certain kinds of jobs considered harmful to them (SIGI 2011)
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institutionalizes patriarchy in family and the family as the basic component of 
Egyptian society. Women's dependence on men is thus institutionalized as their rights 
are defined in relation to their husband and gender inequality is institutionalized by 
these gendered definitions of rights pertaining to either women or men. This has wide 
implications for women's economic, social and political rights. 
Secondly, women as well as men have had their human rights and civil liberties 
compromised by Egypt's authoritarian regimes, especially their political rights and 
related liberties such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and 
association (SIGI 2011). And finally, many rights are not recognized by the law (for 
example, women's right to protection from spousal rape) and laws on paper are often 
not realized (for example, female genital mutilation is illegal but widespread) (Ibid). 
This could be due to lack of implementation or because people don't have the capacity 
to exercise their rights. Women as a group are disproportionally affected by this. 
All these factors collude against women's political participation. For example, 
women are underrepresented in formal labor and in 2007 the ratio of estimated female 
to male income was 27% in Egypt (Save the Children 2011). Only 24% of Egyptian 
women participate in the formal labour force, compared to 79% of the men (World 
Economic Forum 2011: 42). This means that the economic capacity of women as a 
group to participate as candidates in political elections is highly unequal to that of 
men, as the candidates need to spend huge sums on campaigns in order to win office. 
The underrepresentation of women in paid labor is institutionalized by personal status 
laws that stipulate the man as the provider of the family, granting the husband control 
of his wife's income and power to deny her the right to work. Mulki Al Sharmani 
argues that because of these gendered laws, women who seek paid labor out of 
necessity may actually experience this as disempowering, because their interests and 
needs are not recognized by the Egyptian legal model of marriage (Al Sharmani 2011: 
8). Al Sharmani has studied the process and outcomes of family law reforms in Egypt. 
She concludes with the following:
“First, the lack of gender justice in family laws (both the theory and 
practice) is constitutive of multiple barriers which diminish women’s right 
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to full and equal citizenship rights on the one hand, and hinder their ability 
to claim these rights on the other hand. These barriers in turn re-enforce 
gender injustice in the family domain, perpetuating a vicious circle” (Al 
Sharmani 2011: 10).
8.1.2 “Democratic political representation in central and local 
government through parties and elections.”
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups (such as breakaway reformists 
from the Brotherhood) have long been prevented from forming political parties by the 
Mubarak regime's repressive control of the institutions by which parties may be 
legalized. This is a good example of how the authoritarian regime abused the law 
rather than ruled by it. After the revolution and the overthrow of Mubarak's regime, it 
was made possible for any group to form a party according the 2011 interim 
constitution proposed by SCAF and adopted by popular referendum. Article 4 of the 
Egyptian constitution now reads:
“Article 4: Citizens have the right to form associations, unions, syndicates, 
and parties, according to the law.  It is forbidden to form associations whose 
activities are opposed to the order of society or secret or militaristic in 
nature.  It is not permitted to directly engage in political activity or form 
political parties on the basis of religion, race or origin” (SCAF 
Constitutional Declaration nd).
The regulation about political parties based on religion proved no hindrance for 
the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist groups, who quickly formed parties in 
the spring of 2011. Because membership in these parties was not based on 
religion (the Muslim Brotherhood even alleges to have recruited 100 Copts as co-
founders of their Freedom and Justice Party), they were licensed.
Women received the right to vote in Egypt in 1956, but their representation in 
politics has remained low both at the local and the national level. In 2010, they held 
2% of the seats in parliament (amounting to 65 seats, 64 of which were reserved for 
women by a quota) and 9% of ministerial positions (Gender Gap Index 2011: 164). 
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Women hold only 11% of leadership positions in Egypt as operationalized in the 
Gender Gap Index as legislators, senior officials and managers (Ibid).  According to 
the country profile on Egypt put together by the OECD for the Social Institutions and 
Gender Index, the lack of women in public leadership positions reflects a distrust in 
the idea of women leaders that prevails in the Egyptian society and which also limits 
social support for their political representation (SIGI 2011). If the general society is 
not used to or supportive of women's leadership and participation in decision-making, 
can this be compensated for by empowering party policies, election regulations and 
other rules and regulations concerning democratic political representation in Egypt?
A women's quota was introduced in the Egyptian parliament in 2009 by adding 
on and reserving 64 seats for women in the lower house of parliament, the People's 
Assembly, which already consisted of 454 seats. The quota was a result of activism by 
women's rights organizations, including the government-affiliated National Women's 
Council. The Council's leading figure First Lady Suzanne Mubarak praised it as an 
opportunity for women to prove their qualifications in parliament (Tadros 2010: 89). 
From its introduction, the quota was criticized by female politicians of the opposition 
such as Gameela Ismail of the liberal el Ghad party, who argued that the quota was 
likely to only empower affluent women able to climb within the existing power 
hierarchies and as such be counterproductive to women's rights (Ibid).  
After president Mubarak was forced to step down in the 2011 revolution, the 
women's quota in parliament was scrapped when electoral laws were rewritten by the 
SCAF. The new laws instead required that all party lists for the People's Assembly 
include at least one woman (Carnegie Endowment A, nd). The election results proved 
that these new regulations on elections were weak as measures to ensure women's 
representation: only 9 women were elected (and three appointed by the SCAF) out of a 
total of 498 members of the People's Assembly. Four of the elected women represent 
the Freedom and Justice Party and five were elected by liberal parties (Al Wafd, the 
Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Reform and Development Party). Two 
thirds of the seats in parliament were filled by popular representation while one third 
of the seats in were reserved for independent candidates elected on a first-past-the-post 
principle. No women were elected to the People's Assembly as independent 
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candidates.
 Judging from these election results, women’s political representation has been 
weakened after the revolution with the scrapping of the women’s quota, at least in 
terms of numbers and descriptive representation. There are clearly less female 
representatives “standing for” Egypt’s women in parliament today than there was in 
2010. However, in 2010 the women who were elected to parliament were not seen as 
providing substantial representation by “acting for” Egypt’s women. Their legitimacy 
was very low in the eyes of the population and politicians were perceived as primarily 
serving their own narrow interests with little accountability to the people. At least the 
nine women who were elected to the People’s Assembly in 2011/2012 represent a 
potential for substantial representation which women in Egypt have never experienced 
before, now that they have been elected through free and fair elections and carry the 
legitimacy of the people’s will.
Why did women fare so badly in the elections? Were they actually electable? It 
is not surprising that women did badly as independent candidates. With less economic 
resources, women are easily outdone by candidates who can spend more on 
advertising and campaign staff. Women suffered from this especially as the laws 
regulating the campaign spending of the candidates were not enforced, according to 
the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (2012). In order to succeed in elections, 
women are therefore more reliant than men on the backing of a political party. As 
mentioned, Egypt's post-revolution electoral legislation required that each party list 
include at least one woman, but it did not ensure that they would be in electable 
positions on these lists. The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights has monitored the 
elections for the People’s Assembly and compared the number of female candidates on 
the top, middle and bottom of the electoral lists for 35 parties that participated (Ibid). 
Their figures show that the conservative Salafi Nour party was one out of nine parties 
that listed no women in the top of its list; it was also one of five parties that listed none 
in the middle (Ibid). All its 22 female candidates were listed at the bottom (Ibid). The 
Freedom and Justice Party listed seven of its women in the top of its lists and as such 
was matched or outdone by only five other parties. However they too put most of their 
women in the bottom, where 18 of their candidates were found, and 6 in the middle 
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(Ibid). The Egyptian Bloc (the main liberal alliance in the elections) and The 
Conservative had the highest number of women in the top of their lists; 10 each (Ibid). 
All four parties that managed to have their female candidates elected had six 
women or more in the top of their lists. However, the seven parties other than the 
Freedom and Justice Party who ran six or more women in the top only won 19,8% or 
99 of the seats in the People’s Assembly, roughly half of the seats won by the Freedom 
and Justice Party. Therefore their high positioning of female candidates still did not 
bring more than five women into parliament. This emphasizes that for women to be 
represented, they must be given a real chance of being elected (high on the lists) and 
the political parties they represent must have capacity to win the seats they contest.
8.1.3 Supplementary democratic channels for interest- and issue-
based democracy.
Who promotes women’s interests in Egypt, and how are these interests channeled into 
the political decision-making process? We have seen from previous research that the 
popular strategies of promoting women’s rights in Egypt are either through secular 
feminism or through the gender agenda of the Islamist movements.
As has been noted in the theory discussion, civil society organizations are the 
realm of the middle classes, and this is also true in Egypt. The Mubarak regime also 
put considerable efforts into controlling these organizations through laws and 
regulations, effectively banning the organizations that were deemed too radical, 
including some feminist organizations. Still, feminist organizations in Egypt have 
devoted considerable time and effort to promoting women's rights in a hostile, 
repressive political environment and managed to achieve small victories, but they have 
failed to produce a popular movement for women's rights. In my literature review I 
found much criticism of how the secular women's rights organizations in Egypt have 
engaged in compromises with the government both in terms of discourse and in terms 
of demands. Furthermore, Sholkamy has noted their incapacity to deliver 
empowerment as long as they are unable to reshape the larger structures which 
disempower women. 
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The way women's interests have been incorporated into the state through 
primarily the governmental organization of the National Women's Council, headed by 
the former First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, has served to “feminize authoritarianism” 
more than it has served to empower women. Suzanne Mubarak and her likes were 
unable to produce substantial representation and “act for” women, due to a lack of 
legitimacy with the people, or even descriptive representation by “standing for” 
women, as women did not identify with such a hated figure. Instead she became a 
disliked symbolic representative of women, resembling an unwanted monarch. This 
incorporation of women's interests has also served to delegitimize the feminist 
organizations who formed uncomfortable alliances with the regime to have their 
demands heard and claims for increased rights granted through compromises with the 
regime. The Islamists have not been invited into these processes controlled by the 
regime, but Islamic activism has had a strong, indirect impact by reshaping the values 
of the society at the local level to be more Islamic. Thus it has been able to force the 
regime to adopt more conservative politics or introduce only limited reforms about 
women’s rights in line with Islamic values, while being excluded from democratic 
channels.
8.1.4 Democratic control of instruments of coercion.
Democratic control of the police and state security forces has been absent under 
Mubarak; indeed they have been an arm of his regime. Under the continued use of 
emergency law since 1981, the Egyptian regime under Mubarak has given itself 
extensive room to violate the civil liberties of its citizens. It has used this ability to 
detain citizens without court order, try them before military courts which grant few 
rights to the defendant instead of before civilian courts, and effectively keep political 
prisoners. This abuse of emergency law has especially been directed towards the 
Islamists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, as shown in the brief account of its 
contentious relationship with the Egyptian state in chapter 7. Women have generally 
been excluded from high-risk political activism, but also women have been detained 
and imprisoned, among them the iconic “godmother” of women’s Islamic activism, 
Zainab al-Ghazali.
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The informants I have interviewed give considerable insight into how women 
experience the threat posed by state security forces acting on behalf of the repressive 
regime. To them, this is the major factor which has kept women from participating in 
politics, especially in highly visible roles as candidates for elections. As emphasized 
by Heba Raouf Ezzat (2007), insecurity is a political constraint which especially 
affects women's participation in the Arab world. Ezzat points to the futility of political 
awareness raising or programs to develop women's political skills as long as political 
participation is associated with violence, harassment, physical and psychological 
threats and a negative image of corrupt politicians (Ibid: 188). When Islamist women 
in Egypt have still entered into political activism and indeed political representation, it 
is in defiance of this insecurity. It is interesting that their participation was on the 
increase even before the revolution “cleaned up” the formal party politics by removing 
Mubarak, the National Democratic Party and abuse of the state’s instruments of 
coercion for violent and repressive means towards political competition in elections 
and formal politics.
Although the revolution toppled Mubarak, it did not immediately transfer power 
over the state into the hands of the people in a democratic process, and therefore it also 
failed to put the state’s instruments of coercion under democratic control. Alarmingly, 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces currently ruling Egypt has not yet lifted the 
emergency law at the time of writing, 15 months after the revolution succeeded in 
overthrowing Mubarak. They claim that it should remain in place until a new president 
is elected and power is turned back into civilian hands. Meanwhile, the SCAF 
continues to use the state security forces in similar ways to the Mubarak regime, 
especially in confrontation with “informal” political contention in street 
demonstrations and protests. Thousands of civilians have been detained from these 
protests and tried before military courts only since the revolution began, and this 
practice continues to this day. Last year several female protesters were detained by the 
armed forces and subjected to forced “virginity checks”, which human rights 
organizations described as sexualized torture. It created a national outcry and 
highlighted how the military regime is able to violate the human rights of its citizens in 
lack of democratic control over the state and its coercive powers.
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8.1.5 Guaranteeing citizens' democratic self-organizing on the basis 
of their right to free organization, and as training grounds for 
democracy.
The Mubarak regime violated citizens' right to democratic self-organizing blatantly by 
political repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups, justified 
by a discourse that described Islamic fundamentalism as a security threat and the 
Muslim Brotherhood as an actor seeking to overtake the state. Has women's rights 
been served by the regime oppressing the opposition indiscriminately in the name of 
containing Islamism? Not if women’s rights are understood in terms of equal rights to 
political participation, as in this thesis. Again, this democratic institution has been 
missing while Islamist women’s participation has been on the rise.
Political parties were underdeveloped under the authoritarian regime, and equal 
representation was not a priority for the dominant actors, especially not gender equal 
representation. Mubarak's now-abolished National Democratic Party was described as 
an artificial structure that let people reach power to access resources, and many of its 
MPs (Members of Parliament) were businessmen. Women in the NDP often climbed to 
political positions through family ties, especially when their husbands were successful 
businessmen and thus important economic contributors to the party. Real opposition 
forces, notably from the popular Islamist movement, were not allowed to form parties, 
subjected to threats and harassment in formal politics when they ran candidates in 
elections for parliament or unions, and little tolerated in the street. Mubarak even 
undermined the democratic structure of his own party as he sought to consolidate 
power around his own person and office.
Despite the lack of institutional support for free organizations, both previous 
research and the informants in this thesis point to women’s growing roles in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s activism as the main reason why its women are also entering 
politics. This suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization has been a 
catalyst for women’s political participation without the support of democratic rules and 
regulations guaranteeing rights to free organization. Some informants feel that the 
previous regime used election rigging to exclude Islamist women specifically from 
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political participation because their presence in politics would contribute to moderate 
the Brotherhood’s image. Women’s presence would then undermine the discourse with 
which the regime repressed political opposition, in order to “protect” the country (and 
Egyptian women) from Islamic fundamentalism.
8.1.6 Summary
The lack of full universal human rights limit women's political participation in Egypt. 
Although the Egyptian constitution grants all citizens equal rights, women are not able 
to exercise them. Factors such as legal discrimination, institutionalized patriarchy and 
lack of economic participation collude to undermine women's capacity to exercise 
their political rights. This again diminishes their capacity to claim full and equal 
citizenship.
Women's political representation in Egypt has been consistently low, and the 
measures introduced by the Mubarak regime to improve their numbers in politics can 
best be understood as “feminizing authoritarianism”. Democratic political 
representation has been underdeveloped and the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
subjected to violent political oppression as the Mubarak regime has abused the state's 
means of coercion. As shown in the findings from my fieldwork, the Islamist women 
themselves emphasize this as the main factor which has restricted their political 
participation.
After the revolution, democratic political representation has become safer and 
more accessible. However, election results show that women need the committed 
backing of a political party to be elected. The Muslim Brotherhood has been among 
the more progressive parties in terms of running women in electable positions on their 
electoral lists, and therefore succeeded in electing four women to the People's 
Assembly.
8.2 Second dimension: Democratic adherence of major  
actors
Are the main actors that influence women’s political rights in Egypt adhering to 
democratic rules and regulations? Are they accepting and in their actions promoting 
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the principle of women's right to political participation, or are they either consuming 
or destroying the institutions that encourage women’s participation?
As is already obvious from the previous section, the past authoritarian regime 
produced few rules and regulations benefiting women’s political rights and abused or 
destroyed many. 30 years of Mubarak’s rule has left essential democratic institutions 
undermined and underdeveloped. By ruling under emergency law, Mubarak put 
himself and his regime above the law which protects the rights and liberties of citizens. 
He abused party politics and elections to sustain his own power and kept the state’s 
instruments of coercion out of democratic control in order to oppress his political 
opposition by them. He did not allow his citizens freedoms essential to developing a 
democratic culture such as freedom of organization, and his policies increased 
inequalities in the Egyptian society. In sum, Mubarak did not adhere to or contribute to 
these democratic rules and regulations studied here in any considerable way.
One effort which Mubarak seemingly made at improving women’s political 
representation deserves closer attention; the introduction of the women’s quote in 
parliament in 2010. Was this a genuine attempt at producing increased democratic 
rights by the former regime? In an article examining the potential of the Egyptian 
women's quota such as it was introduced, Madriz Tadros questions whether it was 
adopted to make politics more inclusive and democratic, or to give authoritarianism in 
Egypt a more “female face” (Tadros 2010: 90). Indeed, the top-down process by which 
it was introduced lends credit to the first suggestion.
What then about the Muslim Brotherhood, are they adhering to democratic rules 
and regulations? As described briefly in chapter 7, the Brotherhood has officially 
committed to democratic party politics several decades ago, yet they are still 
mistrusted. As mentioned in chapter 7, this is because the Brotherhood is perceived as 
incoherent and vague in its differentiation of state and religious authority. While the 
organization supports the rule of law and human rights, it also supports contradicting 
principles such as equal citizenship combined with differentiated rights for men and 
women or Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt.
The Brotherhood has chosen peaceful political contention as the means by 
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which it seeks to pursue its goals, and has become a strong supporter of pluralist 
electoral politics in Egypt. As such it has shown commitment to several of the 
institutions that benefit women’s political participation, especially democratic political 
representation and the related right to self-organizing. After the revolution, however, 
the Brotherhood has been accused of pushing for early elections after Mubarak's fall 
for their own gain, rather than waiting for other parties to organize their forces and 
mobilize support. 
The matter is complicated further by the realization that it is difficult to speak of 
one ideology for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood experiences and allows 
for internal debate, engaging a multitude of Islamic interpretations and opinions that 
range from conservative Salafi-influenced thinking to liberal Islamists who embrace 
universal human rights. The field study I conducted for this thesis revealed a multitude 
of opinions about women’s roles in the organization and in politics even in a small 
sample of mostly liberal women. Individual members may disagree with official 
movement ideology and policy. However the final decisions of the leaders are 
sometimes enforced with measures as drastic as expulsion, as happened to former 
Muslim Brother Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotoh who decided to run for presidency in 
violation of Brotherhood policy in 20116.
Ashraf El Sherif, teaching specialist on political Islam at the American 
University in Cairo, has examined how the post-revolution behavior and discourse of 
the Muslim Brotherhood has failed to internalize criticism voiced by revolution-
empowered reformists of the Brotherhood. This may be a warning sign in terms of 
Brotherhood strategy and the acceptance of and dedication to women's rights, as 
women's lack of representation inside the Brotherhood has been one of the contested 
issues. Already it has resulted in the up-spring of new break-away Islamist groups and 
parties such as the Egyptian Current Party (al-Tayar al-Masry), which is the largest 
and favored by the youth, as well as al-Nahda and al-Reyada which are smaller groups 
led by older reformists (El-Sherif January 12 2012). Among my informants, several of 
the young women had left the Brotherhood in favor of the Egyptian Current Party over 
this issue, as their considered the breakaway group to be more committed to 
6 In 2011 the Brotherhood had announced they would not field a Muslim Brother as candidate for the 
presidential elections, to show their commitment to political plurality, and denied all their members to run.
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empowering youth and women.
These reformists Islamists have been visible in the political debate in Egypt 
since 2004 as critics of the authoritarian nature of the Brotherhood's guidance bureau 
(Ibid). Their demands included “greater freedom of debate and accountability within 
the movement, greater participation for women and the young, and a set of transparent 
guidelines to decision-making”, and they advocated “more creative approaches to 
Islamic texts” and “the necessity of justifying the values of democracy and citizenship 
in Islamic terms” (Ibid). “Crucially, they advocate far-reaching doctrinal and 
organizational restructuring that would separate the party's networks of political 
participation from its mission of proselytization” (Ibid). El Sherif argues that the 
Brotherhood leadership refused to internalize these criticisms and calls for reforms in 
fear that it would alienate the more conservative constituency and drive these towards 
Salafi movements with which the Brotherhood competes for support (Ibid). This may 
be interpreted to suggest that the Brotherhood was not ready to risk its electoral base 
among conservative voters in order to fulfill women's rights. 
However, it may also strengthen women’s rights that Islamists are forming new 
groups based on greater emphasis on equality and political rights that can nuance the 
Islamic debate and potentially influence the Brotherhood to more liberal policies. 
Although the break-away groups failed to secure a single seat in the parliamentary 
elections, El Sherif argues that “Egypt's New Islamists” are still to be taken notice of:
“Though not yet apparent on the ballot, they have tapped into a generation 
of Islamist activists and young middle class professionals whose aspirations 
for socio-economic development is not fulfilled by the FJP’s discourses, 
and they are in the process of reshaping a new Islamist discourse on good 
governance, democracy, and development. In doing so, the Reformists are 
undermining the polarization between Islamists and secularists that long 
inhibited the development of policy-oriented (rather than identity-based) 
party politics” (El Sherif January 12 2012).
Indeed the Brotherhood has made promises to also reform the roles of women inside 
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the organization and allow for their internal representation, but has not made it a 
priority. Many of the informants I interviewed did believe that it is only a matter of 
time before they are represented in the decision-making bodies of the Brotherhood 
now that the security threat posed by political oppression is gone. In the meantime, 
perhaps the Freedom and Justice Party represents a window of opportunity for 
women’s participation and representation, especially if the party will gain more 
independence from the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in the future.
A recurring question in this thesis has been whether the Islamic empowerment 
of women is seriously challenged by a secular feminist alternative. The arguments of 
Hania Sholkamy presented in the review of previous research suggest that women's 
rights organizations have contributed somewhat to women’s political participation by 
giving them training and organizational experience, but with an elite bias. Otherwise, 
they have failed to produce more democratic rights for women because they have 
failed to transform the structures of Arab societies that limit women’s universal human 
rights and their democratic political participation. Sholkamy argues that women of 
lower socio-economic classes especially have been left on their own (Sholkamy 2010). 
Moreover, as Aliaa Dawoud has shown, the women's rights organizations that continue 
to address women's rights in Egypt do so with a discourse that has abandoned the 
terminology of women's rights and instead replaced it with de-gendered and 
paternalistic discourses (Dawoud 2011). 
The organizations still aim to promote gender equality and women's equal 
rights, but the strategies and arguments they employ as their means potentially distort 
their ability to reach these long-term goals. Empowering women and promoting 
women's rights in a patriarchal discourse where the benefits (security, protection, 
peace, economic benefits) are used as motivations/arguments have short-term gains. In 
the long run, however, they may undermine the aim of democracy because important 
principles such as equality between the citizens are put aside. Heba Raouf Ezzat, 
writing on the future of women and politics in the Arab world, argues that many 
feminists across the Arab world have been co-opted by the authoritarian regime to 
achieve change by means that actually undermine democratic demands, thus 
contributing to a “feminization of authoritarianism” (Ezzat 2007: 186). “It is a strategy 
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abused by regimes to improve their image and at the same time delay the wider 
democratic transition” argues Ezzat (Ibid). The logic behind her argument is simple; 
women cannot be politically empowered by the same policies that empower an 
autocratic state. The two goals are mutually exclusive. The lingering effects of the 
undemocratic means by which women’s universal rights and political participation has 
been promoted is that both these initiatives and their supporters are put in a bad light. 
This is what Hoda Elsadda (2011) calls the “First Lady syndrome” because in Egypt as 
well as in many other Arab countries, women's rights have been introduced from 
above as part of a state modernization project, often in the name of the wife of the 
authoritarian leader. In turn, this makes the Islamist alternative to promoting women's 
rights all the more powerful and important.
Finally, the selective democratic adherence of the currently ruling Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces deserves some remarks. Indeed, SCAF has provided 
Egypt with its first free and fair elections for both parliament and, at the time of 
writing, the presidency. These have been free of the violent political oppression of 
political opposition that marked elections under Mubarak’s rule. However, SCAF 
remains above the law, continuing to rule under emergency law, and has refused to let 
itself be controlled by the same democratic institutions it has introduced. SCAF has 
refused to turn its control of the government over to the parliament, holding on until 
the new president is elected by which time it has promised to step down. As a result, 
SCAF has been able to continue using violent means against protesters, as the 
instruments of coercion are still outside democratic control despite the election of a 
new parliament which vehemently opposes it. This continued use of emergency law 
and abuse of the state security forces has a disproportional effect on women’s political 
participation versus men’s, raising the costs of their political activism and limiting 
their space in the political sphere. SCAF has also been the main architect of a chaotic 
and confusing transition process with complicated election procedures which has 
largely excluded women from decision-making, such as in the drafting of a new 
constitution.
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8.2.1 Summary
Mubarak's regime abused, consumed or destroyed most of the democratic institutions 
which contribute to women's political participation. The Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces have restrained some of this behavior. They abuse the state's means of 
coercion only to control street politics and not electoral politics, making the latter safer 
and more accessible for women while the first remains dangerous and destructive to 
women's mass participation.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been a supporter of democratic institutions in a 
power struggle with the previous regime as well as the current military regime, at least 
in actions. Their ideology still contains contradicting principles which raise doubts 
about the democratic results they would produce should the Brotherhood come in a 
position where they shape the content of these institutions. However, with regards to 
women's political participation they have produced the largest numbers and fostered 
bottom-up empowerment of Islamist women in politics.
Women's rights organizations, by allowing themselves to be co-opted into 
compromises with the former regime and in terms of discourse, have largely failed to 
introduce legitimate institutions that encourage women's political participation. 
Reforms such as the women's quota in parliament suffer from the “First Lady 
Syndrome” and are easily dismissed in the post-revolution chaos.
8.3 Third dimension: Political capacity of the actors
What is the political capacity of the main actors on this issue? As noted in the chapter 
on theory, this has important implications for the dynamics of how democratic rights 
are developed. In this assessment I focus mainly on the actors’ capacity in terms of 
political inclusion/exclusion, transformation of capital into authority or legitimacy, and 
mobilization and organization capacities.
The Egyptian regime has for decades built much of its legitimacy on its role as 
protector of the nation from Islamic fundamentalism/extremism, while de-legitimizing 
the Islamists as political actors. Further, the state has misused its authority to define 
political inclusion as well as its coercive capital to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other Islamic actors from the political scene. In other words, the authoritarian state 
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has abused its political capacity in order to corrupt important democratic institutions 
such as citizens' right to democratic self-organizing and democratic political 
representation through parties and free and fair elections, not to mention avoided 
completely to observe the rule of democratic control of instruments of coercion. 
Ironically, this regime exclusion has led the Islamists to develop mobilization and 
organizational capacities in other arenas. In the words of Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, 
an Islamist presidential candidate and former middle-rank leader in the Brotherhood: 
"When you don't have a platform to express your political views you try to find 
another way. People had to use mosques, churches and professional syndicates as 
platforms for political expression. That was the regime's fault" (Al Jazeera 24 May 
2012).
At the same time, the political capacity of the state has diminished, much 
because of macro-economic reforms to market-oriented liberalism. Coupled with 
economic stagnation and a population boom, this has left the state unable to answer to 
the needs of its citizens, indirectly increasing the room of operation for other actors. 
By not being able to provide for its citizens, the regime has also been unable to 
mobilize popular support by ways of integrating the masses into the state. Instead it 
has ruled by clientelism, and suffered losses of legitimacy. The Islamists have 
attempted to fill the void of the receding state by offering social services, networks and 
an alternative perspective on the organization of politics and the role of the citizen 
(Wickham 2002). Contrary to the state, they have tirelessly asserted their support for 
democratic institutions such as democratic control of instruments of coercion 
(naturally, since they have suffered most from the lack of it), citizens' right to self-
organizing and increasingly also human rights in a universal language, and particularly 
the principle of democratic political representation through parties and elections, 
which they have committed to both in word and in action. However, they have had 
limited capacity to practice what they preach under aggressive exclusion and 
repression by the regime.
The Muslim Brotherhood was however the actor that suffered repression the 
best. While continuing to constantly contest the regime's power in elections and 
claiming political representation despite the risks and repercussions suffered by 
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Brotherhood members, the Brotherhood also took advantage of opportunities to 
influence and shape society at the local level which were left open by a weak and 
receding state. This included offering services to the poor where the state did not 
adequately care for its citizens, and encouraging its members to exercise da'wa. As 
such, they turned their religious capital into legitimacy by reshaping social values at 
the grass root level and challenged the religious authority of state institutions, as well 
as the political authority of the regime. This strategy is classic for the Islamist 
movements and similar to the one Janine Clark (2004) has described in Yemen. This 
dual strategy of grass root activism and political participation has proven unbeatable 
after the fall of Mubarak and most restrictions on party politics and elections. In terms 
of building trust, cooperation and legitimacy, the Muslim Brotherhood has achieved 
much of what the liberal democratization literature often ascribes to civil society. In 
addition, they have achieved the rarer feat of connecting on-the-ground work and 
demands for social justice with political participation and activism to make political 
inclusions more inclusive and based on equality. 
How has the regime been able to counter the Islamist attempt to turn religious 
capital into political authority and legitimacy? Since Sadat, the Egyptian state has tried 
to sap into religion as a source of authority and legitimacy (Wickham 2002). Sadat 
presented himself as the “believer president” and tolerated the existence of the Islamist 
movement, notably releasing Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members from prison. 
However the Islamization of society in the 70s and 80s challenged the authority of the 
state in matters of religion and established religious organizations and leaders as vital, 
competing actors. Both the state and the Islamist have struggled over authority on 
religious interpretation, and the topics over which they clash are often related to 
women, family or morality. 
However, because the regime lacks the mobilizing capacity of the Islamist 
movements, their attempts at using religion to gain authority can best be described as 
faith-based populism. Comparatively, Islamist movements have the capacity to engage 
large numbers in political work through their use of an Islamic frame, particularly 
among the urban middle- and lower-middle classes. As Wickham (2004) has 
demonstrated in her study of youth mobilization in Egypt, this is both because they 
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offer them appealing incentives (social, emotional or psychological incentives, such as 
shared community) from a rational actor perspective, and because they are able to 
frame political activism as a religious duty. As my interviews with Islamist women in 
Cairo confirmed, their political activism is motivated by the idea that it is a kind of 
religious service, a duty on those who are able to fulfill it, to pursue the aim of their 
ideology in the political field also. This explains how Islamist women's political 
activism was able to grow under authoritarian structures of insecurity also. Indeed, this 
way of integrating citizens from below in a political project is more democratic than 
the populist strategy pursued by the Egyptian state through decades.
As discussed before, the Egyptian regime as well as women's rights 
organizations failed to mobilized support for policies that may have had empowering 
potential for women, such as a political quota. The top-down construction of the 
National Council of Women and its practices is a clear example of incorporating 
support, which many women's rights organizations have accepted in lack of better 
options. Women's rights organizations are thus included at the formal level but 
excluded at the popular level; they have access to policy-making arenas, but they are 
mistrusted by the general public and cannot mobilize considerable grass root support.
8.3.1 Summary
The Muslim Brotherhood has built its political capacity by organizing at the outskirts 
of a receding state and restructuring the values of society through religious activism. 
Women have been central to these efforts of building bottom-up influence and 
legitimacy, which has also empowered them as political actors and integrated them 
into the political project of the Brotherhood as well. Comparatively, the state has only 
managed to use religion by populist incorporation and has failed to both contain the 
Islamist movements and truly empower women.
8.4 Fourth dimension: The democratization process
How does the strategy of the main actors affect the development of women's political 
participation in Egypt, and vice versa? Islamist women's political participation is still 
not influential enough to make a large impact on the political process in Egypt, 
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especially in representative politics. Because women's participation is not a prioritized 
issue by the most influential actors, it is also hard to trace the interrelationship between 
women's participation and their strategies. These are often indirect and 
uncommunicated. However, the following are some reflections on how authoritarian 
legacies and the dynamics of the democratization process may influence or explain 
Islamist women's political participation, and vice versa.
The transition process after the 2011 revolution in Egypt has been shaped 
primarily by the choices of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military 
council which stepped in to rule Egypt as Mubarak stepped down. SCAF is formally 
accountable to no one although constantly challenged by “the power of the street” in 
various demonstrations and protests, by political parties and opposition movements, 
and most recently through the parliament. Although they have engaged in some 
dialogue with opposition forces, the process which they have designed has been 
decided without any kind of democratic consultation of the people's will based on 
equal participation. Nathan J. Brown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowmen's 
Middle East program, describes Egypt's post-revolution transition process as a weakly 
designed and with so many legal and constitutional loopholes causing uncertainty and 
confusion that the term “process” is not a timely description of what is going on 
(Brown April 16 2012).
“Making things worse was the way in which critical administering, 
governing, and adjudicating bodies were (or have come to be seen) as 
deeply interested or partisan actors -- the parliament as the arm of Islamists, 
the SCAF as wedded to a set of political and material interests, the State 
Council as willing to seize any opportunity to pursue its ambitious 
understanding of its judicial role, and even the presidential election 
commission as a body headed by the constitutional court's chief justice, a 
figure seen as close to the military and security establishment” (Brown 
April 16 2012).
In simple terms, the transition process has been quite chaotic so far. Although the 
needs to rebuild important institutions by electing a new parliament and a new 
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president and rewriting the constitution have been acknowledged by all, the manner 
and order in which the SCAF has gone about it has received much criticism. Marina 
Ottoway, in a review of the transition process for the Carnegie Endowment's “Guide to 
Egypt's Transition” online project, compares it to the experience in neighboring 
Tunisia:
“Rather than addressing the chicken-and-egg problem faced in all 
transitions—that you cannot elect new institutions until there is a 
constitution, but that you cannot have a constitution without electing a body 
to discuss and approve it—Egypt decided to ignore the challenge, electing 
institutions for the long term while their powers are likely to be altered in 
the short term. By contrast, Tunisia addressed the same problem in the time-
honored way of electing a constituent assembly with a one-year mandate, to 
be replaced at the end of the period by a parliament elected under the new 
constitution” (Ottaway 2012).
This choice of sequencing has seen the election of a parliament (and, as this is 
being written, of a president) whose powers are yet undecided and most likely to 
change during the period for which they are elected. The value of a democratic 
process of democratization is that it is self-enforcing, more so than democracy 
introduced from above (or worse yet, from outside). However, SCAF has not 
allowed the transition process in Egypt to benefit from natural self-enforcement 
of democratic principles. Rather these are something that the opposition is 
continually struggling with the SCAF for. This is much because the shaping of 
democratic institutions such as the elections of a new parliament has not been 
accompanied by substantial strengthening of these institutions, such as providing 
parliament with a mandate and powers laid down in a rewritten constitution. 
SCAF suspended the Egyptian constitution when they took power after Mubarak, 
and the writing of a new one is postponed. In the meantime, SCAF rules by a 
minimalist temporary constitution which leaves much undefined, including the 
powers of parliament and the president.
Quite naturally, the transition has then been shaped also by the power 
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struggle between the competing actors, the strongest of which are the SCAF and 
the Muslim Brotherhood, but which also include Salafi groups, revolutionary 
youth groups, and others. In a transition where the most powerful set the agenda 
and democratic means are promoted by undemocratic processes, women have 
lost much of the ability to influence that they were experiencing and hoping for 
during the revolution. The is because the inclusion of women in the transition 
process has not been a priority for the most powerful and influential of the actors, 
and because excluding practices are still continued. Most notable among these is 
the continued insecurity related to informal political activities such as street 
demonstrations in opposition to the ruling regime, due to the military's violent 
means of repressing protests.
The formal politics of elections, campaigning and representation has risen 
from the revolution as a safe sphere of public participation which is available 
also to women. But few women yet have access to formal political participation, 
being underrepresented in all political parties as well as in parliament, or the 
capacity to claim such representation. Meanwhile the “street politics” of 
demonstrations, sit-ins, marches and other kinds of activism outside the chain of 
representation, which is more easily accessible for women, remains a dangerous 
line of activity. This is especially true for women, who continue to suffer 
detention, brutality, torture and sexualized violence at the hands of the SCAF-
controlled police and military, immune to democratic control and accountability. 
This challenges the ability of the masses and especially women to exercise 
“people pressure” and influence the decisions of SCAF. 
The Muslim Brotherhood has pursued a cautious, gradual strategy since 
the revolution and frustrated many of its members by its resistance to swift 
change. Some of its most reformist figures have broken away, deluding their 
influence of the reformist trend as a catalyst for change in the movements they 
left behind. One notable example is Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh who is now 
running for president against the official candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Still, there remains an active youth division within the Brotherhood that 
continues to negotiate with the leadership about strategy and democratic 
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principles, in alliance with reformists who are still loyal to the Brotherhood. Like 
the people in Egypt have the newfound ability to influence top-down political 
decision by taking to the streets in protest, so do the young and reform-minded 
members of the Brotherhood have some ability to check the compromises it is 
able to make with their ideals of democratic freedom and equality.
The institutions most important to women's political participation are still 
weak in Egypt or subject to abuse by the military regime. It would appear that it 
is the capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood to challenge authoritarian powers by 
religious activism and develop new arenas for contention that initially promoted 
its women's activism to grow and developed into political participation. Islamist 
women's political participation in the Muslim Brotherhood has been further 
promoted by the importance the organization has attached to their contributions 
in different fields, increasingly acknowledging their capacity to advance their 
goals also in the political field. As the Brotherhood struggles for power in the 
open and shifting political landscape of post-revolution Egypt, women's political 
contributions to the movement are more important than ever. With the 
elimination of the security threat towards candidates in representative politics, 
the revolution has opened up the formal political field to women's participation. 
It has also sparked a debate about women's rights and roles within the 
Brotherhood, as women are demanding decision-making roles within their own 
organization now that Mubarak's repression is no longer a threat to movement 
leaders. If the Brotherhood adopts the principle of gender equality in decision-
making within its own organization, it would be a powerful sign of commitment 
to women's equal rights, but this has yet to happen.
8.4.1 Summary
The post-revolution transition process orchestrated by the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces has been chaotic, undemocratic and largely left women out of the 
decision-making. Women are less able to contest this as street protests remain unsafe, 
while “formal” politics have become safer and more open to women's participation. 
Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood has failed to internalize demands from its youth 
and liberals to reform women's roles within the movement.
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8.5 Comparing theoretical perspectives
How do the three different theoretical perspectives explain this evidence about 
factors influencing the increase in Islamist women's political participation? 
Which perspective explains the different developments better?
The sequencing argument that an opening to mass politics should await 
certain preconditions was in practice rejected by the popular uprising which led 
to the Egyptian revolution. Indeed, Mubarak had used precisely the kind of 
arguments that Mansfield and Snyder propose about preserving order at the cost 
of popular participation in politics to legitimize his continued authoritarianism. 
The regime's message was that Egypt was not ready for democracy. The 
interview material I have gathered for this thesis gives many examples of how 
women who tried to participate in peaceful politics were met by brutal 
oppression by the Mubarak regime. The Islamist women I have interviewed view 
the regime oppression as the primary factor that restricted their participation, as 
shown in chapter 7, not as a contribution to stability and construction of liberal 
prerequisites for democracy. Indeed, as shown in the assessment of democratic 
institutions important for women's political participation, the Mubarak regime 
did little to foster these prerequisites but instead abused or destroyed them.
When Mubarak was toppled by the hundreds of thousands, perhaps 
millions of citizens participating in peaceful demonstrations against his rule, the 
sequencing argument also suffered a blow. Egypt did not descent into violence 
and chaos. Nor did it experience an Islamist take-over like Iran, despite the 
empowerment of Islamist movements in the process that followed. The 
sequencing theory can not explain how the people rose up and demanded 
democracy peacefully. Egypt did not miss its “dictatorship moment”, as Thomas 
Friedman wrote; it shook dictatorship off after three crippling decades.
By the conservative understanding of democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood is a 
threat and only playing the game of democratic politics to exploit the system. By 
extension, they are also a threat to the democratic rights of women.  This is how those 
primarily concerned with regime stability interpreted events in Iran with the Islamic 
revolution in 1979 and in Algeria, where the military intervened after Islamists won 
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the country's first multiparty elections in 1991, and civil war ensued. However the 
Islamist women I have interviewed consider the ideology they follow to be 
empowering and a force which encourages their political participation. In other words, 
it contributes to the development of equal political participation and democracy.
Despite its moderate, non-violent ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood's declared 
dedication to restoring sharia-based rule and a global Caliphate is enough for some 
democratization scholars and practitioners to eye them with mistrust as they seek to 
engage in democratic politics. This perspective justifies continued authoritarian rule in 
countries susceptible to the Islamist influence, a la Mansfield and Snyder's sequencing 
theory. As exemplified earlier with Adrian Karatnycky's Freedom House report, policy 
recommendations based on this perspective recommend increasing economic and civil 
freedoms while holding off on mass politics. Meanwhile, Mansfield and Snyder 
suggest that reforms can be implemented by moderate groups, which they certainly do 
not consider Islamists to be. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood as I have shown in chapter 7 
has managed to promote women's political participation in the face of violent 
repression from the regime. Clearly, the sequencing approach to democracy does not 
explain the rise of Islamist women's political participation.
The Muslim Brotherhood indeed emerged as the best prepared and strongest 
actor to contest political power after the revolution. However, the organization 
experienced much competition from both secular groups and other Islamists. In 
elections and as a vocal critic of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' 
undemocratic strategies, the Brotherhood demonstrated commitment to democratic 
elections and the establishment of other institutions vital to the expansion of political 
rights. By a minimalist, liberal definition of democracy this makes the Muslim 
Brotherhood a democratic actor, simply by committing to electoral politics, rule of law 
and other core institutions of minimalist democracy. The election results even showed 
some electoral victories for women representing the Freedom and Justice Party. The 
same way as some of my informants have interpreted this as a sign of the 
Brotherhood's commitment to women's participation in decision-making, so would this 
suffice to meet a transition approach definition of an actor committed to women's 
representation.
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Mubarak legitimized his violations of political freedoms in the name of 
protecting the people and the country's interests from the Islamists and other forces 
that would exploit any opening up of the political space for their own interests and 
destabilize Egypt. Although the Islamist threat has not materialized, this is exactly how 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is still legitimizing its continued 
undemocratic rule as a necessary “sequence” before the country can be run 
democratically. In its rhetoric, “Islamist” has simply been replaced by “thugs”, a word 
used to de-legitimize protestors. Among the pro-revolutionary forces, this approach to 
democratization has long since lost its legitimacy. However, they also do not trust the 
liberal approach to democratization which allows democracy to be built top-down by 
elite negotiations and structuring of democratic institutions for the many, but by the 
few. This is most obvious among the youth, also among the young women from the 
Muslim Brotherhood whom I interviewed for this thesis. They wish the free, mass-
scale political participation of the revolution to be preserved in the restructuring of a 
new political system. The findings in chapter 7 give examples of how some young 
women have even left the Brotherhood after the revolution because it failed to live up 
to their raised hopes and expectations by granting them decision-making equality 
within their own movement.
The Muslim Brotherhood leadership, however, appears to have a liberal 
transition approach to democratization, at least with regard to women's political 
rights. As shown in the assessment of strategy and dynamics earlier in this 
chapter, they seem content to focus on what they deem to be the most significant 
democratic institutions first, and leave women's rights and political participation 
to develop in response to the introduction and enforcement of these institutions. 
They also seem inclined to accept elite negotiations as a means to bring about a 
democratic system, as they have engaged in many dialogue meetings with the 
SCAF. By a transition approach to democratization, then, it would appear that the 
Brotherhood is an actor which is contributing to the transition to democracy and 
thus, somewhere down the road, to women's political participation. In this 
perspective, it does not matter as much if the Brotherhood is able to include 
women in decision-making within its own organization or otherwise integrate 
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women in its political project from below. 
Because of this narrow, formal perspective, the transition approach fails to 
explain how women's political participation in the Brotherhood has already 
grown. As I have shown in the findings from my interviews and the assessments 
earlier, it has grown in the absence of the correct institutions and as a result of the 
Brotherhood's organizational capacity to mobilize support and the important roles 
women play in this mobilization. Although the institutions of elections, which the 
transition approach puts special faith in, have been in place, elections have 
indeed been too insecure to allow for Islamist women's participation with a few 
notable examples. As suggested by the interview material, Islamist women have 
increased their participation in a bottom-up process of expanding women's roles, 
and it has happened in defiance of a repressive regime rather than as encouraged 
by democratic institutions.
The transition approach also fails to account for another development, 
which further suggests that it is an insufficient explanation of Islamist women's 
political participation. According to liberal democratization theory, a democratic 
reform such as the introduction of a quota for women in parliament by elite 
negotiations and international support should have more formative effects on the 
actors. However, in Egypt the Islamist actors rejected their introduction. 
Although they ran women as candidates for the allotted seats, this was a strategy 
made to contest regime power by all means possible and did not amount to 
support for this institution, nor substantial adaption to it. They consumed the 
quota as an institution enabling political representation but also contested its 
legitimacy and as such contributed to its destruction as soon as Mubarak's regime 
fell. Women's rights gains achieved in Egypt under authoritarian rule have been 
elite-negotiated by a regime seeking to «feminize» in order to legitimize itself, 
often in accordance with Western and international pressure, and women's rights 
organizations have let themselves be co-opted into compromises on principles of 
democracy. Such democratic institutions as the women's quota in parliament and 
improvements on gender equality in family law have been introduced by 
undemocratic means and are thus easily dismissed on account of their autocratic 
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heritage in the political turbulence following the revolution. As this assessment 
has shown, it has not been top-down measures by the previous regime that has 
empowered women in the Brotherhood to participate in politics. Indeed, in 
negotiating such institutions with much less influential and popular women's 
rights groups, the Mubarak regime excluded the actor which has the strongest 
influence on women's day-to-day-lives on the grass root level. Instead the women 
of the Brotherhood have increased their participation from the bottom up; 
proving their capacity in religious and charitable fields, and then advancing into 
politics. As recounted in chapter 7, my informants believe that candidates who do 
well in elections are those whom the public knows and trusts, and that 
Brotherhood women have earned this legitimacy with their long history of 
activism in the service of their communities.
In the perspective of Thomas Carothers and gradualism, the Muslim 
Brotherhood also has potential to be a democratizing actor in Egypt as it indeed has 
been a long-time oppositional force steadfast in its call and push for democratization 
and civil freedoms, but it is not a straightforward thing to judge. The reason is that if 
you adopt a broader definition of democracy, the answer to whether an Islamist 
movement exemplified by the Brotherhood is compatible with democracy and civil 
pluralism becomes more complex. This is especially true because the Brotherhood has 
changed its strategy and ideology over time in response to its surroundings and 
internal factors. Under Mubarak and since the revolution, however, the Brotherhood 
has stuck to its commitment to participatory politics and call for equal democratic 
freedom for all citizens.
During the revolution, women's participation was highly visible and important 
to its success, as my informants have emphasized. This raised hopes for women's 
political participation in Egypt in the future. But what happens after a revolution? How 
can mass contentious politics turn into institution formation when the movements are 
as leaderless as they appeared to be in the Egyptian revolution? A top-heavy transition 
is almost unavoidable in a situation like the Egyptian transition where the military is 
leading the process, but it has received much criticism. Indeed the pro-revolutionary 
forces in Egypt including the Brotherhood agree with Thomas Carothers that elites 
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deserve no special place in democratization, as in Egypt they are seen to threaten its 
success more than support it. This is especially true regarding women's participation, 
as we have seen that the strategy of the SCAF continues to avoid or abuse the 
institutions that should support their participation, especially the democratic control of 
instruments of coercion. The gradualism approach pays closer attention to the 
importance of contesting power in a democratization process than the transition 
approach does, and as such can better explain how women's participation is effected by 
this. Indeed, women's increased political participation in the Muslim Brotherhood is a 
sign of what Carothers called improved variety and quality of a main political actor. In 
terms of promoting women's participation, the Brotherhood has been an important 
alternative center of power which has managed to mobilize grass root support for its 
organization and by extension for its women. By empowering women in its movement 
and supporting them in elections, the Brotherhood has succeeded in a few cases of 
bridging the considerable gulf between women as citizens and the formal political 
system, which long remained a sphere for the elite regimes in Egypt.
Is something left unexplained by the three perspectives on 
democratization? None of these three theories pay special attention to the 
democratizing potential mass participation through revolutions, except for the 
sequencing approach which dismisses it as dangerous. However, it must be 
emphasized that the revolution has been the factor that has had the strongest 
impact on women's ability to exercise their right to political participation in 
Egypt today and, hopefully, in the future.
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9 Conclusion
In this thesis, I aimed to explain why Islamist women's political participation is 
increasing in Egypt by a qualitative study of women's political participation in the 
Muslim Brotherhood. I have studied this within the perspective of democratization, as 
it is a question about realizing a political right which is necessary to reach the aim of 
democracy; “popular control of pubic affairs based on political equality”. In the post-
revolution transition process Egypt now has entered, where the Muslim Brotherhood 
plays an important role as the most powerful democratically elected actor, it is a highly 
interesting puzzle to study.
I have sought to investigate this puzzle by gathering qualitative data about 
women's participation from their own perspective, and by combining this insight with 
secondary sources to assess the development of women's political participation. 
Further I have chosen to focus on a selected number of democratic institutions and 
actors to include in this assessment. As tools to explain the data about these institutions 
and actors by, I have used three theoretical perspectives about democratization; 
sequencing theory, transition theory and gradualism.
The findings in this thesis suggest that the integrating, bottom-up means by 
which the Muslim Brotherhood has contested political power in Egypt has been the 
main cause of women's increased political participation within the movement. By 
mobilizing support through grass root religious activism combined with activism 
aimed at improving social justice, and by utilizing women's activism to these aims, the 
Brotherhood has empowered women within its movement. Their entrance into political 
elections has been facilitated by the Brotherhood's wish to contest political power in 
Egypt in the strongest possible way and by the successful activism which women have 
demonstrated at the grass root level. It has happened in defiance of a repressive regime 
rather than as encouraged by democratic institutions. This can best be understood by 
the gradualism approach to democratization promoted by Thomas Carothers, as 
compared to a transition approach or a sequencing approach. 
Islamist women's political participation has not been facilitated by the 
introduction of correct democratic institutions, as transition theory would propose, or 
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an authoritarian-led politics of order, which sequencing theory prescribes. Indeed, the 
Islamist women themselves emphasize the past authoritarian regime's power abuse as 
the main obstacle to women's political participation and democratic rights being 
respected before the revolution. This threat restricted the roles women were 
encouraged or allowed to take in the Muslim Brotherhood before the revolution; 
however many of the women did participate in high-risk political activism despite this 
insecurity. Today the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces continue to abuse the 
state's means of coercion to control street politics, with destructive effects on women's 
mass participation in politics.
Rather, the findings in this study suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood's 
capacity to engage women through alternative ways and arenas of participation, and by 
constructing the Islamist movement as an alternative center of power in Egypt, has had 
an empowering effect on its women. The Muslim Brotherhood has built its political 
capacity by organizing at the outskirts of a receding state and restructuring the values 
of society through religious activism. Women have been central to these efforts of 
building bottom-up influence and legitimacy, which has also empowered them as 
political actors and integrated them into the political project of the Brotherhood as 
well. Comparatively, the state has only managed to use religion by populist 
incorporation and has failed to both contain the Islamist movements and truly 
empower women.
This thesis suggests that experiences of activism as well as interpretations of 
activism as a religious duty are factors which encourage individual Islamist women 
into political participation. The women I have interviewed understand the increase of 
women's political participation within the Muslim Brotherhood as a natural expansion 
of their roles as activists in the movement. Their sense of religious duty and identity is 
a strong motivational force to go out of the home and try to change their society for the 
better. They see politics as a means to achieve this goal, thus they find support for 
political activism in their interpretation of the “real Islam”. In addition, they emphasize 
that the revolution has facilitated women's political participation by removing the 
repressive former regime and the security threat previously connected to political 
participation.
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These findings further support the notion that through activism aimed at 
spreading Islam and creating a just Islamic society, women's roles in Islamic 
movements and the Arab world have grown beyond what the movements initially 
envisioned. Thus, women's Islamic activism seems a potent strategy to empower 
women and change their roles within their societies. As women take on these new, 
public roles they are also renegotiating their roles within the Muslim Brotherhood 
organization. Whether the Islamist movements will develop more democratic 
structures and greater gender equality internally will be an indicator of whether an 
Islamic understanding of women's roles will indeed contribute towards a democratic 
system built on political equality.
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